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Introduction to Portfolio
This portfolio contains a selection of work completed during the Doctorate of 
Psychology (PsychD) clinical training course. This volume contains the three 
dossiers: Academic, Clinical and Research. The work presented in this portfolio 
reflects the range of client groups, presenting problems and psychological 
approaches covered during the course. Within each dossier, the work is presented in 
the order in which it was completed to illustrate the development of academic, 
clinical and research skills during the period of training. Please note that all 
Identifying details have been changed or removed in this portfolio in order to 
maintain client confidentiality and anonymity.
Copyright Statement
No part of this portfolio may be reproduced in any form without written permission 
of the author, except for legitimate academic purposes.
© Jonathan Pointer, 2011
Page 5 of 233
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
The Academic Dossier consisting of two essays, two problem-based learning 
accounts and two personal and professional discussion group process account 
summaries.
Adult Mental Health Essay -  Year 1
Edition 20(5) of The Psychologist had a picture on its front cover of DSM IV 
burning. What issues might this raise for service users, psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists and you?
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Version IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), and previous versions1, have had a significant impact 
on services that work with people experiencing psychological distress (Mayes & 
Horwitz, 2005), as well as research that informs clinical interventions (Sanders & 
Wills, 2005). The DSM diagnostic system is based on the syndromal approach 
(Nathan, 1998), whereby the cluster of signs observable to the clinician and the 
symptoms reported by the patient are used to identify the syndrome. This essay 
explores what issues might be raised for service users, psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, and myself, if the use of the DSM was abandoned. In order to consider 
these issues, this essay will be arranged into six sections. The first section will 
highlight the discrepancies between the orthodox and critical position within 
psychiatry. I will consider whether psychological distress is a ‘mental illness’ with 
separate entities or whether it is something that is experienced on a continuum, and 
the implications each position has for service users. This debate concerns whether 
psychological distress should be understood in terms of illnesses caused by 
biological abnormalities (a viewpoint which I argue is embedded within the DSM) or 
whether there are valid reasons to doubt this dominant viewpoint.
1 Throughout this essay, the reader is to be aware that when I refer to the ‘DSM’ I am referring to 
version III onwards of the American Psychiatric Association’s ‘The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders’, unless I explicitly state otherwise.
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The second section explores the shorthand argument which psychiatrists have used to 
defend their use of the DSM, and my belief that the experience of labelling and being 
labelled has affected service users and myself. In the third section I discuss the 
benefits of the ‘formulation-based approach’ (Hall & Llewelyn, 2006) to 
psychological distress in comparison to psychiatrists’ use of the DSM as a diagnostic 
tool (Division of Clinical Psychology, 2000). In the fourth section I take the 
formulation-based approach into the field of understanding ‘unusual’ experiences, 
and argue that this is a more meaningful way of working with service users, rather 
than labelling them according to DSM criteria. The fifth section moves my argument 
forward again by showing how the ‘recovery approach’ (Shepherd et al., 2008) 
would benefit from the abandonment of the DSM in favour of psychologists’ 
formulation-based approach to psychological distress. The final section discusses a 
recent model by Kinderman et al. (2008) that could be used to operationalize an 
alternative to the DSM approach within mental health services, and proposes 
implications for service users, psychiatrists, psychologists, and myself.
A greater focus has been made on the issues raised by psychologists, service users 
and myself, rather than those of orthodox psychiatrists regarding the potential 
abandonment of the DSM. This is because I propose that the viewpoints of most 
psychiatrists concur with the dominant arguments which are bound up with the DSM. 
Therefore psychiatrists have little need to generate literature to defend their position, 
compared with those held by psychologists, critical psychiatrists and service users.
My own relationship with the DSM is that of ambivalence, and it was these feelings 
which drew me to this hypothetical question. These emotions are based on how the 
structure of the DSM has allowed my dyslexia to be recognized as a valid ‘problem’, 
but also how the previous structure of the DSM prior to version III pathologized my 
sexuality. The latter has left me with a possible glimpse of the damaging effects that 
the DSM has had on previous generations who identified as being gay. Their 
construction of their sense of self would have been almost inevitably caught up in
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their internalization of the DSM discourse that was attempting to legitimize 
homophobia through the ‘medicalizing’ of their experiences.
1: Psychological distress: a ‘mental illness’ with separate entities, or something 
experienced on a continuum? Implications for service users.
With regards to historical context, it is important to recognize that neither the 
original DSM-I (published in 1952) nor the DSM-II focused on specific diagnoses; 
instead a mainly psychodynamic perspective was held in which symptoms were 
understood within individuals’ personal histories as meaningful symbolic 
manifestations (Horwitz, 2002). From this perspective, ‘overt symptoms did not 
reveal disease entities but disguised underlying conflicts that could not be expressed 
directly’ (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p.250). However, these experiences were still 
pathologized (for example, homosexuality). With the introduction of DSM-III, the 
‘whole person’ approach was left behind, and instead diagnosis became central to 
psychiatric thinking. Advocates of this new approach claimed that this shift 
transformed psychiatry into ‘a model that equated visible and measurable symptoms 
with the presence of diseases’ (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p.251), and led to claims 
that real diseases were being treated.
My own position on this shift towards the medicalization of psychological distress, 
which has led me to believe that biological interventions are not always necessary to 
reduce psychological distress, is driven from my own previous experience of 
successfully overcoming ‘depression’ through mindfulness meditation. However, the 
DSM from version HI onwards assumes that psychological distress such as 
depression, bi-polar disorder, and schizophrenia, are psychiatric ‘diseases’, and are 
acknowledged by mainstream psychiatry as biological abnormalities with 
distinguishing pathologies that need to be treated with biological interventions 
(Moncrieff, 2007). Although neuro-imaging research has highlighted structural 
abnormalities that are suggested to be linked to particular diagnoses, similar 
abnormal structures have also been found in people with characterological
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‘disorders’ (Me et a l, 2005), depression (Lin et a l, as cited in Moncrieff, 2007), and 
post traumatic stress disorder (Nemeroff et ah, 2005).
Regarding the idea that chemical imbalances in the brain cause mental health 
problems, psychiatrists tend to believe that schizophrenia is caused by problems 
relating to dopamine receptors. However, Valenstein (as cited in Moncrieff, 2007) 
found that the antipsychotic medication given for this diagnosis affects dopamine 
receptors. This raises the question of whether schizophrenia is caused by 
abnormalities such as chemical imbalance, or whether these differences are caused 
by anti-psychotic medication. In a similar way, it is a moot point whether abnormal 
levels of catecholamines and serotonin cause depression, or whether antidepressant 
medication induces this chemical effect (Moncrieff and Cohen, 2007). There is no 
confirming evidence to support the position that drugs designed for specific 
diagnoses have a more therapeutic effect than non-diagnostic specific psychiatric 
medications (Moncrieff & Cohen, 2005). Instead, it may be that psychiatric drugs 
induce abnormal brain states, rather than locate and treat biological lesions. The 
induction of these abnormal brain states can be useful in the short term when it is 
beneficial for service users to have their distress reduced by medication with sedative 
effects, or for their concentration to be increased by medication with stimulant 
effects (ibid.).
However, it seems to be the case that sometimes service users’ distressing 
experiences are unfortunately replaced by the distressing side-effects of medication. 
Psychiatrists who are mainly guided by the DSM will take this biological approach. 
But these findings raise questions of whether medicine is an appropriate intervention 
for psychological distress, and if not, how the abandonment of the DSM may affect 
how psychiatrists understand and thus work with service users regarding 
‘treatments’. This shift could arguably create positive implications for service users 
because if psychiatrists no longer used the DSM or any other diagnostic system to 
label people, then there may be less stigmatization of service users. Evidence 
suggests that biological explanations for psychological for ‘mental illness’ has
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increased the public’s stigmatization of people experiencing psychological distress 
(Read, 2007).
One of the benefits of the DSM is that it has been useful within cognitive therapy in 
bringing a more systematic approach to psychological distress research (Sanders & 
Wills, 2005). However, research that uses the DSM categorization as a selection 
criteria for recruiting participants often only accepts ‘pure’ cases (i.e. less complex 
cases), and so the richness and complexity of most people’s lives that is present in 
therapy tends to be excluded from the studies on which this practice is based (ibid.). 
For example, people experiencing psychological distress often have a range of 
difficulties. From a DSM approach, this can mean that they have several co-existing 
diagnoses. The prevalence of co-morbidity has been researched through the cluster 
analysis of people with differing mental health problems, and has indicated that the 
majority have both neurotic and psychotic symptoms (Kessler et al., 1994). For 
example, most people diagnosed with schizophrenia also experience other ‘illnesses’ 
such as depression, anxiety, mania, personality disorders, and substance abuse (Hall 
& Llewelyn, 2006). Co-morbidity can arguably arise from one problem leading to 
another (for example, relationship problems might lead to panic attacks, which can 
lead to avoidance of socialising, which can lead to depression, which can lead to 
alcoholism). A trans-diagnostic approach (Harvey, et al. 2004) suggests a 
commonality of cognitive processes within different DSM categories, and can be 
evidenced by how the treatment of one difficultly in therapy can result in shifts in 
others area (i.e. within other co-existing diagnoses) (Tsao et al., 2002). Also, 
cognitive behavioural therapies are effectively treating people across the whole 
spectrum of mental health problems, from mild transient states such as stress, to full 
psychotic episodes (Hall & Llewelyn, 2006).
These observations made within trans-diagnostic research, which suggest that 
psychological distress cannot be conceptualized as separate entities, echo the 
tendency of mainstream psychologists to conceptualize psychopathology on a 
continuum from neurotic (including problems with anxiety, depression and
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obsessions) to psychotic (schizo-affective disorders and schizophrenia) (McGovern 
& Turkington, 2001). Brown (1996), also refers to this when observing that a 
‘normal’ individual differs from an individual who has been given a psychiatric 
diagnosis only in terms of the severity and/or frequency of his or her experiences. 
Likewise, Bentall (2004) considers that the experiences of both service users and the 
general public to be qualitatively similar, and for individuals with ‘psychosis’ to have 
similar, yet stronger, cognitive biases to that of ‘non-psychotic’ individuals.
2: The short-hand argument and the experience of labelling and being labelled
Most psychiatrists and some clinical psychologists view the use of the DSM as useful 
in terms of a short-hand shared language which helps communication amongst 
multidisciplinary teams, independent practitioners, and researchers, thus allowing an 
objective way of standardizing diagnosis and treatment. It is assumed that by 
studying common symptoms amongst a homogeneous group, it becomes possible to 
construct theories of ‘casual’ and maintaining factors in a particular disorder, and 
therefore what treatment might be most beneficial for its alleviation (Adams et al., 
1977). However, I think most clinical psychologists would consider that by using this 
short-hand approach we run the risk of losing the richness of the very experiences we 
are trying to understand.
These issues are reflected in the following counterarguments and include the 
positions held by Bentall (2004), who states that diagnostic categories cannot 
effectively predict ‘symptoms’, emotions, behaviours, nor outcomes of interventions, 
and van Praag (1988), who echoes this by stating that diagnostic categorization acts 
as a 'straitjacket for conceptual progress' (p.767). This is because they often both 
consider personal information to be irrelevant and minimize the complexity of the 
‘problem’ (Bentier & Malik, 2002). In the past I also have used a short-handed 
diagnostic approach in some of my employment settings. On reflection, this was 
because I was attempting to fit into the cultural norm in which I was immersed. I 
began to question whether the DSM approach of framing people’s experiences was
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always helpful when I began working for an organization whose working practices 
centred around a non-diagnostic ethos based on the recovery approach. At present I 
find myself again working within an organization (a Community Mental Health 
Team, on placement) in which the prevalent discourse is that of DSM terminology 
and the medical model assumptions underpinning it. This manifests itself most 
evidently in how referrals in the client allocation aspect of staff meetings are couched 
in diagnostic terms. The presence of this dominant medical model discourse fosters 
unequal power relations within the team, and I believe that this affects both my 
clinical supervisor and myself in terms of feeling partially muted from offering 
differing perspectives on service users’ ‘presentations’ and expressed experiences. If, 
however the DSM was discarded, and in its place a more psychologically-based way 
of working was introduced, then the unequal power relations in the team would 
perhaps alter (although, arguably this would change the dominant discourse to 
become that identified with clinical psychologists psychological assumptions, which 
in itself would then require deconstructing, so as to address the balance).
In my experience, service users’ responses to the short-hand labelling culture within 
mental health are mixed. Some service users are relieved to be given a diagnosis, and 
a subgroup of these appears to want to maintain their identity as someone with a 
mental illness. This can be understood in terms of people having the chance to frame 
and define their experiences around a medical label, in a sense validating what they 
have experienced. This can give people a sense that their problems are understood, 
and therefore manageable and treatable. For some service users the removal of this 
label could be anxiety provoking if they have lived with it for a long time. They 
might feel that they are losing part of their identity, and might not know what they 
can replace it with. They may also fear that all support will be removed from them if 
they are considered ‘normal’ again. Often, though, service users can feel that once 
they have been given a diagnosis, the value of their personal experiences is 
disregarded by professionals, and in turn, by society. People can feel further 
depressed when given the label of having a mood disorder, feel further anxiety when 
give the label of having an anxiety disorder, et cetera. This may be because these 
labels allude to an apparent intrinsic and fixed medical condition and thus affect
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people’s meta-cognitions. A move away from a diagnostic system could therefore 
help to reduce the dehumanizing experience of stigmatization, whereas currently 
service users who are unwell some of the time are discriminated against all of the 
time.
My experience of being labelled dyslexic has been mainly positive and useful in 
terms of receiving additional support. However, although this is a DSM diagnosis, it 
does not come under mental ‘illnesses’, and thus I have not felt overly stigmatized by 
it. However, had homosexuality remained as a mental illness within the DSM, then I 
can only too easily imagine the distress that this diagnostic label would have caused 
me. These reflections have helped me consider how the DSM has a white, middle 
class, orthodox view of ‘normality’ and how difference and diversity are often 
pathologized. What we diagnose as pathologies in our culture can be view differently 
in other cultures. For example, experiences that are often shunned in the West can be 
respected in other cultures, such as hearing voices within the Plains Indians 
community (Spiro, 2001), or being attracted to the same sex within Native American 
culture (Tafoya, 1996).
3: The diagnosis versus formulation debate
As discussed earlier, the shift away from using short-hand diagnostic categories 
would leave psychiatrists in need of a different language, and would be welcomed by 
many clinical psychologist and service users. A new common language amongst 
health professionals was offered by The British Psychology Society’s Division of 
Clinical Psychology in their proposal for ‘a move away from the diagnosis and 
towards a psychological formulation-based approach’ (Division of Clinical 
Psychology, 2000). This is because, as I have already argued, DSM diagnoses limit 
the richness and complexity of people’s experiences, increases the risk of 
stigmatization, and implies that medication is nearly always the needed intervention 
for people experiencing psychological distress.
Page 13 of 233
The formulation-based approach is seen to address these issues because it refers to 
psychological conceptualizations of psychological distress. These are constructed 
from the integration of both the information that is gained in assessment (and 
continues to be gained throughout the remaining sessions) and psychological 
theories, and are considered necessary for the development and application of 
effective interventions (Hall & Llewelyn, 2006). Psychological theories often include 
those from developmental psychology (for example, attachment theories), cognitive 
psychology (for example, cognitive biases), psychodynamic psychology 
(emphasising unconscious processes), and social psychology (including 
interpersonal, group/systemic and societal processes). This is a collaborative process 
that involves both the psychologist and his or her service user attempting to develop 
a co-constructed understanding of the latter’s experiences, with the aim that this is a 
transformative process which allows the service user to re-evaluate his or her 
distressing experiences.
An individual’s difficulties can be framed in a way that aids understanding for both 
service user and clinical psychologist, thus allowing collaborative person-centred 
interventions. For example, in cognitive behavioural therapy a model from which 
more idiosyncratic formulations can be developed in order to understand a person’s 
difficulties (particularly depression) has been suggested (Beck, 1995; Fennell, 1989). 
This model suggests that from an individual’s early experiences, beliefs are 
generated about the self, other people, and the world. Assumptions (sometimes called 
intermediate beliefs, conditional beliefs, or rules for living) are constructed to protect 
the person from these often painful core beliefs. However, critical incidents can re­
activate these core beliefs, thus creating a cycle of thoughts, emotions, physiological 
sensations, and behaviours, which interact with one another in a way that both 
distresses the person and yet maintains his or her psychological distress.
There are many other models to help explain more specific problems within 
cognitive behavioural therapy (for example, Blackburn and Davidson, 1995; 
Chadwick et al., 2003; Persons and Tompkins, 1997) and many other
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conceptualizations are offered within other therapeutic orientations (e.g.. Eels, 1997; 
McWilliams, 1999; and Westmeyer, 2003). However, all models and theories across 
the different therapeutic orientations have in common the following: they all require 
the psychologist to ‘access, review, critically evaluate, analyse, and synthesise data 
and knowledge from a psychological perspective’ (Hall & Llewelyn, 2006, p.23). 
This allows for the generation of idiosyncratic formulations that enable clinical 
psychologists to focus, along with the service users, on interventions that will be 
most beneficial within the social context of the service users’ lives.
4: Formulations can give alternative wavs of understanding unusual experiences
Unusual experiences are categorized in the DSM under the label of ‘hallucinations’, 
and beliefs that are important to the person who suffers hallucinations are considered 
‘delusional’ (Barham & Hayward, 1995). Such labels can create public fear, because 
people often respond to difference in others with fear and hostility. This may 
compound the stigmatization experienced by people who are often already distressed 
and isolated. The potential creation of further psychological distress through 
clinicians’ use of the DSM to construct unusual experiences in this way is especially 
poignant when considering that distress is seen as a factor in the maintenance of 
‘psychosis’ (Smith et al., 2006).
However, unusual experiences can be conceptualized in other ways. Embedded with 
the DSM and other diagnostic systems is the assumption that distressing ‘symptoms’ 
have no personal meanings. However, the process of constructing formulations 
brings forth assumptions that meanings can be found in people’s experiences and 
behaviours (May, 2007). The presenting problems of someone who is ‘mentally ill’ 
can be understood as the person attempting to manage difficult relationships and 
situations in the only way they know how (Small, 2001; Stoppard, 1999; Wilkinson, 
2005), and that ‘mental illnesses’ are not illnesses, but ‘problems in living’ (Szasz, 
1962). From this perspective, people’s auditory ‘hallucinations’ and ‘delusion’ belief 
systems can be seen as ways of having meaning for the person once the context in
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which these experiences is understood. For example, Laing (1959) believed that 
once a person’s anxiety or depression is understood through the individuals lived 
experience, then the ‘problem’ may less likely be located within the person as a 
pathology, but may instead be attributed to the person’s attempts to adapt to difficult 
situations and relationships (i.e. familial, social, cultural, and historical contexts are 
vital in this respect). Therefore, Laing argued that schizophrenia has a psychological 
origin and that people can cure themselves in supportive environments. Other examples 
of how academics and practitioners have understood these ‘unusual’ experiences include 
the conceptualizations by Harper (2000) and Blackman (2001) regarding ‘hearing 
voices’, and ‘delusions’, respectively. Bracken and Thomas (2005) consider that these 
experiences are how some individuals respond in a meaningful way to the world they 
find themselves in. I therefore argue that abandoning the DSM could allow 
psychiatrists the opportunity to approach service users in a new way, which is in 
keeping with how most clinical psychologists and service users would wish for 
psychological distress to be understood. Service users would then have a greater 
chance of being offered interventions that do not take away the value of these 
meanings, but instead recognise each person’s idiosyncratic journey.
5: The Recovery Approach
The questioning of the diagnostic system by academics and clinical psychologist has 
also allowed for mental health trusts, clinical training bodies, and service users, to 
begin thinking outside of the diagnostic ‘box’ and to become more vocal as they 
challenge the medical models’ understanding of how their experiences are 
understood. People who hear voices are finding ways to view their experiences as 
meaningful (Romme & Escher, 1993). People who self-harm do not want the 
pejorative label of attention-seeker (although everyone needs attention) and instead 
want their behaviours to be recognised as responses to distress (Pembroke, 1994).
The community psychology approach (Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2005) explores how 
the social context contributes to and maintains ‘problems’ that have been located by
Page 16 of 233
other mental health professionals as being within the ill person. The community 
psychology approach puts the emphasis on mental health workers to actively set up 
and support interventions that reduce isolation at a community level, for example, 
self help groups that focus on service users sharing their experiences. Professionals 
can help by offering to co-facilitate these groups. This role focuses on maintaining 
the group’s boundaries. When these boundaries are strong, then the group can feel 
safe, and this can allow for the development of a group culture that is accepting of 
differing people’s belief systems (Knight, 2005; Romme & Escher, 1993). The 
recovery model also embraces these ideas, encouraging service users to share via 
differing modes of support (e.g. self-help and community groups) their views and 
experiences (Scileppi et al., 2000).
The recovery approach, which emphasises a need for a shift from a deficit approach 
of mental health problems towards drawing on advancements in positive psychology, 
emphasising resilience and happiness (Hall & Llewelyn, 2006), so that Tack of 
insight’ can be reframed as an adaptive copying mechanism against personal losses in 
the individual’s life (ibid.). This is echoed by Dew et al. (2008) who suggest that an 
individual’s spiritual, religious, and personal beliefs may be important to their mental 
wellbeing.
The recovery model emphasises the need for professionals to hold the hope for 
service users when they cannot believe in a future where they have a better quality of 
life. This is so that professionals can truly empower people to take charge of their 
own recovery, and for both professionals and service users to believe that this is 
possible. Therefore service users are encouraged to become more independent; to be 
able to reframe their own situations rather than having their experiences divorced 
from their own frame of understanding; and to gain a sense of self-determination 
(Rose, 2001; Wallcraft et al., 2003). This ethos also emphasises the importance of 
believing that service users’ experiences are valid and worth listening to, their 
opinions are worth valuing, and their goals are possible. The implementation of the 
recovery approach has meant that service users’ experiences are now beginning to be
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considered equal alongside the more theory-based knowledge of academics and 
clinicians, and thus their input is now valued on mental health panels and training 
courses in clinical psychology, psychiatric nursing, and other related professions.
Therefore, I argue that the abandonment of the DSM could allow the recovery 
approach to be taken more seriously by some service users who are still unsure of 
what to belief in at a time when there are conflicting discourses to be navigated; 
between the positions of the dominant psychiatric establishment and the increasingly 
vocal psychological framework proposed by critical psychologists in the first 
instance, and more recently by mainstream psychologists. The recovery approach, 
although welcomed by most clinical psychologists, would also come as a challenge. 
This is because it demands a shift from mainly intra-psychic interventions to 
community-based ones. Therefore psychologists would need an experiential 
knowledge of their local community. Psychiatrists would be challenged in terms of 
needing to shift from an assumption that psychological distress is primarily caused 
by brain abnormalities that need medical interventions within a maintenance model, 
to a position of accepting and validating people’s differing experiences within an 
ethos of believing in their potential for a meaningful future.
6: Shifting the focus from DSM diagnostic categorizations to that of 
psychological formulations within multi-disciplinary teams
The insidious battle between the dominating discourse of the medical model and its 
attempts to describe and categorize peoples’ experiences with the DSM and the 
psychologists prevalence for formulations to help frame their clients psychological 
distress, is unhelpful. This essay has been advancing an argument towards 
implementing more psychologically-based mental health services. In terms of 
readdressing the balance within multi-disciplinary teams between the influence of the 
DSM, and the need for psychological and social input, the biopsychosocial model 
(Pilgrim, 2002) goes some way to achieving this. This is because it recognizes the
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biological, psychological and social aspects of an individual’s life. However the 
psychiatric diagnosis is still central to this theoretical framework.
A radical new model is the mediating psychological processes model o f mental 
disorder (Kinderman et al., 2008). This model suggests that biological factors (both 
physical damage and abnormalities), social factors (for example, social deprivation, 
housing problems, and poverty), and circumstantial factors/life events (for example, 
physical and sexual abuse, and losses) all contribute to the disturbance of 
psychological processes, which in turn leads to mental disorder. Interventions in this 
model centre on the adversely affected psychological processes, and do not require a 
diagnosis. Psychiatrist’s medical expertise would still have a valued role within this 
framework because service users would sometimes require for their distressing 
experiences to be alleviated by medication. Within a multi-disciplinary team, other 
professionals would focus on psychological and social interventions, and 
psychologists would have a consultative role (Kinderman et al., 2008). This way of 
conceptualizing emotional distress is complementary to the recovery approach 
because service users’ experiences are validated rather than medicalized. This would 
allow the professionals and service users to see the ‘problems’ which they are both 
jointly working with as being fluid rather than being fixed. Because this model 
suggests that recovery is possible, it would also allow professionals of all disciplines, 
including psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, to truly believe in empowering the 
people that they serve so that they can reach their goals, and for the service users to 
experience being valued and respected.
Conclusion
In this essay I considered what issues would be raised for service users, 
psychologists, psychiatrists and myself if the use of the DSM was abandoned. 
Through exploring discrepancies between the orthodox and critical position within 
psychiatry I raised the issue of whether psychological distress is a ‘mental illness’ 
with separate entities, or something that is experienced by everyone along a
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continuum. The implications were discussed in terms of how psychiatrists would 
work differently if their assumptions that are currently embedded within the DSM, 
that psychological distress is caused by biological abnormalities, were revealed to be 
unfounded. I then considered how the use of DSM categories as a short-hand 
communication device is seductive in its simplicity, but that it threatens to reduce 
service users’ complexities down to a label under which service users’ identities 
would be lost. It also creates unequal power relations within teams whereby the 
dominant DSM discourse mutes clinical psychologists’ input within multi­
disciplinary team meetings. I proposed that the abandonment of the DSM could 
allow for formulation-based approaches to psychological distress to take the place of 
psychiatrists’ use of the DSM, in order to allow for more idiosyncratic 
conceptualizations of service users’ psychological distress to be explored. Therefore 
service users’ experiences, however ‘unusual’, would be validated as meaningful. 
Interventions would be used that respect, and work with, individual’s different 
experiences.
The development of the recovery approach was considered important in addressing 
the balance between the medical discourse prevalent within the DSM, and service 
users’ lived experiences. This approach could lead to service users feeling 
empowered enough to leave behind their diagnostic labels and find a more 
idiosyncratic journey to recovery. This would be supported by clinical psychiatrists, 
who would, however, find this approach challenging. This is because they would 
need to become more aware of their own local valuable resources which could aid 
community-based recovery programs. Psychiatrists would need to challenge their 
own assumptions regarding the causes of ‘mental illnesses’ if they are to fully 
believe in service users’ potential for living more meaningful lives.
Lastly, I explored a model by Kinderman et al. (2008) as a way of operationalizing 
an alternative to the DSM approach within mental health services, and suggested 
what the implications might be for service users, psychiatrists, and psychologists 
(and therefore myself). In this model, psychiatrists would no longer take the lead
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within multi-disciplinary teams, but would have a valued role in giving their medical 
expertise to service users’ who require their distressing experiences to be alleviated. 
The role of clinical psychologists would be that of consultants who specialize in 
supporting their teams’ understanding and implementation of interventions which are 
guided by psychological formulations. Service users would benefit from working 
with professionals in a way that is centred on valuing their experiences and guiding 
them along their own journey of recovery.
I began writing this essay feeling that my relationship with the DSM was that of 
ambivalence. As I researched the literature to understand what its demise would 
mean for differing professionals and myself, I found my position moving 
increasingly towards the wish that the DSM could be abandoned. I hope that the 
model proposed by Kinderman et al. (2008) will help accomplish this goal.
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Adult Mental Health Essay -  Year 2
Emancipation versus empowerment (Sticklev, 2006)? Is the involvement of
service users and carers in the development and planning of mental health 
services perpetuating existing power imbalances?
When I began considering whether the involvement of service users and carers in the 
development and planning of mental health services perpetuates existing power 
imbalances, my position was one of believing that these power imbalances could be 
addressed through the empowerment of service users and carers. This belief 
developed whilst working for mental health charities (including a local MIND 
organization that champions service user and carer empowerment) and the National 
Health Service (NHS). However, whilst working on this essay my thoughts regarding 
the issues of emancipation versus empowerment of mental health service users and 
carers has evolved.
This essay will first of all look at the history of service user and carer involvement 
within the mental health system, before then giving an outline of the ethical and 
evidence-based arguments for involving service users and carers in the development 
and planning of mental health services. I will then consider differing approaches to 
service user and carer involvement, described as consumerist and democratization 
approaches by Hickey (1993, cited in Hickey and Kipping, 1998), and which reflect 
the ideologies of empowerment and emancipation, respectfully. I will then look at 
what has been achieved through the empowerment of service users and carers before 
then critiquing this approach. I will argue that the mental health system can benefit 
from both the collaborative non-tokenistic aspects of empowerment, as well as the 
emancipation of service users and carers who wish to plan and develop their own 
service provisions. Finally, I will argue that although the operationalized ideologies 
of both empowerment and emancipation have made valuable contributions towards 
giving service users and carers a voice, these ideologies still perpetuate power 
imbalances within the mental health system unless they also encompass the 
principles of community psychology.
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As a trainee clinical psychologist, I feel a strong sense of loyalty towards the NHS 
which funds my training and provides my clinical placements. Also, I have worked 
alongside professionals who are dedicated to improving the wellbeing of their client 
group. Therefore, it feels uncomfortable to consider how as a profession, amongst 
others, we may be inadvertently maintaining power positions that are detrimental to 
the wellbeing of those we serve.
The history of service user and carer involvement
Within psychiatry, more so than any other institution, there has been a power 
imbalance between the experts and those they serve. This has been developed and 
maintained through the mental health system having the power to keep patients in 
their institutions against their will and enforce treatments, often to the extent where 
they could be argued to be abusive (Barnes & Bowl, 2001). This led to a service user 
movement within the mental health system, unparalleled in any other health care 
system, whose focus has been upon attempting to reduce the power differential 
between the system and themselves. Campbell (1996, cited in Stickley, 2006) 
describes how the inadequacy of community care within the United Kingdom’s post 
de-institutionalization of mental health provisions, along with the political climate 
towards consumerism in which ‘people with mental health problems were redefined 
as consumers’ (Stickley, 2006, p. 573) with demands and needs, led to the rise of the 
service user movement. A consequence of this was that Patient’s Councils were 
created, statutory services funded advocacy groups, and thus service providers began 
to actively involve service users and carers. This included having representatives 
nominated by service user groups on mental health trusts’ management committees 
(Stickley, 2006). The government now expects the NHS to involve the public, 
service users, and carers in its decision-making, and this position is reflected in 
Department of Health (DOH) policies (DOH 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008). 
The DOH has set up a unit called ‘Involve’ (originally, when set up in 1996, it was 
called ‘Consumers in NHS research,’ before changing its name in 2003) to promote 
and support user and carer involvement in research (Rose, Fleischman & Wykes, 
2008). The Service User Research Group in England (SURGE), supported by the UK 
Mental Health Research Network, supports the development of good collaborative
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practices in research between academics, and service users and carers (Rose, 
Fleischman & Wykes, 2008).
Ethical and evidence-based arguments for involving both service users and 
carers in the planning and development of mental health services
There are both ethical and evidence-based arguments for involving service users and 
carers in the development, planning, and evaluation of mental health services 
(Faulkner, 2009). Ethically, service users and carers should have the right to shape 
services that directly affects them (Read & Wallcraft, 1992), and services need to 
respect the important contributions that service users and carers can make to their 
service if given the opportunity (Thomicroft & Tansella, 2005). Evidence-based 
arguments include the following: the importance of including service users’ rating of 
outcome data (this has led to services learning more about the value of service users’ 
unmet needs regarding their long-term wellbeing) (Slade et a l, 2004); how research 
conducted by service users, rather than professionals, may elicit a more truthful 
response from service users concerning their experience of psychiatric treatments 
(Rose et a l, 2003); and how better treatment outcomes may be developed by 
involving service users more in their own care (Henderson et a l, 2004).
Empowerment: Its achievements
Empowerment does not seem to have changed the core experiences of mental health 
service users. Service users often still face compulsory treatment, including both 
electroconvulsive therapy and psychiatric medications, and thus have little control 
over the types of interventions that they believe would be of benefit to them. 
However, the service user and carer perspective has made a positive impact on 
education and research within the mental health field (Beresford & Holden, 2000). 
Some service users and carers value the growing sense of involvement they have 
achieved through becoming consultants, researchers, and educators within statutory 
mental health services. Therefore, they believe that their empowerment has been a 
positive step in collaborating with a system that previously did not allow for them to 
have a voice, and would not want to give this up for a philosophical ideal of
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emancipation if there is not a way of putting it into practice. This is because it is 
better to have some power within a system rather than none (Stickley, 2006).
Service user and carer involvement
There are two main service user and carer involvement approaches. These are the 
consumerist and democratization approaches (Hickey, 1993, cited in Hickey & 
Kipping, 1998) which reflect the ideologies of empowerment and emancipation of 
service users and carers. McKnight (1977, cited in Hickey & Kipping, 1998) draws 
the following distinctions: the consumerist approach is one where users accept the 
ideology that they are consumers who are able to judge the benefits of competing 
services, but where service providers hold onto their power, knowledge, and 
resources (Kemshall & Littlechild, 2000); the democratization position is one where 
users are viewed as citizens, and thus can change their services’ content through both 
working in partnership with service providers and/or develop their own services. 
Hickey (1993, cited in Hickey & Kipping, 1998) offers a participation continuum 
model, with consumerist approach at one end of the continuum and democratization 
at the other, to describe different degrees of service user involvement. At the farthest 
end of consumerist continuum is the information/explanation position, and to a lesser 
extent, the consultation position. Within the information/explanation position, service 
user and carers have no influence regarding the decision-making processes of the 
services, and instead are only given information and explanations. Within the 
consultation position, although service users are surveyed for their opinions 
regarding the running of the service, the service is not obligated to take on any 
concerns or ideas by service users or carers. At the democratization end of the 
continuum model is the partnership position (in which both service users and service 
providers make joint decisions regarding the service), followed by the most 
democratic position being the user control position (in which service users control 
the decisions-making process and decide whether they wish the involvement of other 
parties in the development and planning of their services).
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Problems with the consumerist approach to empowerment
Criticisms of ‘consumer’ involvement include the non-representativeness of the 
consumers actively involved in research, and that consumers become socialized to 
the professional language and underlying assumptions of the researchers and 
clinicians (Boote et al. 2002). An opposing concern has also been expressed; i.e. that 
some consumers may be biased in their views and therefore would not be impartial 
when conducting research. Professionals have also questioned whether specific 
expertises may be lacking in consumers which may affect the quality of their 
research. This has led to training courses in health research being set up to address 
this concern (Boote et al. 2002). By it (1994, cited in Boote et al. 2002) describes 
professionals and stakeholders concerns over losing power and control over research 
projects if consumers become increasingly involved.
Another problem with the consumerist view of service user and carer involvement is 
that it assumes a model of high street consumerism whereby consumers are assumed 
to have enough knowledge to make rational decisions regarding choosing the 
appropriate product (Morris et al., 2007). However, professionals are divided 
regarding whether service users and carers are in this position to choose mental 
health provisions that would best serve their needs (Bradshaw & Bradshaw, 2004).
Empowerment for the privileged few
The idea of service users and carers as consumers is also problematic because it is 
often only the privileged few who are in enough of an authoritative position to be 
able to exercise their choice (Sherwin, 1992). This is because the inequalities in our 
society are mirrored in our mental health system, whereby the people who are 
marginalized by society but who have an understanding of both their own needs and 
those they care for, are not in positions of influence to shape future health polices 
which will affect them (Sherwin, 1992). Therefore, I argue that the concept of 
empowerment does not promote democracy within our mental health system because 
it does not allow marginalized voices to be heard against the dominant discourses in 
our society.
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Valuing professionals, service users, and carers in mental health research
Within the consumer model of empowerment Boote et al. (2002) describes how 
service user and carer involvement in the research process has been operationalized 
on a continuum of levels; with consultation being at the lowest level, collaboration 
being at a moderate level, and consumer control being at the highest level. 
Consultation refers to consumers being asked their views on completed research 
proposals and findings; collaboration refers to consumers being in an equal 
partnership with researchers, and thus participate in all stages of the research process; 
consumer control refers to consumers being in control of the research process (this 
means that researchers from outside the consumers’ organization are only involved if 
they have been invited by the consumers to participate in their research).
I argue that if we believe in either the ideology of empowerment or emancipation 
then we should be valuing service users’ and carers’ opinions. Therefore it is 
important to include service user and carer participation in mental health research 
because the conclusions from this research are used to direct interventions aimed at 
benefiting service users and carers. Service user and carer participation in research 
often adds a qualitative and heuristic perspective that allows for researchers to work 
with the data that has captured the meanings behind the richness of service users’ 
and carers’ lived experiences. For example, outcome measures on randomized 
control trials for psychiatric medications may favour the introduction of a particular 
medication to help with the symptoms of a particular mental health problem. 
However, from the perspective of service users, they may wish to live with the 
‘symptomology’ attributed to their ‘illnesses’ rather than experience medications that 
have debilitating side-effects (Rose, 2008). Service user defined outcome measures 
are possible, as testified by the work at the Service User Research Enterprise (SURE) 
(Rose, 2008). These examples of how service users and carers can offer a different 
perspective within mental health research and helped me become aware of why the 
British Psychological Society (BPS) recognizes the important of valuing clients’ 
conceptual frameworks (BPS, 2000). However, Boote et al. (2002) also argues that 
researchers need to acknowledge a shift in their epistemological position if they are 
to embrace service user and carer involvement in the research process; from a
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positivist position in which knowledge is out there in the world and just needs to be 
collected from ‘consumers’ who are seen as otherwise passive in this process, to one 
in which ‘consumers’ are actively involved in the whole research process. I also 
believe that mental health research should include phenomenological perspectives in 
research and practice. This allows for services users’ voices to be heard, and their 
experiences to be expressed rather than pathologized. However, it is important not to 
denigrate research that is positivist in its approach. This is because I believe that 
mental health research requires both the expertise of professionals and the expertise 
that service users bring through their lived experiences (Tolman & Bryman-Miller, 
2001, cited in Goodbody, 2003).
Empowerment: An individualistic ideology
The idea of empowerment is based on the ideology of individualism, whereby each 
person is expected to take responsibility for his or he own needs (physical and 
psychological) (Anderson, 1996). Therefore, professionals tend to attempt to enable 
individuals to become more responsible for themselves. However, this approach can 
deflect attention away from social and political injustices, such as sexism, 
homophobia, racism, and poverty in our society that often are both contributing and 
maintaining factors of psychological distress (Anderson, 1996). This means that 
individuals, who are stigmatized and thus marginalized by society for having mental 
health problems, do not have access to the resources to change their lives for the 
better.
The ‘irrationality’ argument for mental health services keeping some control 
over service users
Handy (1990) described twenties years ago how psychiatry was constructing 
increasingly more behaviour within our society as pathological, and purporting that it 
knew best how to deal with these ‘problems.’ This approach caused service users to 
increasingly feel disempowered by professionals who assumed that service users 
were unable to get better without their expertise.
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Along the same time Rogers et al. (1993) stated that the majority of the public and 
some mental health professionals feared that people who have mental health 
problems were irrational and thus they dismissed service users’ opinions as invalid. 
An illustration of this feeling of disempowerment, caused by professionals 
invalidating services users’ experiences and opinions, was succinctly captured by 
Esso Leete when expressing her position as a service user within the mental health 
system.
T can talk but may not be heard, I can make suggestions but they may not be 
taken seriously, I can voice my thoughts, but they may be seen as delusions. I 
can recite experiences, but they may be interpreted as fantasies. To be a 
patient or even an ex-client is to be discounted.’
(Leete, 1989, cited in Campbell, 1998, p.241)
Since Leete expressed these views, the efforts made by service users and carers to be 
increasingly involved in the planning and development of mental health service 
provisions has meant that the views of service users and carers are recognized for the 
positive impact they are making on education and research within the mental health 
field (Beresford & Holden, 2000). However, I shall now consider whether service 
users’ and carers’ views are really being considered by service-led organizations.
Empowerment: Genuine or tokenistic service and carer involvement?
The health system, including mental health provisions, has a history of patriarchal 
power structures (Fournier, 2005) in which service users and carers are placed at the 
bottom. Service user and carer involvement is seen as way of climbing this hierarchal 
ladder to acquire power so to address power imbalances within the mental health 
system. However, Stickley (2006) argues that service user and carer empowerment is 
illusionary, and instead perpetuates existing power balances within the mental health 
system. This is because the mental health system has not given up its power in 
relation to service users; and thus service user and carer involvement initiatives by
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service-led organizations is often a tokenistic gesture used to legitimize decision­
making processes. Hodge (2005) describes how service-led organizations hold onto 
their power by deciding which service users and carers are given the opportunity to 
represent the organization, thus excluding those who do not agree with these 
organizations’ agendas. Professionals can also manipulate what discourses are given 
the most exposure in meetings through ‘discourse management’ (Hodge, 2005, 
p. 174); i.e. using agenda setting to manipulate what discourses are allowed to 
dominate meetings. Therefore, it is crucial that organizations are open and honest 
with service users and carers about what aspects of their service are open to debate, 
and thus not mislead them into believing that they have decision-making power in 
areas of the service that they do not (Hodge, 2005). This way of working would 
allow service users and carers to trust the motives of these services and thus feel that 
professionals give them the respect they deserve.
Genuine user involvement would require for professionals to relinquish their power. 
Unfortunately some professionals feel threatened by shifts in power as service users 
become increasingly involved in the running of statutory services (Read & Wallcraft, 
1992). Others professionals can become immersed in their own organization’s 
cultures and profession’s language (Brandon, 1991). According to Stickley (2006), 
this can occur to the degree that they expect service users and carers to both be 
grateful for being empowered and feel privileged to work alongside them as unpaid 
workers in their organization. Thus, it is questionable whether policy makers are 
motivated to involve service users and carers so as to address power balances within 
their mental health organizations, or just to be seen adhering to government policy. 
Bramwell and Williams (1993) has suggested the latter as the prime motive, and thus 
believes that these organizations will select service users and carers who will 
represent and champion the organizations’ policies and practices.
Emancipation: Shifting the power balance away from professionals and towards 
service users and carers
Emancipation means the act of setting free from the control and restraint of powerful 
others, including institutional systems. Social and political movements that embrace 
the ideology of emancipation are critical of power imbalances within our society.
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Therefore, they attempt to readdress this inequality by questioning the legitimization 
of dominant social discourses and related power structures that marginalize people 
who reflect the difference and diversity within our society.
Stickley (2006) purport that service users and carers are limited by the knowledge 
that they possess. This has led to advocacy services being used to teach service users 
and carers how to negotiate the mental health system via learning its language, 
polices, and practices. Stickley (2006) argues that by doing this, service users and 
carers are inevitably being caught up and constrained in a system that grants them 
only a certain amount power; and that this approach maintains the imbalance of 
power between the professionals and those that they are supposed to be serving.
Stickley (2006) argues that emancipation will occur when service users and carers, 
no longer wait for permission to be granted so that they achieve some degree of 
power in how their services are run, but instead create their own services, i.e. service 
user-led and carer-led services. This would allow them to develop their own position 
of power. However, the emancipation of service users and carers is not about 
dismissing the knowledge and expertise of professionals, but is instead an ideology 
that attempts to put in to action a way of working for social justice whereby 
everyone’s needs are considered (Williamson, 2008).
Empowerment and emancipation: Are both these ideologies dividing society?
Campbell (1999) states that the consumerist approach to mental health services has 
helped give service users a voice and a degree of power, but that this approach, 
which espouses the ideology of empowerment, still places them outside of society by 
labelling them as service users, not citizens. This view highlights the possibility that 
mental health providers can use particular language, such as referring to people as 
‘mental health professionals,’ ‘service users,’ and ‘carers,’ which has the effect of 
positioning people in relation to one another both within the mental health system 
and society. In Telford et aVs (2002, cited in Boote et al. 2002) study, health
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professionals were asked their opinion on the use of the word ‘consumer,’ ‘patient,’ 
and ‘user.’ Opinions were divided amongst professionals who expressed concern that 
the word consumer suggested that ‘doctors... [were] running a supermarket,’ those 
who disliked the word ‘patient’ as it highlighted being disempowered through 
sickness, and those who thought that the word ‘user’ had connotations linked to drug 
abuse.
My own experience is of working within organizations that have used the terms 
‘patient,’ ‘resident,’ ‘client,’ and ‘service user,’ and have been part of conversations 
in which service users have passionately expressed their like or dislike for these 
particular labels. For example, for some being labelled a ‘patient’ was a comforting 
term that suggests that someone will look after them, whilst for others it suggested 
that their sense of power and control had been stripped.
Goodbody (2003) argues that our identity as clinical psychologists requires the role 
of service users, and vice versa, but using categorical differences, such as ‘clinical 
psychologist,’ ‘service user’ and ‘carer’ creates illusionary divides. However, it is 
difficult not to fall into this trap. For example, whilst writing this essay I have been 
aware of how, for the sake of clarity, I have used divisionary language that has 
positioned me as a trainee clinical psychologist and thus, apparently, not a service 
user or carer. Nevertheless, as clinical psychologists, we need to consider whether we 
are holding onto the belief that there is a distinction between us as mental health 
practitioners, and that of service users and carers. This is because if we are to act as 
advocates of service user and carer involvement then we need to recognize that 
creating an illusionary divides will also maintain a hierarchical mental health system 
that perpetuates power imbalances between professionals and the people they 
service.
Goodbody (2003) offers us a way of thinking about how easy it is to separate 
ourselves from those we see as having psychological ‘problems,’ through reminding 
us of psychodynamic concepts such as projection and splitting. These concepts can
Page 38 of 233
help us understand how both clinical psychologists and the general public can 
disavow their own emotional distress and conflicts and locate it in others, rather than 
see the position of clinical psychologists, service users, and carers as simply roles 
that people have in relation to one another.
With regards to the question of whether the involvement of service users and carers 
in the development and planning of mental health services perpetuating existing 
power imbalances, I believe that neither the empowerment nor emancipation of 
service users and carers on their own are best placed to challenge this illusionary 
divide, Instead, I argue that both of approaches can lead to this division within our 
society. This because service user-led and carer-led services by default are 
maintaining the illusion that mental health ‘problems’ reside within individuals 
rather than society.
Operationalizing the ideologies of empowerment, emancipation, and community 
psychology
So far, I have argued that neither the ideology of empowerment nor emancipation of 
service uses and carers truly prevents power imbalances being maintained within the 
mental health system, and may inadvertently perpetuate them. This because both the 
ideologies of empowerment and emancipation of service user and carers can be 
operationalized in such a way that they still locate mental health problems within 
individuals rather than, at least in part, as the result of social injustices within society. 
Therefore, I think it is important for the mental health system to consider the value of 
community psychology, which focuses on trying to change aspects of individuals’ 
environments which are seen as causing and maintaining psychological distress 
rather than locating these problems within individuals (Rappaport, 1977). As clinical 
psychologists, we need to act according to these principles, and thus work within our 
own community to develop discourses that advocate acceptance of difference and 
diversity, including both respecting other peoples’ rights to have both different ways 
of expressing themselves emotionally and cognitively, including having alternative 
belief systems. However, this does not mean that we should assume that people in
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psychological distress should not be offered one-to-one psychological interventions 
if all parties concerned agree that this may be a helpful approach to alleviating an 
individuals’ experience of emotional distress.
Conclusion
In this essay I have considered whether the involvement of service users and carers 
in the development and planning of mental health services perpetuates existing 
power imbalances. I outlined the history of service user and carer involvement, have 
given ethical and evidence-based arguments for involving both service users and 
carers in the planning and development of mental health services, and summarized 
the achievements that the ideology of empowerment of service users and carers has 
achieved. I have described McKnight’s (1977, cited in Hickey & Kipping, 1998) 
model of service user and carer involvement that is constructed on a continuum from 
consumerist to democratization approaches, argued that collaborative research 
between professionals, service users, and carers should be valued, and discussed the 
problems with the consumerist approach to empowerment.
I have argued that the ideology of empowerment is both individualistic and hence 
does not recognize social injustices that have a systemic affect on perpetuating power 
imbalances within the mental health system, and also that any sense of empowerment 
is only experienced by the privileged few who are ‘granted’ this opportunity to 
influence the planning and development of their service provisions. I have 
highlighted how both some professionals and the public hold the belief, driven by 
fear of losing their own power and control over their own position within the mental 
health services and society, that service users within the mental health system are 
irrational and therefore should not be given control over planning and developing 
their own service provisions.
I have questioned whether the ideology of empowerment has lead to service users 
and carers having genuine or tokenistic involvement in their services, before then
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offering Stickley’s (2006) idea that the ideology of emancipation may be a more 
honest and effective way of shifting the power balance away from professionals and 
towards service users and carers. I then critiqued both the ideologies of 
empowerment and emancipation, and suggested that although they have benefited 
some service uses and carers and made a positive impact on education and research 
within the mental health field, they unfortunately still position service users and 
carers differently (and unfavourably) to professionals and the public. I have 
described Goodbody’s (2003) suggestion that psychodynamic ideas, such splitting 
and projection, can help to make sense of how both some mental health professionals 
and the public can disavow their own psychological distress and locate it in a group 
of people who are thus described as having mental health problems. I then argued 
that both professionals and the public need to recognize that power imbalances 
within the mental health system are, at least in part, driven by social injustices within 
society. Without this recognition both the ideologies of empowerment and 
emancipation will continue to replicate societal power imbalances within the mental 
health system to the detriment of service users and carers. Therefore, I stated firstly, 
that what is required is for psychologists to lead the way in ensuring that 
professionals within service-led organizations work in a respectful, honest and 
transparent way with service users and carers so as offer them as much power and 
control as possible. Secondly, psychologists need to advocate for service users and 
carers to set up their own services; and thirdly, psychologists need to operationalize 
the principles of community psychology so as to help reduce both the stigmatization 
of psychological distress and other social injustices within our local communities 
that, at least in part, perpetuate power imbalances within the mental health system.
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Problem-based Learning Task -  Year 1
A Reflective Account of my Personal and Professional Development Group’s
Problem Based Learning Task 
Introduction
When I first began thinking about what I could write with regards to a reflective 
account of the Problem Based Learning (PBL) task within our Personal and 
Professional Learning Discussion Group (PPLDG), I thought that there was not 
much I could say. However, as I immersed myself in the reflective process I began to 
develop my thinking around this concern. The following account describes my own 
thoughts both at the time and since having gained an additional perspective from 
spending several months on my first clinical placement. I will divide this reflective 
account into the following sections: the original problem; group processes; and the 
presentation. I will then conclude with a summary of both what I have learnt from 
this PBL task and how this can help with my further learning needs as a trainee 
clinical psychologist.
The original problem
My own relationship to change has tended to encompass both a sense of loss derived 
from leaving behind familiar knowledge, people, rituals, and places, and a sense of 
anxiety and excitement as I take a leap of faith into the unknown. These were my 
feelings when our cohort’s PPLDGs were informed that the PBL task was to develop 
a presentation pertaining to the title, ‘The relationship to change’. Each PPLDG had 
already been allocated a member of staff to facilitate their group throughout the 
course. However we needed to appoint a chairperson and a scribe to take the minutes 
of our meetings. Our presentations would take place in front of members of staff, and 
our cohort.
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Group processes
When considering my PPLDG’s group processes throughout the PBL task, I have 
needed to reflect on my reflections. This is because our PPLDG made the decision to 
do our presentation on our own groups’ ‘relationship to change’ via drawing on 
models that framed our group experiences. The model that we drew on the most, 
because it resonated with our group experiences of inter-group conflict, describes ‘a 
developmental sequence in small groups’ (Tuckman, 1965, p.l). However, our 
PPLDG discovered through experience that these differing stages of development 
often blend into one another and do not progress in a linear fashion. Two other 
models that our PPLDG thought overlapped with this model and thus were only 
outlined in our presentation (and therefore are not detailed in this reflective account), 
are ‘a systems approach to small group interaction’ (Tubb, 1995), and Charrier’s 
(1972) ‘model of group growth’.
In our first meeting, our group seemed preoccupied by the following questions: What 
was the meaning of the task? What were other groups were doing? Who was going to 
be the chairperson? Who was going to be the scribe? At a personal level, I was 
wondering ‘what are these people like and can I work with them?’ I did not know 
anyone very well in the group and so found myself trying to ease my way into 
conversations in a particularly gentle manner. Members of our PPLDG offered to be 
the chairperson and scribe without the need for difficult negotiations. These 
questions and behaviours are indicative of Tuckman’s (1965) ‘forming stage’ which 
is characterized by group members’ gentle testing of their group’s boundaries.
I think my allegiance to our group developed as soon as we knew we were going to 
be working on a task together. I noticed that each of the PPLDGs began to separate 
off from the other groups. This in-group versus out-group divide (Sherif & Sherif, 
1969; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was most clearly demonstrated by the behaviour of 
each group (including ours) seemingly not wanting to openly discuss their 
presentations in the presence of members of ‘other’ groups.
My sense is that our group did not take long before it entered a more conflictual 
period in its development, which is indicative of the ‘storming stage’ (Tuckman,
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1965), which is characterized by power struggles both within the group and in 
relation to the leader. I think that within this period we were acting, whilst in our 
facilitator’s presence, as if she was our leader. In her absence, differing members of 
the group (including myself) would seem to try and rally support for their own 
position regarding the PBL task. I think my reasoning for doing this was that I 
wanted the PPLDG to see me as a ‘legitimate’ member of the group, and assumed 
that if I tried to make lots of suggestions that demonstrated my academic knowledge, 
then I would be respected. After doing my own genogram in a later PPLDG task I 
came to realize how my family value education, and had therefore previously 
assumed that our PPLDG would also value education, and thus me. The widening of 
our positions in terms of ideas and responses to one another within our PPLDG can 
be understood in terms of group polarization (Baron & Bryne, 1981), whereby 
members of the group gradually take more extreme positions than they would if they 
were making decisions on their own. A psychodynamic explanation for this 
polarization might be that groups can be viewed as an organism in which differing 
members take on certain emotional positions (that have the most unconscious 
resonance for that person) within the group. This occurs through other members 
projecting their denied feelings into those who, at an unconscious level, accept and 
thus act on these feelings as if they are their own (Hinshelwood, 1987).
I think the ‘norming stage’ (Tuckman, 1965), which is characterized by the group 
finding its own culture through the members negotiation of both roles and 
relationships, became possible when our facilitator said that she thought we were not 
listening to one another with enough respect. I think that we were all taken aback by 
this comment. However, we knew that she was correct since we realized that whilst 
we had become enthusiastic about our ideas regarding the presentation, we had also 
become insensitive of each other feelings. We therefore decided to take up our 
facilitator’s suggestion for ground rules. We came up with rules that encompassed 
the ethics of confidentiality and respect.
I found that by thinking about and then introducing grounds rules, our PPLDG began 
to function better as a cohesive team rather than as a team of competitors. It could be 
that this was because we felt that our anxieties had become more ‘contained’ (Bion,
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1961) by the ground rules. This lessening of anxiety seemed to allow us to loosen our 
need for control and allowed for a more collaborative style of working. An example 
of this is when our PPLDG needed to decide between an idea that focused on ‘the 
relationship to change’ in terms of looking at how psychological change occurs at an 
individual, interpersonal, group and societal level, and another idea that focused on 
our own PPLDG’s changing group dynamics. I have since wondered whether issues 
of difference and diversity played a part in our PPLDG’s decision-making process. 
This is because I noticed that it was the members of our group who belong to 
minority cultures (a woman who defines herself as Asian, and myself, a gay man) 
who had tended to put forward ideas from critical psychology (which highlights 
power differentials within society), when thinking about the PBL task. However, in 
terms of decision-making, we decided to put these two ideas to the vote and the latter 
idea won. The group then decided to encompass the former idea within the 
presentation. This was a clear example of synthesizing ideas in a collaborative way.
Later on in our weekly meetings, our group members began to negotiate the sharing 
of the task; for example, who was going to do the research on group processes, script 
writing for the presentation that echoed previous group conversations, and the 
PowerPoint presentation. I think that it was at this point that we began to move into 
the ‘performing stage’ (Tuckman, 1965), which is characterized by both the presence 
of healthy group conflict and the group supporting everyone in taking turns at the 
leadership role. Our PPLDG’s performing stage was even more evident from when 
we began rehearsing our presentation. I felt that we were finally being truly 
supportive of one another. This was the point when we began to incorporate the three 
models, particularly Tuckman’s (1965) model, regarding the life of our group.
I think that our PPLDG sensed that we briefly entering Tuckman’s (1965) 
‘adjourning stage’, which is characterized by a sense of task closure and the group’s 
life coming to an end, when our group completed our PBL presentation. However, 
we all knew that our group’s life would be continuing for several more years to 
come, and thus this feeling was short-lived. Since finishing this task, I think our 
group has returned to the Tuckman’s (1965) ‘performing stage’.
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The presentation
Our group’s presentation focused on our own changing relationship to one another 
throughout the task of working together to deliver a presentation on ‘The 
Relationship to Change’. We described our decision-making processes that led us to 
decide on taking this approach to the presentation using our own developing 
awareness of the group processes. Some of our group acted out a script that 
demonstrated snap shots of conversation from our time as a group when working on 
the PBL task. Other members of the group (including myself) used PowerPoint to aid 
the theoretical side of our presentation. We used mainly Tuckman’s (1965) model to 
show how it helped our group frame our experiences, and thus allow us to stand back 
from conflicts as and when they arose in our group. We emphasized the importance 
of ground rules which act as container for our anxieties; the importance of having a 
facilitator, leader, and scribe; and the process of learning about some of the processes 
present in groups via reflecting on our own group experiences. We spoke of how an 
understanding of Tuckman’s (1965) model of group processes has helped us to 
reframe our group conflicts in terms of recognizable group stages, rather than as 
personal attacks against one another which then need to be defended against.
What I have taken from my experience of presenting, is an unexpected joy from 
helping deliver our group’s joint efforts; and maybe this has allowed for my own 
relationship to change to shift. I now feel more enthusiastic about taking part in new 
ventures than I did previously, and have learnt that change does not always need to 
be seen as threatening. Believing this helps me hold the hope for clients who are also 
struggling with change.
Conclusion
This PBL task has helped me develop an aware of difference and diversity issues; for 
example, how membership of a minority group (in this case ethnicity and sexuality) 
may influence the position one takes in group decision-making processes. Our 
PPLDG membership also represented differences in gender and age, although 
interestingly, these have yet to seemingly play a significant role in the dynamics of 
our group (therefore demonstrating that we cannot assume what may arise from 
issues of difference and diversity, but that we do need to deconstruct our own reality
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so that we can be open to other people’s perspectives). Being more accepting of 
difference and diversity has also helped me develop my collaborative approach on 
my placement with regards to working with clients, my supervisory relationship, and 
my position within the team.
My reflective account of the PEL task began with my own thoughts regarding this 
task. I then focused on the group process to explain some of the shifts in how 
differing members of our PPLDG (including myself) related and thus functioned 
together as a team in response to our PEL task, before then describing the 
presentation. With regards to my learning, I believe that the task has helped me 
develop skills that are transferable to my personal and professional life. This has 
included learning the importance of practicing as a psychologist from within an 
ethical framework that has clearly negotiated boundaries derived from grounds rules; 
and that my own relationship to change, and hopefully that of my clients, is itself 
changeable.
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Problem-based Learning Task -  Year 2
Problem-based learning reflective account: How do we know if IAPT is 
working?
Introduction
This is an account of my experiences and reflections regarding being part of group 
that was given the following problem-based learning (PEL) task; to prepare a 
consultancy report on how the effectiveness of the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) can be assessed. However, a staff member told our 
cohort that we could be creative in how we delivered our presentation and thus did 
not need to follow a more traditional consultancy report format.
I will be considering the PEL task in relation to the following issues: the membership 
of the group to which I was allocated; how our group approached the task and how 
this impacted on the group in terms of its functioning; issues of difference and 
diversity; ethical issues; service user involvement; and the valuable PEL derived 
learning that will influence my working practice within the National Health Service 
(NHS).
The PEL task and my reflections on it both in terms of content and process
Our group’s diverse membership consisted of three 3rd years and four 2nd years 
(including myself), a gender mix, and differing trainees’ beliefs regarding the value 
of IAPT. When we initially meet to discuss the task, one of the 3rd years suggested 
that we could sub-divide the tasks and allocate these to differing members of the 
group. These tasks included reading literature on the development of IAPT, and 
doing a literature searches for qualitative and quantitative research on IAPT 
outcomes. We then had another meeting in which we shared what we had found. 
Also, because of the dearth of qualitative research on IAPT outcomes, we thought 
about having role plays within our presentation as way of illustrating some of the 
possible themes that researchers may find if they used qualitative research methods 
when assessing LAPT’s effectiveness. Our group was passionate in ensuring that we 
actively valued difference and diversity, and thus wanted to highlight how IAPT
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might be experienced by service users and carers. Therefore, I suggested a scenario 
whereby two service users were discussing their expectations about having 
psychological therapy through an IAPT program.
We then thought about other people’s involvement in IAPT. We decided on General 
Practitioners, because they are the gatekeepers to this service. A 3rd year suggested 
that we could again split into two groups that meet separately for a while. One group 
would focus on producing a PowerPoint whilst the other group would focus on doing 
role plays. Her reasoning was logistical; if we sub-divided the tasks we could spend 
more time focusing on our own tasks. We thus meet separately in these groups as 
planned. However, we kept in contact by email and then meet as a complete group a 
few days before the presentation so as to both bring together our ideas and reflections 
and also run through our presentation together. I was slightly sceptical about whether 
our group’s identity could continue to exist once we began only meeting up with 
some of the members of our group. Therefore, I was surprised how through the 
process of each of us emailing the whole group each time we had an idea, found out 
some information on IAPT, or wanted to alter something, that we were able to 
maintain a cohesive feel to our group, and thus our presentation.
I found it a valuable experience to be part of a group that worked mainly in sub­
groups rather than as a whole group. This was because it helped me develop a way of 
working that is often required within the NHS where, because of logistical reasons, 
not everyone can always attend their team meetings. Also, because we did not have a 
facilitator we needed to take on personal responsibility to ensure that our own voices, 
and that of others, were heard. This was an important skill to develop because 
clinical psychologists within the NHS are required to develop leadership and 
consultancy roles leadership, and thus have knowledge regarding how to foster team 
collaboration.
With regards to ethical issues that arise in complex clinical settings, one of our 
group’s concerns was regarding IAPT’s triage system, whereby service user users are 
initially assessed by professionals with less experience than was previously the case 
prior to IAPT; only then are they referred on to more experienced professionals if
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deemed appropriate. Our group was concerned that this triage system may mean that 
some service users may inaccurately be assessed as not having complex needs when 
they do, and thus would experience being referred on several times before being seen 
by an appropriately experienced clinician.
When thinking about if IAPT works, our group became especially concerned by the 
following issue: how effective at reducing psychological distress are IAPT services if 
they rely on delivering their services via mental health practitioners who have only 
experienced short training courses from within one theoretical modality? Since this 
PEL exercise I have become aware of other professionals, such as John and Vetere 
(2008), who share similar concerns regarding this issue. Both this issue and our 
group’s aforementioned concern regarding the triage system highlighted for me how 
clinical psychologists are required to constantly weigh up the differing factors within 
complex issues. This reminded me of how Stedmon et al.’s (2003) purports the 
importance of a reflective approach within clinical practice, and that this approach 
emphasises the importance of giving equal attention to differing areas of knowledge 
when making decisions.
This PEL exercise has helped me recognize the value of staying open to different 
ideas and ways of working, both whilst as a trainee and throughout my working life 
as a qualified clinical psychologist. Since this exercise, my awareness of needing to 
remain open and curious in my understanding of people, theories, and psychological 
processes has been complemented by my reading about the importance of holding a 
position of ‘safe uncertainty’ (Mason, 1989, cited in Mason, 1993) when working 
with service users’ psychological difficulties.
When reflecting on the way in which I learn, I realized that one of the strengths of 
our group’s approach to the task was how we developed new ideas through our 
disagreements. I noticed how the varying viewpoints on IAPT held by different 
members of our group had initially created a sense of anxiety within me, but that 
through openly discussing our conflicting viewpoints, we developed both our 
capacity to critique the effectiveness of IAPT and think of novel ways of presenting 
these ideas within our presentation. When attempting to understand the psychological
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group processes behind this experience, I was reminded of the theory of social 
cognitive conflict (Perret-Clermont, 1979, cited in Perret-Clermont et al., 2004), 
which purports that children’s ability to develop novel solutions to problems is 
enhanced by group participation. Research by Schwarz et al., 2000 (cited in Perret- 
Clermont et al., 2004) indicates that this is also true for adults.
Whilst doing this PEL exercise, I initially thought that a weakness of our group’s 
approach to the task was in the way that as 2nd years we wished to prioritise our 
workload differently compared with the 3rd years. We wished to spend more time on 
thinking creatively about the task than the 3rd years, who because of the demands of 
their Major Research Projects, openly expressed their wish to spend just enough time 
on the task so as to deliver an acceptable presentation. It seemed to me that the 
pressure that the 3rd years were under to prioritise their work lead to them wishing to 
focus on the content of the presentation to the exclusion of thinking about the process 
of doing the task. However, on further reflection, I realized that the 3rd years were 
recognizing that in circumstances where multiple demands were being made on 
them, then it is legitimate to consider pragmatic decisions.
When thinking about the difference between the 2nd and 3rd year trainees within our 
group, it made me think about the idea of clinicians going through a process of 
gradually developing competences (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, cited in Beinart et al. 
2009). This model describes five developmental stages: novice, advanced beginner, 
competent, proficient, and expert, and that these stages occur as trainees (and 
qualified clinical psychologists) increasingly integrate their skills and knowledge in a 
flexible way that allows them to become more efficient and competent.
The presentation
Our group began our presentation by giving an overview of the history of IAPT and 
its current emphasis on quantitative research to demonstrate its efficacy. We then 
discussed both the strengths and weakness of IAPT programs relying on mainly on 
quantitative research as an evidence base from which to roll out this service across 
the nation. This part of the presentation used PowerPoint to aid the delivery of 
information to our audience. We then discussed how the use of qualitative research
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could help to give a voice to the experiences of service users, carers, and 
professionals involved with IAPT. We then introduced two roles plays so as to give 
an illustration of themes that may come up regarding the IAPT approach to 
psychological distress if a qualitative approach was used in adjunct to quantitative 
research. The first one was of two services users’ expectations of having therapy 
through services that have adopted the IAPT model of delivering psychological 
interventions. The second role play was of two General Practitioners discussing their 
experiences of IAPT within their medical practices. We finished our presentation by 
giving our reflections in terms of content and process, i.e. referring to both how our 
views of IAPT had developed through doing this PEL task and also on the process of 
working together as a group. Under the content section of our reflections we included 
the following: that we had to be careful not to drawn into taking polarised positions 
regarding our opinions of the IAPT; that because of our own individual preferences 
towards differing therapeutic orientations, we did not reach a common consensus on 
the value of the IAPT program; that the PEL task focused our attention on learning 
about IAPT; and that the process of critiquing research on the effectiveness of IAPT 
furthered our understanding of research methodologies. Under the process section of 
our reflections we included how the experience of working with trainees from across 
two academic years gave us an awareness of the developmental process that takes 
place as we progress through our clinical psychology course. As second years, we 
spoke of being able to see where our development as trainee clinical psychologists 
could be in a year’s time if we continued to engage with the demands of the training. 
For the third years, they were able to look back at where they were a year ago, and 
feel that their hard work was paying off in terms of their development towards 
becoming qualified clinical psychologists.
We also reflected on how we had all struggled with trying to find ways of bringing 
our presentation alive, but that eventually we had achieved this goal, and also how 
we believed that we had embraced the diversity within our group regarding both 
differing trainees’ styles of approaching the PEL task and their differing opinions of 
IAPT.
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Conclusion
Within this reflective account I have described the PEL task that our cohort were 
given, how our group worked together on this task, and both my personal reflections 
and those of our group regarding this process. However, to summarize, my most 
salient learning outcomes that derived from engaging with this task included the 
following: the opportunity to become more familiar with IAPT and to consider the 
ethical issues regarding this model of service; the chance to develop my team- 
working skills, further my understanding of group processes, and hone my ability to 
critique research; and finally, through the experience of working with 3rd year 
trainees, developing more awareness of my developmental progress towards 
becoming a clinical psychologist.
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Process Account of my Personal and Professional Learning 
Discussion Group -Year 1
Summary
The experience of contributing to my personal and professional development group 
(PPLDG) through presenting my genogram, clinical work, experiences of 
supervision, and dilemmas on placement helped me develop in several ways. I learnt 
to trust trainees with aspects of my family history. I was reminded how easy it is to 
hold taken-for-granted values, which if not acknowledged as such, can be imposed 
on our clients. I learnt that although holding a reflective space for the group has been 
valued by some members, I also need to balance this ability with expressing my own 
feelings more readily. I suggested a psychodynamic theory that I found illuminating, 
which was that maybe our group’s anxieties were sometimes projected out of the 
group and onto a common enemy. I described useful conversations we had regarding 
managing the task of report writing, and balancing the tension between being a 
novice yet being perceived as an expert on placement. I reflected on the importance 
of understanding that differing professions arguably use different unconscious 
defences to manage stress, and that this can lead to tensions in multi-disciplinary 
teams. I described our group’s intention to be proactive in asking our future 
facilitators to encourage us with developing aspects of our work. I wondered if the 
discussion I sparked concerning how being positioned as holding the male 
perspective in our group highlighted how we can inadvertently restrict our clients’ 
view of themselves; also, whether my openness helped other trainees with the task of 
being reflective within their professional practice.
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Process Account of my Personal and Professional Learning 
Discussion Group -  Year 2
Summary
I began this process account by describing our group’s decision to change its 
structure to having no set agenda (apart from when discussing set readings). I then 
reflected on our group’s changing membership and its possible influence on group 
dynamics (for example, possible unconscious processes linked to our group’s 
boundaries being breached). Regarding the work of our group, I gave an example of 
how we had discussed ethical ways of working with service users with whom we 
experienced strong emotional reactions, and the importance of using supervision to 
maintain good clinical practice.
I reflected on how our group’s set readings influenced my values, thinking, and 
clinical practice, and how my experience of feeling emotionally contained by our 
group allowed me to reflect on personal and professional issues. For example, I 
referred to how having had a cognitive assessment affected my own approach to 
administering tests; on reflection, I wondered if my disclosure contributed to the 
group thinking more about difference and diversity in terms of people’s differing 
cognitive profiles). I then described other contributions that I had made to the group, 
the group’s contributions to my learning and development, outlined a group 
discussion on how our professional development had impacted on our personal 
development and vice versa, and critiqued our group’s approach to working together. 
Lastly, I described how I felt about our facilitators changing again at the transition 
point between our 2nd and 3rd year of training.
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CLINICAL DOSSIER
The Clinical Dossier containing summaries of the five placements, four case 
reports and the oral presentation of clinical activity.
Overview of clinical experience obtained throughout 
placements
Adult mental health
This placement was based in a Community Mental Health Team.
Clinical work: I worked with male and female clients aged from 22 to 49 from 
diverse backgrounds who were experiencing/diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, OCD, 
health anxiety, psychosis, low levels of social and assertiveness skills, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, social phobia, and borderline personality disorder. This work was 
within a CBT framework. I gained experience in the use of standardised outcome 
measures in therapy. I undertook a cognitive assessment and a psychometric 
assessment. I took part in the weekly business meetings, a duty assessment, and 
observed family work and DBT supervision meetings. Risk assessment was an on 
important on-going process with all the clients.
Teaching and presentation: I presented/taught staff at a residential home the basic 
C.B.T approach. I requested feedback to be given to my supervisor  ---------
Child and Adolescent
This work was based mainly within a Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service, 
and some work linked to a Paediatric Multi-Disciplinary Assessment Service.
Clinical work: I worked with male and female clients aged from 3 to 15 from 
diverse backgrounds. This included clients who were experiencing/diagnosed with 
ASD, OCD, health anxiety, social phobia, and psychosomatic abdominal pains; 
assessing infants regarding possible diagnosis of ASD; and carrying out two
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cognitive assessments. The therapeutic work was within CBT, systemic, narrative, 
and developmental frameworks, and included working with parents, schools, and 
other professionals, in a variety of contexts. I took part in business/client meetings. 
Risk assessment was an on important on-going process with all the clients.
Teaching/presentation : I presented/taught information on ASD to 20 parents of 
children diagnosed with this disorder.
Learning Disability
This placement was based with a Joint Community Learning Disabilities Team.
Clinical work: I worked with male and female clients aged 20 to 63 with diverse 
backgrounds, with severe to borderline learning disabilities, experiencing/diagnosed 
with generalized anxiety, “challenging behaviour.” This was mainly within a 
functional analysis framework, but also included CBT and systemic work. I used 
appropriate psychometric assessment/approaches when assessing for dementia, ASD, 
assessing capacity for consent regarding sexual contact with another resident, and 
assessing eligibility for access to the learning disability team. Joint/multi-disciplinary 
working with other professionals, carers/relatives and staff in residential homes. Risk 
assessment was an on important on-going process with all the clients.
Teaching/presentation: I presented to staff at a residential home for people with 
severe learning disabilities psychological formulations regarding their clients. This 
included teaching on ASD. I attended business/client meetings at the service.
Specialist Placement
This was based at a psychotherapy department.
Clinical work: I worked with male and female clients aged between 20 and 51 
experiencing/diagnosed with long-term complex issues relating to anxiety,
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depression, and schizo-affective disorder. These clients had ready worked within a 
CBT model with other professionals before being referred to the psychotherapy 
department for therapeutic work was within a psychodynamic therapy framework. I 
also took an active role in the weekly psychotherapy assessment workshop. Risk 
assessment was an on important on-going process with all the clients.
Presentation/teaching: Presenting clinical work to tern of psychotherapists and 
psychoanalysts.
Older Adults
This was based at an Older Adults Mental Health Service, which involved both 
inpatient and out-patient work.
Clinical work: I worked with males and females aged between 67 to 93 from diverse 
backgrounds who were experiencing/diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and bi­
polar disorder, and which were made complex by health problems, adverse 
circumstances, tensions within families, tensions within their homes. The therapeutic 
work was within the frameworks of individual CBT (including third wave), narrative, 
systemic; and included joint working with an occupational therapist and family work. 
Cognitive and psychometric assessments were conducted. Risk assessment was an on 
important on-going process with all the clients. I attended ward rounds, a CPA, CPD 
workshops, a staff development meeting, and regional business meetings.
Group work: I co-facilitated a meditation group, a falls group and a pulmonary 
rehabilitation group and a psycho-educational group.
Consultation/service development work: Consultation to CPN was given regarding 
client work. I also conducted consultation/development work related to running of the 
meditation group.
Teaching/presentation: Presented Mindfulness literature and my experience of co- 
facilitating a mindfulness group to a regional network of psychologists.
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Summary Case Report 1
Cognitive behavioural therapy with a man in his twenties presenting with
symptoms characteristic of both obsessive compulsive disorder and health 
anxiety
Michael is a white, heterosexual male in his twenties, who lives with his girlfriend. 
He was referred by his GP to my community mental health team because Michael 
was experiencing health anxiety and thoughts of harming his girlfriend. A risk 
assessment indicated that he was not a risk to others or himself. Michael has neither 
experienced previous contact with psychiatric services nor psychological therapy. 
His early life experiences included being rejected by friends and a previous 
girlfriend, and the death of 2 close family friends. Michael took street drugs for 3 
years. On quitting, he experienced a headache which he misinterpreted as a brain 
tumour. Michael and I formulated his problems as follows: Michael developed the 
belief that he was responsible for distressing others, possibly linked to him believing 
he caused problems by being bom through highlighting his parents’ extra-marital 
affair. He believed that there was something ‘wrong’ with him and that his negative 
thoughts towards others were harmful. His attempts control his thoughts failed. His 
anxiety caused physical sensations that he misinterpreted as health problems. The 
work of therapy was to illuminate these beliefs; to learn how he maintained his 
anxiety; and then to find new, normalising, ways of explaining his experiences, so 
that he could achieve his goal of ‘not obsessing’ and begin ‘enjoying life’. Michael’s 
anxiety shifted from severe to mild, and his depression from moderate to mild 
(according to the BAI and BDI scores, respectfully). Observations by his girlfriend, 
Michael, and me concurred with these scores.
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Summary Case Report 2
Neuropsychological assessment of a woman in her sixties, focusing on her acute 
memory problems
Sahira, an Indian woman in her early sixties was referred for a neuropsychological 
assessment to ascertain whether her memory problems were related to severe 
depression, ECT sessions, or a form of dementia. Her memory was reported as 
normal until a week after her last session of 6 of bi-lateral ECT, when she developed 
a rapid deterioration in her short-term memory. Her long-term partner also left her 
within this time frame. Her parents and husband have all died over the last 21 years. 
Sahira has 2 children. She was admitted to a psychiatric hospital last year with severe 
depression. She has had ECT on a previous admission in 1992. Records show no 
other psychiatric medical problems. I administered the BDI-II, BAI, HADS, WTAR, 
WAIS-III, and WMS-Hl 7.5 months after her last ECT session. During the 
assessment she appeared to confabulate and have difficulties with visuo-spatial 
functioning. She performed very poorly across all the tests. Although the evidence 
was conflictual, it appears that Sahira’s memory problems are linked to depression. 
However, a form of dementia cannot be ruled out. Therefore, I recommended an 
fMRI scan, an activity of daily living assessment with an Occupational Therapist, 
and will discuss her case with a specialist neuropsychologist. I will report back to 
everyone concerned including Sahira.
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Summary Case Report 3
Cognitive behavioural therapy within a systemic context of a young boy with 
anxieties related to anticipating physical pain
Richard is a White British boy of primary school age who lives with his family. 
Referred by his paediatrician, because he was experiencing anxieties related to 
anticipating physical pain, a risk assessment indicated that Richard was not a risk to 
himself or others. Richard had not had psychological therapy or previous contact 
with psychiatric services. His life experiences centred on chronic physical health 
conditions and related hospitalizations. Richard felt anxious when exposed to novel 
or uncomfortable physical sensations.
Richard, his mother and I formulated his problems: Richard’s experiences of 
hospitals and his awareness of his parents’ anxieties regarding his health led him to 
believe he was physically vulnerable. He believed he could not trust people because 
medical professionals promised they would not hurt him and then did. Therefore, the 
world was dangerous and needed avoiding. For example, Richard panicked when 
experiencing bowel movements, as this was a novel experience after his ileostomy 
reversal, then avoided the toilet and soiled himself. To achieve his goal of ‘not 
worrying as much that this may hurt [him],’ the work of therapy was to elucidate his 
beliefs, assumptions and anxious predictions and learn how Richard and his ‘system’ 
maintained anxiety; teach him to challenge his thoughts; test his anxious predictions 
through behavioural experiments; and learn ways to relax his body. Richard’s 
anxiety on the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (Parent Version) reduced. 
Observations concurred with these scores. My supervisor continued the work with 
Richard because he required further intervention to alleviate his chronic anxieties.
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Summary Case Report 4 (Oral Presentation of clinical activity)
Working with a staff team, using a positive behavioural support framework, to 
support a man in his early 20s with learning disabilities, Down’s syndrome and 
autistic spectrum condition, to reduce his self-injurious behaviour
The oral presentation began with a discussion on my development as a trainee 
clinical psychologist. I focused on how I have learnt to make theory-practice links 
using differing theoretical models, whilst considering neuropsychological factors and 
working with service users’ systems. I then discussed my work with Alvin, an Afro- 
Caribbean man in his early 20s with diagnoses of Down’s syndrome, learning 
disability, and an autistic spectrum condition. He is reported to have been abused and 
neglected by his carer in the Caribbean whilst his mother visited the UK to find a 
home, which he moved to, aged 8. Since his mid-teens, Alvin was supported at a 
residential school for children with learning disabilities. Two years ago, he moved to 
his current residential home. Alvin was referred by his Psychiatrist for an assessment 
of his self-injurious behaviour (banging his head and ears), and management 
guidelines for staff at his residential home. Alvin also engaged in anal poking 
behaviour.
The framework of my intervention with Alvin was positive behaviour support. This 
included gathering information staff at his residential home, and observing him in 
different environments.
Formulation: Alvin has a significant learning disability, Down’s syndrome, is non­
verbal, and has great difficulty with verbal comprehension. Thus he finds it difficult 
to communicate his needs, and requires people to actively try to work out what these 
might be. Alvin also has an autistic spectrum condition, causing him to have an 
impaired imagination. Thus he finds it difficult to imagine what might happen next in 
any situation, particularly when experiencing new events or transitions, and thus he 
experiences anxiety. Much of Alvin’s self-injurious behaviour seemed to occur when 
he could not work out what was likely to happen. Alvin banged his head in an
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attempt to escape from his experience of anxiety. As a consequence of this 
behaviour, staff attempted to engage him in an activity or help him soothe. This 
resulted in Alvin’s anxiety being reduced, which reinforced the behaviour.
Recommendations included for staff to develop consistent, detailed routines and 
activities around times that Alvin experiences transitions; and to routinize their 
approach to supporting Alvin when he was anxious. For Alvin to be referred by 
myself to a Speech and Language Therapist, so that his expressive and receptive 
language could be assessed.
Evaluation of pre- and post- intervention scores on Challenging Behaviour Interview 
forms showed the following differences in ratings: frequency in which Alvin would 
definitely be observed engaging in head banging behaviour decreased from ‘in the 
next 15 minutes’ to ‘by this time tomorrow’ ; longest period of this behaviour 
decreased from ‘less than an hour’ to ‘less than 15 minutes.’ Alvin’s Health of the 
Nation Outcome Scales for People with Learning Disabilities score decreased from 
26 to 25, because he had ceased to engage in anal poking behaviour.
Throughout my oral presentation, I focused on how my engagement skills have 
developed from my previous psychodynamic training (one-to-one work), to now 
recognizing the importance of learning how to engage with everyone involved in 
service users’ systems.
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Summary Case Report 5
Consultancy and service development work, based on systemic thinking, related 
to the running of a meditation group
This case report focuses on my consultancy/service development work relating to the 
running of a meditation group in a mental health service for older adults, although it 
also acknowledges that I am also a facilitator in the group. It describes how I used 
systemic thinking to negotiate these multiple roles. I was commissioned to find a 
psychometric instrument for measuring both service users’ suitability for the group 
and the group’s ‘effectiveness’; develop an evidence-based structured group course; 
and improve the functioning of the group in terms of the ways the facilitators work 
together. I decided that it would be appropriate to use a collaborative consultation 
model, whilst also drawing on both the development consultation approach and 
strategic planning. Informal and formal conversations with the facilitators/consultees 
were used to gather information. The processes of assessing and formulation 
included giving consideration to multiple roles, hierarchy, coalitions, implicit and 
explicit beliefs within the subsystem of facilitators/consultees and commissioner. 
Formulation included hypothesising whether the facilitators wanted to keep the 
group functioning in a way that prevented change which might challenge their 
positions as facilitators. An initial group consultation meeting developed the goals of 
my consultancy/development work to include helping the team develop a pathway 
through the meditation group. Feedback included facilitators saying that being 
consulted gave them the experience of being listened to and valued as team 
members. Additionally, my supervisor/commissioner said the consultancy work 
raised her aware of the multiple roles that she has within the facilitatory subsystem.
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RESEARCH DOSSIER
The Research Dossier contains the research logbook, the service related research 
project completed in Year 1, an abstract of the qualitative research project 
completed in Year 2 and the major research project, completed in Year 3.
Research Log
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research questions Z
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information technology and 
literature search tools
/
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating research methods Z
4 Formulating specific research questions z
5 Writing brief research proposals z
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols z
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, including issues of 
diversity, and structuring plans accordingly
z
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics committee z
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research z
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research z
11 Collecting data from research participants z
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions z
13 Writing patient information and consent forms z
14 Devising and administering questionnaires z
15 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS settings
16 Setting up a data file z
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS z
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses z
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis z
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis z
21 Summarising results in figures and tables z
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews z
23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative methods z
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses z
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data analysis z
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts z
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27 Producing a written report on a research project Z
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses Z
29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed journals or edited 
book
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice z
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Abstract
In order for a university’s clinical psychology programme to help maintain its BPS 
accredited status, this audit was commissioned with the aim of ascertaining whether 
this programme complies with criteria set by the BPS guidelines on clinical 
supervision (BPS, 2002, p.l); these guidelines also refer to necessary structural 
placement requirements outside that of the supervision sessions that support trainees 
clinical and administrative needs2. Therefore, this audit’s objective was to find 
evidence to support the hypothesis, ‘the majority of trainees will agree/strongly agree 
to positively framed statements which are informed by standards on clinical 
supervision set by the BPS.’ Taking into account the limitations of the sample size 
and unequal representation of cohorts within the programmes trainee population, 
evidence for this hypothesis was supported by the analysis of this audit; thus 
indicating that the university’s clinical psychology programme meets the 
aforementioned BPS standards. However, there are clear areas for improvement. 
These include more opportunities for trainees to both observe their supervisors’ work 
and get more organisational work; for trainees to have at least three hours a week of 
contact time with their supervisors, and to be given sufficient time for clinically 
relevant reading on their placements. Therefore, this audit concludes with a 
recommendation for further audits to be carried out as trainees develop through the 
clinical psychology programme, focusing on the quality of trainees’ supervisory 
experience; particular attention should be given to aforementioned areas of concern 
that require improvement.
2 The title of this report has changed since the proposal stage, so as to clarify that it is an audit.
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Introduction
Clinical placements are central to trainee clinical psychologists’ development as 
competent clinicians. This is because the purpose of supervision includes the 
teaching of clinical skills (Watkins, 1997) that ensures that clinical practice is both 
effective and safe (Falender & Shafranske, 2004). Supervision also needs to have a 
supportive function for supervisees (Russell & Petrie, 1994).
In order for a university’s clinical psychology programme to help maintain its BPS 
accredited status, this audit’s aim was to ascertain whether the programme complies 
with the criteria set by the BPS guidelines on the ‘minimum standards necessary to 
achieve good practice in the supervision of clinical trainees’ (BPS, 2002, p.l); these 
guidelines also refer to necessary structural placement requirements outside that of 
the supervision sessions that support trainees clinical and administrative needs. 
Therefore the objective of this audit was to find evidence to support the following 
hypothesis: the majority of trainees will agree/strongly agree to positively framed 
statements which are informed by standards on clinical supervision set by the BPS, 
thus suggesting that the university’s clinical psychology programme meets the 
predetermined standard set by the BPS guidelines on clinical supervision of trainees 
(BPS, 2002).
With regards to service-related implications, any concerns highlighted in this audit 
will be offered as feedback to supervisors, collectively, and for responses to this 
feedback to be monitored in future audits.
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Methodology
Setting
The university’s clinical psychology doctorate programme.
Data sources
A questionnaire (Appendix A) based on a Likert-scale format was designed to extract 
data necessary to measure trainees’ experiences of supervision against guidelines for 
supervision, set down by the BPS to ensure good practice (BPS, 2002). Statements 
were derived from sections of the aforementioned BPS guidelines that trainees were 
in a position to comment on.
Open questions were included so as to capture themes emerging from the trainees’ 
collective experiences. The open ended questions derived from relevant research on 
supervisory issues. For example, the open question, ‘What impact do you think your 
supervisory relationship had on your clinical work?’, derived from research by 
Kavanagh et al. (2003) suggesting that supervisees consider their clinical work more 
effective if they have experienced supervision as an safe, empathie space.
The open question referring to trainees’ experiences of supervisory boundaries and 
its impact on clinical work, derived from a grounded theory analysis by Beinart 
(2002, as cited in Fleming & Steen, 2004) focusing on predictive factors that 
supervisees considered necessary for a good supervisory relationship. Predictive 
factors included the importance of supervisory boundaries between personal and 
professional life, and boundaries concerning time, place, and frequency of 
supervision (ibid.).
Page 77 of 233
A study by Yourman and Faber (1986) that indicated that supervisees occasionally 
conceal and distort clinical material in supervision informed the open question, ‘To 
what extent were you able to be open with your supervisor?’ Also, relevant to this 
question was research suggesting that the working alliance can be developed by 
supervisors sharing their experiences with supervisees (Ladany et ah, 2001).
The rational for the open questions referring to trainees feeling able to discuss issues 
of difference and diversity, and power relations, derived from recognizing that 
difference and diversity, and power relations, can remain neglected issues within 
supervision (Patel, 2004).
Procedures
The following items were emailed, via the programme administrator, to all trainees 
on the university’s clinical psychology programme:
• Information sheet (Appendix B; includes purpose of audit).
• Consent form (Appendix C; specifies ethical considerations).
• Questionnaire (Appendix A).
Trainees were asked to complete questionnaire (anonymously) with respect to their 
most recently completed placement, or, for first years, their current year-long 
placement. To further protect trainees’ anonymity, a collection box for completed 
questionnaires was placed in the clinical psychology’s administration office. 
Therefore, trainees were given the opportunity to be candid regarding their feedback 
because it could not be linked to their supervisors.
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Method of Analysis
Both descriptive statistics and a qualitative thematic analysis of trainees’ experiences 
were derived from the responses to the questionnaires, and were measured against 
the guidelines on clinical supervision of trainees, set by the BPS. Braun and Clarke 
(2006) stated that the research question guides how a thematic analysis is conducted. 
In this audit the superordinate themes were deliberately left in a more descriptive 
state than usual, for the purpose of being useful as a guide for improving future 
supervisory practice.
Results and Analysis
Table 1.
Response levels to questionnaire from PsychD Clinical Psychology trainees
Year (number on cohort) Number of responses 
(proportion of cohort)
Percentage of 
overall responses
1 33 24 (72.73%) 64.9%
2 27 8 (29.63%) 21.6%
3 22 5 (22.73%) 13.5%
Total - 37 (45.23%) 100%
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Overall, trainees who completed the questionnaire mainly agreed or strongly agreed 
to the positively framed statements. Trainees also mainly agreed or strongly to the 
following 2 statements (which examined the presence of negative aspects, so that a 
negative response to these was a positive result):
• I was given too much organizational work (5.3)
• I was not given enough organizational work. (5.3)
However, a high percentage of trainees disagreed/strongly disagreed with the 
following statements:
• I was given an appropriate amount of organizational work. (5.3)
Therefore, overall it appears that 45.9% of trainees would have liked have 
been given the opportunity to do more organizational work.
Also, a high percentage of trainees also disagreed/strongly disagreed with the 
following statements:
• I had at least three hours a week of contact time with my supervisor. (6.1)
• I had sufficient opportunities to observe my supervisor’s clinical work. (6.4)
• I had been given sufficient time for clinically relevant reading. (6.3)
Therefore, the analysis of the data collected from trainees who completed the 
questionnaire supports the following hypothesis: the majority of trainees 
agreed/strongly agreed to positively framed statements which are informed by 
standards on clinical supervision set by the BPS. This suggests that the university’s 
clinical psychology programme meets the predetermined standard set by the BPS 
guidelines on clinical supervision of trainees (BPS, 2002). However, a concerning
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minority of trainees dis agreed/strongly disagreed with some of positively framed 
statements, including:
• My supervisor arranged cover for his/her annual leave, etc. (4.3)
• I had sufficient secretarial support and IT support. (4.4)
• My supervisor helped me integrate my academic and clinical learning (6.3)
The thematic analysis highlighted several themes for each open question, and is 
reported below (see Appendix E for table of themes, superordinate themes, and 
selection of relevant quotes).
1. Trainees described helpful supervisor’s behaviour as follows: supervisors’ ability 
to trust their trainees; and supervisor’s accessibility, responsiveness, flexibility, 
supportiveness, approachability, willingness to offer and accept constructive 
feedback. Also, trainees valued being given enough structured supervision, 
opportunities to observe, access to clinical reading material, and appreciated 
supervisors who they regarded as knowledgeable and experienced.
2. Trainees reported that what was unhelpful about their supervisor’s behaviour 
included lack of containing, emotional and practical support (including feedback), 
not enough collaboration and reflectivity, the overestimation of trainees’ level of 
knowledge and experience, and lack of time and structure.
3. Good supervisory relationship were experienced by trainees as supportive, 
motivating, emotionally containing, and allowed for trainees to develop both 
confidence and creativity, alongside development of personal awareness, in their 
clinical work. It also enabled trainees to make links between theory and practice.
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4. Trainees said that discussions regarding issues of difference and diversity were 
often encouraged; however, some trainees thought that their supervisors’ apparent 
discomfort and lack of reflections on these issues impeded these discussions.
5. Most trainees experienced both supervisory and placement boundaries as helpful 
with regards to allowing them to feel contained and safe, and to develop their own 
clinical boundaries. However, positive aspects of looser time boundaries in 
supervision were also highlighted.
6. Most trainees felt that they could discuss in supervision the effect of differing 
power relations experienced in their clinical work, supervision, and within the 
placement, generally, and that this helped trainees think about both inter-personal 
and organizational power relations. Power relation discussions were impeded by 
supervisor’s apparent discomfit with discussing these issues.
7. Trainees’ power relations within the supervisory relationship often affected 
trainees’ openness; openness was regarded by trainees as a facilitative factor in their 
learning.
8. Trainees reported that they would have preferred supervisors who were organized 
and structured in supervision, and also been offered more reflective space to discuss 
issues. However, other trainees reported no wish for changes regarding their 
supervisory experiences.
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Discussion
When critiquing this audit, it is important to consider that trainees’ experiences of 
supervision are considered within the following context: that ‘effective supervision is 
not always the most satisfying supervision (i.e. the struggle inherent in learning may 
not always be experienced as the most satisfying)’ (Ladany et al., 1999, p.454). 
However, the minority of trainees who disagreed/ strongly disagreed to positively 
framed statements still needs to be taken seriously.
However, a particularly reassuring finding was that, overall, trainees strongly agreed 
to the statement, T had a good relationship with my supervisor,’ which refers to 
section 7.1 of the BPS Guideline for Clinical Supervision. This is encouraging 
because a study by Moskowitz and Rupert (1983) reported that 38% of graduates of 
clinical psychology had experienced a significant conflict within their supervisory 
relationship which they considered had inhibited their learning capacity within 
supervision.
Also, many of the themes that emerged from this audit echoed those that were 
described in Beinart’s (2002, as cited in Fleming & Steen, 2004) analysis on predictive 
factors that supervisees consider to necessary for a good supervisory relationship: an 
experience of a supportive, respectful, open, yet boundaried relationship, where the 
supervisee believed that the supervisor was committed to the supervisees 
supervision; and where there was frequent two-way feedback between both the 
supervisee and supervisor.
A limit of this audit is that only certain sections of the BPS guidelines on clinical 
supervision of trainees were audited for this report. Also, any conclusions drawn 
from this audit are weakened by the possibility that the trainees who declined to take 
part in this audit shared a different set of views to those who took part, regarding 
both their supervision and placement experiences. A possible reason for this low
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response rate may have been that the researcher, being a 1st year trainee, had stronger 
personal connections with this cohort. Also, some trainees may have felt pressurised 
by receiving the following emails (via the programme administrator) after receiving 
the original questionnaire, information sheet, and consent form via email):
• one email, confirming that trainees were to only report on their experiences 
related to their main supervisor and placement (this was because the 
questionnaire design had not taken into account the possibility that some 
trainees had more than one supervisor and placement - this meant that 
trainees with more than one supervisor could only describe part of their 
supervisory and placement experiences).
• one email, with a different formatted version of the questionnaire, 
information sheet, and consent form, because not all trainees could open their 
original files.
• two emails, both on request of PsychD staff, to encourage trainees to consider 
taking part in this audit.
I was very aware of the ethical implications of ‘encouraging’ trainees to respond to 
the questionnaire, but was encouraged myself, to do so by the university’s clinical 
psychology staff. However, it was argued that trainees were robust and that this audit 
should include all this university’s clinical psychology trainees. I regret both not 
formatting the questionnaire and related documentation using a lower version of 
Word that all PC users could have accessed first time, and using email so much. I 
have learnt from these mistakes.
Although the 1st year trainees’ proportion of responses to the audit was 72.73%, (a 
high response rate), it would have been valuable to have had more responses from 
the senior trainees (2nd and 3rd years); the proportion of responses from these cohorts 
was only 29.63% and 22.73%, respectively. This is because, as suggested by the 
developmental approach to supervision (Watkins, 1995; Stoltenberg and Del worth,
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1987), trainees develop their awareness of self and other, autonomy, and motivation 
throughout their clinical training. Therefore they have arguably developed their 
ability to critique their clinical supervisory and placement experiences.
Another limitation was the timing of this audit. It meant that the 1st year could only 
review their experiences of supervision for approximately % of the full duration of 
their time on placements. However, arguably these trainees still had many 
supervisory and placement-related experiences on which to reflect.
Conclusion
According to this audit, which has recognized its limitations, the majority of trainees 
agreed/strongly agreed to positively framed statements which are informed by 
standards on clinical supervision set by the BPS. This suggests that the university’s 
clinical psychology programme overall meets the predetermined standard set by the 
BPS guidelines on clinical supervision (BPS, 2002). However, there are clear areas 
for improvement. These include, more opportunities for trainees to observe their 
supervisors’ work; opportunities for trainees to get more organisational work on their 
placements; to ensure that all trainees have at least three hours a week of contact time 
with their supervisors; to ensure that all trainees are given sufficient time for 
clinically relevant reading on their placements; for supervisors to arrange their cover 
for their annual leave, etc; for trainees to have sufficient secretarial support and IT 
support; and for supervisors to help trainees integrate their academic and clinical 
learning.
This audit concludes with a recommendation for further audits focusing on the 
quality of trainees’ supervisory experience to be carried out as trainees develop 
through the clinical psychology programme; particular attention should be given to 
aforementioned areas of concern that require improvement. This audit will be 
feedback to the clinical psychology staff who commissioned this audit.
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Appendix A
SRRP Questionnaire
SRRP Questionnaire
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1. Are you are 1st, 2nd or 3rd year on the **** Clinical Psychology at ***** 
University?
INSTRUCTION: PLEASE TICK INSIDE THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
l*Year 2»dYear S^Year
NB: First years: All of the following questions refer to your 
current adult placement 
NB: Second and third years: All of the following questions refer 
to vour previous placement (September 2008 -  April 2009) 
Instruction: Please mark your responses to the following 
statements on the Likert Scales provided:
2. My supervisor had sufficient current theoretical knowledge in his/her field of 
work to support my needs as a trainee.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
3. My supervisor had sufficient knowledge of current research in his/her field of 
work to support my needs as a trainee.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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4. My supervisor had sufficient knowledge of current professional 
developments in his/her field of work to support my needs as a trainee.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
5. I was given the opportunity, before and or shortly after beginning my 
placement, to discuss the range of possible experiences that were going to be 
made available to me as a trainee.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
6. Within this period of time, I was told what would be expected of me with 
regards to both my hours and days of work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
7. My interests, needs, and previously accrued experiences were taken into 
account when the placement contract was being jointly created by my 
supervisor and me.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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8. My supervisor planned an induction.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
9. I found my induction helpful. (Instruction: Please leave blank if not 
applicable).
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
10. My supervisor arranged for cover when s/he was on annual leave, et cetera.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
11. My supervisor planned casework for me sufficiently in advance.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
12.1 had sufficient access to office space which included a desk and a telephone.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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13.1 had sufficient secretarial and IT support.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
14.1 was given an appropriate amount of direct clinical work on placement.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
15.1 was not given enough direct clinical work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
16.1 was given too much direct clinical work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
17.1 was given an appropriate amount of indirect clinical work on placement.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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18.1 was not given enough indirect clinical work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
19.1 was given too much indirect work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
20.1 was given an appropriate amount of organizational work on placement.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
21.1 was not given enough organizational work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
22.1 was given too much organizational work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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23 .1 had the opportunity to work with applied clinical psychologists, other than 
my supervisor, whilst on placement.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
24.1 had at least an hour of scheduled supervision a week.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
25.1 had at least three hours a week of contact time (including supervision) with 
my supervisor.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
26.1 had been given sufficient time for clinically relevant reading on my 
placement.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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27. My supervisor helped me integrate my academic and clinical learning.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
28. My supervisor suggested suitable reading suitable for my clinical work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
29. My supervisor helped me develop my critical and scholarly approach to my 
clinical work.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
30.1 had sufficient opportunities to observe my supervisor doing clinical work, 
directly, or via audio recordings, et cetera.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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31. My supervisor observed my clinical work, directly, or via audio recordings, et 
cetera.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
32.1 had a good relationship with my supervisor.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
33. My supervisor adapted his or her style sufficiently so as to enable me to learn 
effectively the differing relevant clinical techniques required of me at my 
current stage of development.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
34. My supervisor seemed to adapt his or her style of supervision to the level of 
training I had reached on the course.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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35. If my supervisor overruled my preferred way of working (e.g. regarding 
theoretical orientation and clinical interests) then s/he gave me clear reasons 
for overruling me. (INSTRUCTION: Please leave this blank if not 
applicable).
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
36. My relationship with my supervisor was such that I could discuss my 
concerns about service users, staff, and other issues (for example, workload, 
time management skills, and experiencing difficult emotions evoked in 
therapy, supervision, and on placement generally).
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
37. My supervisor was able to discuss issues relating to my concerns about 
service users, staff, and other issues with me in a serious, sensitive, and 
sympathetic manner.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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Instruction: The following statement is just for trainees who had team 
or group supervision:
38.1 had additional individual supervision to discuss personal, professional, and 
organizational issues.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
Instruction: The following statement is just for trainees who had more 
than one supervisor per placement:
39. A primary supervisor was identified to support me in terms of planning and 
coordinating my placement, assessment and supervision, and liaison with 
university staff.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
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INSTRUCTION: PLEASE WRITE YOUR RESPONSES BENEATH THE 
APPROPRIATE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
L What was helpful about your supervisor’s behaviour? Please give 
examples.
2. What was unhelpful about your supervisor’s behaviour? Please give 
examples.
3. What impact do you think your supervisory relationship had on your 
clinical work?
4. Did you feel able to discuss issues of difference and diversity in 
supervision (i.e. how your supervisor, service users, and yourself were 
positioned with one another, both within (and outside of) the context of 
your placement)?
5. Did you feel that your supervisor kept you emotionally contained via 
adhering to clear boundaries (time keeping, use of disclosure, et cetera), 
and what impact did this have on your clinical work, your experience of 
supervision, and your experience of the placement generally?
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6. Could you discuss in supervision the effect of differing power relations 
experienced in your clinical work, supervision, and within the placement, 
generally?
7. To what extent were you able to be open with your supervisor? Please 
expand on this.
8. If it was possible, what would you have changed about your supervisory 
experience?
Please now put this questionnaire (including the consent form)
into the collection box
located within the PsychD Clinical Psychology Administration
Room.
Thank you for your time and effort.
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Appendix B
Information Sheet for Participants
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Information for Participants
Trainee clinical psychologists9 evaluation of the quality
of supervision on their clinical placements: a mixed 
method analysis
This Service-Related Research Project (SRRP) is a university-based study. 
Respondents need to be trainee clinical psychologists from the Practitioner 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology course at **** University. Its purpose is to 
audit trainees’ experiences of clinical supervision on placement by mapping 
their responses against the British Psychological Society’s current guidelines 
on clinical supervision of trainees (BPS, 2002)4. I will be also asking trainees 
about what supervisory experiences they have found helpful and unhelpful, so 
as to get a richer sense of the themes that may emerge from the collective 
experiences of the trainees on the **** Clinical Psychology course.
There is no obligation to complete the questionnaire: you can withdraw at any 
stage of the study without justifying your reasons; this action will neither 
compromise your position on the course nor attract prejudice.
If you do choose to participate in this study you will be asked to consider your 
experiences regarding your clinical supervision on placement, and to respond 
via both statements based on a Likert Scale format and some open questions. It 
will take no longer than 30 minutes. A collection box for this questionnaire is 
located in the PsychD Clinical Psychology Administration Room, so as to 
protect your anonymity. Although there is a question on the form which asks 
whether you are a 1st, 2nd or 3rd year on the PsychD Clinical Psychology 
course, any data received will be treated confidentially, in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act, 1998; thus any identifying material will be disguised or 
omitted from my report. Participants can request a copy of the completed 
study.
For further information on this study, please contact me: Jonathan Pointer 
J.Pointer©****.ac.uk
If you have any concerns or wish to make a complaint about how this study 
has been conducted, you can either contact myself at the email address above 
or my SRRP supervisor: Dr. Louise Deacon
L.Deacon@surrey.ac.uk
4 Reference: British Psychological Society. (2002). Guidelines on Clinical Supervision. 
Leicester: BPS.
Appendix C
Consent Form
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Consent Form
I have voluntarily agreed to take part in this SRRP entitled, ‘Trainee 
clinical psychologists’ evaluation of the quality of supervision on their 
clinical placements: a mixed method analysis.’
I have read and understood the information sheet provided. Therefore, I 
have an understanding of the purpose and likely duration of this study; and 
also what taking part in this study entails. I have been given the 
opportunity, via email, to ask for further information regarding this study.
There is a question on the form which asks whether participants are 1st, 2nd 
or 3rd years on the PsychD Clinical Psychology course. However, I 
understand that the questionnaires are collected and processed in a way that 
protects the participants’ anonymity (in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998)) and that any identifying material will be disguised 
or omitted from the report.
I understand that I am not obliged to participate in this research, and can 
withdraw at any stage without justifying my reasons; this action will 
neither compromise my position on the course nor attract prejudice.
W ith regards to this study, I have both had the opportunity to ask questions 
and the time needed to consider my participation.
I agree to my participation in this study (Please tick the appropriate box 
below).
Agree
Disagree
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Appendix D
Table illustrating the percentage of Likert Scale 
responses by trainees to statements in the 
questionnaire
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Appendix E
Table of themes, superordinate themes, and a sample of
related quotes
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Themes within responses 
to each question
Superordinate themes Quotes
Question 1
An accessible supervisor 
who is responsive and 
flexible to the developing 
needs of trainee
‘Accessible’
‘She was able to 
adapt to suit my 
learning needs and 
development and 
supervision structure 
changed to 
accommodate this...’
‘She helped me 
choose clients from 
the waiting list who 
would be appropriate 
to work with 
considering my level 
of training and 
previous 
experience...’
Available/accessible
supervisor
Responsiveness and flexibility
Engaging at level appropriate 
for trainee
Autonomy 
Trusting trainee
Supervisor trusting trainee 
to have a degree of 
autonomy
‘Encouraged me to 
use my initiative’
‘Giving me 
opportunities to learn 
from my own 
mistakes e.g. letting 
me do something my 
way and then 
reflecting with me’
Page 116 of 233
Knowledgeable and 
experienced in area of 
expertise
For supervisor to be 
knowledgeable and 
experienced in area of 
expertise
‘Very experienced 
and knowledgeable’
‘Very good at 
knowing the 
research/evidence 
base for the area’
Offering constructive criticism
Supervisor asking for feedback
Ability to respond to 
constructive criticism/concerns
Supervisor both offering 
and accepting constructive 
feedback
‘Offering
constructive criticism 
and praise in relation 
to my performance 
and social skills’
‘Asking for feedback 
regarding his 
evaluation of my 
performance on 
placement, listening 
and reviewing his 
evaluation’
‘Was able to respond 
to constructive 
criticism/concerns’
Supportive
Helping with university work 
Approachable 
Supervisor disclosure
Supportive (emotionally 
and practically) and 
approachable
‘Supportive of me i.e. 
when a client did not 
want to see me as I 
was a trainee’
‘Great with helping 
with case report’
‘Always being 
approachable 
whatever the issue’
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‘She gives me 
examples of her 
thoughts and 
anxieties to make 
learning and some 
ambivalence feel 
normal’
Opportunities to observe 
supervisor’s clinical work
Opportunities to both 
observe supervisor and 
access suggested reading 
to develop clinical skills
‘Loads of 
opportunities to 
observe him and 
video/audio extracts 
of their work’
Suggestions of appropriate 
literature and having access to 
it
Offered access to clinical 
reading material
‘Forwarding relevant 
articles’
Time
Structure and organisation
Time and structure ‘Sufficient 
supervision time’
‘Organized in terms 
of time/room,/giving 
me
reading/preparation’
Question 2
Lack of emotional and 
practical support
Lack of feedback
Lack of containing, 
emotional and practical 
support (including 
feedback)
‘Supervisor 
sometimes abrupt in 
manner -  this 
sometimes inhibited 
me from bringing 
issues... particularly 
in relation to my own 
emotional responses 
to situations’
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‘Did not give any 
feedback on my 
performance until the 
end of placement 
review’
Non-collaborative style 
Not reflective
Not enough collaboration 
and reflectivity
‘He had a very 
didactic supervision 
style (with him as the 
expert delivering 
tutorials), which 
wasn’t conducive to 
my learning, not 
appropriate to my 
needs at the time’
‘Unable to be 
reflective or promote 
supervision thinking 
in supervision’
Overestimating trainee’s level 
of knowledge and experience
Overestimating trainees’ 
level of knowledge and 
experience
‘Thinking at a 
complex, integrative 
level could 
sometimes feel too 
challenging for my 
level of training’
Lack of time 
Lack of structure
Lack of time and structure ‘Not giving enough 
time to think widely 
about clients -  e.g. 
Focusing on what 
was happening, not 
really about what 
wasn’t happening, or 
what else might be 
happening’
‘Sometimes it could
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be a bit disorganized’
Question 3
Lack of a supportive 
supervisory relationship 
stopped trainees feeling 
clinically creative and 
motivated
Supportive supervisory 
relationship leading to trainees 
feeling respected and 
emotionally contained, and this 
leading to confidence in their 
clinical work
Helped motivation
Helped personal
development/developing
awareness
Good supervisory 
relationship were 
experienced by trainees as 
supportive, motivating, 
emotionally containing, 
and allowed for trainees to 
develop both confidence 
and creativity, alongside 
development of personal 
awareness, in their clinical 
work
Tt definitely caused 
me to be less 
creative. I just go and 
did what I had to get 
through the 
placement rather than 
exploring the area as 
much as I might have 
done...’
‘Helped me feel 
contained, prepared 
and confident’
Tt has a tremendous 
impact. I feel highly 
motivated and 
supported. I get a 
sense that my 
supervisor is really 
interested in teaching 
me...’
‘Excellent -  more 
self awareness 
developed’
Helped learn theory-practice 
links
Supervisor enabling 
trainees to make links 
between theory and 
practice
Tt was invaluable in 
giving me... a good 
sense of theory -  
practice links, being 
critical about my 
work I was doing, 
making links with 
other services in
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order to fulfil the 
contract’
Question 4
Encouraged by supervisor to 
think about issues of difference 
and diversity
Open to discussion
Encouragement given by 
supervisor to think about 
issues of difference and 
diversity
‘Encouraged to think 
about it from a non­
ethnicity focus point 
too -  e.g. life stage, 
married/children, 
personal experience 
of chronic illness’
‘My supervisor was 
open to discussing 
these issues’
Supervisor’s discomfort
Issues of difference and 
diversity were not discussed
Both supervisors’ apparent 
discomfort and lack of 
reflections on these issues 
impeded difference and 
diversity discussions
‘...my supervisor 
seemed
uncomfortable with 
these kinds of 
discussions...’
‘This never really 
came up...’
Question 5
Boundaried supervision helped 
trainees’ own clinical 
boundaries
The importance of time­
keeping boundaries
Feelings of containment and 
safety provided by clear 
boundaries
Supervisors’ crossing
Boundaries helped trainees 
to feel contained and safe, 
and to develop their own 
clinical boundaries process
‘Helped me be more 
boundaried in clinical 
work and supervision 
and was containing 
for my anxiety’
‘Time keeping felt 
very important and 
indicated what a big 
impression it made 
on me with regards to 
how containing and
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boundaries between both 
supervisors’ and trainees’ 
placement and home life.
Broken boundaries causing 
feelings trainee to feel 
apathetic, frustrated, and not a 
priority for the supervisor
organized I felt my 
supervisor was’
‘She did offer 
containment and was 
very clear about 
boundaries, 
particularly time 
keeping in terms of 
total hours worked’
‘My supervisor does 
not make me feel at 
all emotionally 
contained. She does 
not stick to 
boundaries... she 
overruns with 
supervision time, has 
call me when on 
annual leave and 
during the evening’
‘My supervisor did 
not adhere to 
boundaries and made 
it clear that I wasn’t a 
priority to him by 
checking his emails/ 
answering the phone 
during our protected 
supervision time.
This made me feel 
very apathetic about 
the placement 
experience and 
frustrated because I 
did not feel I was
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developing clinically’
Positive aspects of looser time 
boundaries in supervision
Positive aspects of looser 
time boundaries in 
supervision
‘Supervision tended 
to run over intended 
time but this was 
sometimes helpful’
Question 6
Supervisor helped develop 
trainee’s awareness of power 
relations
Open discussion on power 
relations issues
Supervisors helped trainee 
think about both inter­
personal and 
organizational power 
relations
Tt is supervision that 
made me aware of 
some subtle instances 
of power relations’
‘Always -  especially 
thinking about what a 
psychologist brings 
to a team that is 
different and how to 
voice different 
opinions with 
older/more senior 
colleagues’
Supervisor appeared 
uncomfortable with 
discussions on power relations
Power relations were not 
discussed
Power relation discussions 
were impeded by 
supervisor’s apparent 
discomfit with discussing 
these issues
‘This was not 
something my 
supervisor seemed 
comfortable 
discussing. We did 
talk about it when I 
raised it, but I didn’t 
really feel this was 
encouraged’
‘No’
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Question 7
Reduced sense of hierarchy 
within supervisory relationship 
helped trainees be more open 
with their supervisors
Too much hierarchy in the 
supervisory relationships 
reduced the trainees’ sense that 
they could be open
Power relations within the 
supervisory relationship 
affected trainees’ openness
T feel I am quite 
open and share my 
thoughts and feelings. 
We are of a similar 
age and although she 
is professional she is 
not hierarchical, 
therefore she is 
approachable and 
down to earth’
‘This was difficult, 
because there was a 
feeling that you 
needed to do what 
she wanted and 
expressing a point of 
view that she did not 
agree with was 
perhaps a threat, so I 
tended not to ask for 
things she may agree 
with...’
Opportunity for openness 
facilitated trainees’ learning
Openness experienced as 
supportive
Openness experienced as 
facilitating trainees’ 
learning
‘Very open... 
facilitated my 
learning’
‘Completely. Always 
aware that I had a life 
outside the course 
and accepted that this 
might sometimes 
impact on where my 
head was’
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Question 8
More structure and direction Trainees preferring 
supervisors who are 
organized and structured in 
supervision
T would have wanted 
a supervisor to 
provide more 
direction and to give 
me a more structured 
way of working. I 
would have wanted 
more guidance on 
formulation and 
theoretical input 
which was lacking’
More reflective space More reflective space to 
discuss issues
T would have 
preferred a less 
didactic supervision 
style and more time 
for reflection’
No wished for changes No wished for changes T genuinely wouldn’t 
-  feel lucky to have 
had their supervisory 
experience’
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Abstract of Group Qualitative Research Project
How do people feel about the prospect of turning 30?
Whilst some research suggests that the risk of psychological distress has increased for 
people experiencing the “turning 30” transition in current times, others have questioned 
whether the Age Thirty Transition exists at all. As there appeared to be conflicting views 
in the literature with, this research study wanted to find out how people feel about 
turning thirty, with an aim to contribute to the knowledge base around the age thirty 
transition and add to the research literature on ageing.
Purposive sampling was used and four participants were interviewed (two men and two 
women), all aged twenty-nine. A qualitative approach was adopted, with a view that the 
experiences of each participant could be more appropriately explored using this method. 
The researchers were interested in their subjective experience, and therefore used 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Five subordinate themes emerged: 
‘taking stock’, ‘reflecting on the past’, ‘loss’, ‘preparing for the future’ and 
‘expectations’.
This study suggests that the prospect of turning thirty is a salient issue for certain 
individuals, in terms of being a potential period of transition. However, half of the 
participants indicated that they did not consider this a significant transitional period. 
Therefore, further research is warranted around whether individuals’ sense of loss, future 
expectations, and their preparations for the future, are influential in altering the ways in 
which they approach their thirties. The strengths and weaknesses of this study are 
considered.
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Abstract
Objective: Recent theorising highlights a role for self-concept discrepancies in the 
onset and maintenance of obsessions. This theorising suggests that self-concept 
discrepancies might be more influential in the occurrence of autogenous as opposed to 
reactive obsessions. The aim of the current study was to investigate the relationship 
between self-ambivalence, self-discrepancy, and autogenous and reactive obsessions 
whilst controlling for dysphoria. Design: This study employed a cross-sectional 
correlational design in a non-clinical general population sample. Three hundred and 
seventy-six (22.6% male, mean age: 26.60, SD: 9.27; 77.4% female, mean age: 26.13, 
SD: 8.63) participants completed measures of self-ambivalence, self-discrepancy, 
obsessionality (both autogenous and reactive obsessions) and dysphoria. Findings: Self­
ambivalence was positively associated with obsessionality, after controlling for 
dysphoria. There was no difference in the strength of the positive association between 
autogenous obsessions and self-ambivalence, and between reactive obsessions, after 
controlling for dysphoria. There was no association between self-discrepancies and 
obsessionality, after controlling for dysphoria. Conclusions: Self-ambivalence plays a 
small part in obsessionality, but subtyping obsessions into autogenous and reactive may 
not be a helpful distinction. Although self-discrepancy was not associated with 
obsessionality, there was a strong association between self-discrepancy and dysphoria, 
which may have clinical implications for alleviating negative mood. Other theoretical 
and clinical implications are discussed, as are suggestions for further research.
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Introduction
Phenom enology o f obsessions
Obsessions are frequent, repetitive unwanted thoughts, images, and impulses (Julien, 
O'Connor & Aardema (2007) with an intrusive quality that are associated with negative 
affect (Stein & Finberg, 2007). Both Clark (2004) and Purdon et al. (2007) argue that 
ego-dystonicity is a defining characteristic of obsessions. Whereas ego-dystonic defines 
thoughts that are unacceptable, unwanted, and ‘alien’ that contradict valued self­
perceptions, ego-syntonic refers to thoughts which are acceptable to, or in harmony with 
valued self-perceptions (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007).
However, according to Purdon et al. (2007), considering a thought as either ego-syntonic 
or ego-dystonic is simplistic. Purdon et al. propose that the same thought can be both 
syntonic and dystonie in relation to valued self-perceptions. They give the example of 
contamination fear as an obsessional thought that is syntonic in terms of the wish not to 
harm others being in harmony with valued self-perceptions, but the experience of 
excessive feelings of responsibility and fear of the consequence of not preventing 
contamination are experienced by the individual as alien to his or her sense of rational 
thought. Purdon et al. (2007) also consider that although a thought may contradict an 
individual’s valued self-perceptions, it can still be consistent with his or her preferences 
and past experiences, thus not making it an alien thought. Additionally, dystonie 
thoughts can become increasingly experienced as syntonic the more an individual 
experiences them and shifts self-perceptions accordingly.
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The distinction betw een intrusive thoughts and obsessions
The experience of having discrete intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses/urges is a 
normal, universal human phenomenon (Veale & Wilson, 2005), and in the literature 
these phenomena are sometimes referred to as ‘normal obsessions’ (e.g. Barrett & 
Healy, 2003). Intrusive thoughts are experienced by 90% of the general population 
(Wells & Morrison, 1994; Purdon & Clark, 1993; Freeston et a i, 1992; Clark & de 
Silva, 1985; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; Rachman & de Silva, 1978) and refer to 
fleeting unbidden, unwanted thoughts, images, and impulses/urges which are 
experienced as uncontrollable and attributed to internal origin (Rachman, 1981; Wells & 
Morrison, 1984). However, according to cognitive models, as a result of the influence of 
appraisal processes (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1993, 
1997, 2002, 2004), intrusive thoughts can develop into obsessions; the difference 
between them being in terms of frequency, duration, intensity, and consequences 
(Rachman & de Silva, 1978). The more ego-dystonic the intrusive thoughts are, the 
more they are experienced as threatening to an individual’s sense of self (Clark, 2004), 
thus these intrusive thoughts become more frequent and intense (Clark, Purdon & Wang, 
2003).
The classification o f obsessions
Although obsessions may share key features (e.g. intrusiveness and ego-dystonicity), 
attempts have been made to sub-classify them. This has included grouping them into 
themes relating to 'contamination fears, pathological doubt, a need for symmetry or 
order, body-related worries, and sexual or aggressive obsessions’ (Doron et a l, 2009, 
p.3). Lee and Kwon’s (2003) research indicated that obsession might be more broadly 
subtyped into autogenous and reactive obsessions, based on the analysis of responses to 
the Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory (ROII, Clark & Purdon, 1993; Purdon & 
Clark, 1994), which is an inventory that measures the frequency of commonly
Page 136 of 233
experienced intrusive thoughts. These subtypes are categorized by three key differences: 
(1) differences in the content of intrusions, (2) different cognitive appraisals of these 
intrusions, and (3) different control strategies used to reduce psychological distress. 
Regarding reactive obsessions, the content concerns asymmetry, accidental mistakes, 
contamination, and loss; the cognitive appraisal of these intrusions is linked to 
identifiable triggers, which are normally external and relate to the feared threat (e.g. 
contact with dirt will trigger the fear of contamination). The psychological distress 
caused by the feared threat results in the use of control strategies, which for reactive 
obsessions are neutralising behaviours, such as checking, or in the case of contamination 
fear, compulsive washing/cleaning behaviour (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). Regarding 
autogenous obsessions, the content is proposed to be more ego-dystonic and irrational 
than reactive obsessions, such as unwanted immoral, aggressive and sexual impulses and 
thoughts that the experiencer finds offensive, disturbing and sometimes horrific. In terms 
of appraisal, unlike reactive obsessions, the origins of these triggers are difficult to trace 
(Doron & Kyrios, 2005) and it is argued that it is the content of thoughts, images, and 
impulses featuring sex, blasphemy, aggression (i.e. autogenous obsessions) which is the 
source of the triggers which are then misinterpreted (Clark, 2004; Doron & Kyrios, 
2005; Wells, 1997). These triggers are often tenuously or symbolically related with 
thoughts (Lee & Kwon, 2005), such as the letter b triggering the intrusive thought of 
wanting to harm one’s brother (ibid.). Because these intrusive thoughts appear to be self­
generated they are therefore appraised as signifying the true feared nature of the self. 
The control strategies used to reduce psychological distress related to autogenous 
obsessions are suppression and attempts to banish these intrusive thoughts through the 
use of thought-control and/or compulsive behaviours (Lee & Kwon, 2003).
Purdon and Clark (1993) performed an exploratory factor analysis of the ROB, and 
found a similar two-factor structure for women (the content and form primarily divided 
between dirt/contamination and sex/aggression), whilst men seemed to have a one-factor
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structure (the content and form primarily being that of sex/aggression). It is argued that a 
possible reason for this study finding that men have a one-factor structure that excludes 
content and form relating to dirt/contamination, is because of low respondent levels 
(Belloch, Moiillo et a l, 2004, cited in Moulding et al., 2007). When analysing the 
responses to the Spanish version of the ROII, Belloch et al. (2004, cited in Moulding et 
al., 2007) found a similar two-factor model to that of Lee and Kwon (2003), divided 
between “(1) aggression, sexually and socially inappropriate behaviours; and (2) doubt, 
checking and cleanliness,” (Moulding et al., 2007, p.679). Further research evidence has 
supported the subtyping of obsession into autogenous and reactive subtypes (Lee & 
Kwon, 2003; Lee, Kwon, Kwon, & Telch, 2005; Lee, Lee, Kim, Kwon, & Telch, 2005; 
Lee & Telch, 2005; Lee, Zoung-Soul, & Kwon, 2005; Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, 
2007). However, although obsessions may be put into one of these two categories, it is 
still possible to assess on a continuum, as suggested by Lee & Telch (2005). Therefore, 
for example, a person may score high on autogenous obsessions and lower on reactive 
obsessions rather than being assigned to a single category of autogenous or reactive 
obsessions.
The dim ensional perspective on both obsessionality and OCD
In tandem with the view that autogenous and reactive subtypes of OCD may best be 
conceptualized on a continuum (Lee & Telch, 2005), taxometric studies (Haslam et al., 
2005; Olatunji et al., 2008, cited in Doron et al., 2009) also provide evidence that 
supports the dimensional rather than categorical conceptualization of OCD cognitions 
and symptomology. Also, as aforementioned, the content of intrusive thoughts is similar 
in around 90% of both clinical and nonclinical samples (Rachman and de Silva, 1978; 
Salkovskis & Harrison, 1994; Bums, Formea, Keortge, & Stemberger, 1995), and that 
the difference between normal and abnormal obsessions is also on a continuum. 
Additionally, both clinical and non-clinical populations reduce anxiety through using
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similar cognitive and behavioural strategies (Munis, Merckelbach, & Clavan, 1997). 
More recently, research by Garcia-Soriano et al. (2011) has also confirmed that normal 
obsessive intrusive thoughts and clinical obsessions are on a continuum. To assess this, 
the researchers used the Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts Inventory (ENPIOS), a 48 item 
inventory which measures the frequency and content of obsessive intrusive thoughts. 
Their sample population was made up of 734 non-chnical participants and 55 clinical 
participants meeting the criteria for OCD. Garcia-Soriano et al. (2011) used 
confirmatory factor analysis to confirm that both the clinical and non-clinical 
participants experienced obsessive intrusive thoughts across the whole range of 
obsessional content. Therefore, if one accepts that obsessional phenomena are 
continuous then the study of non-clinical expressions is legitimate in theorising the 
nature of obsessions. This has provided the rationale for using a non-clinical population 
in previous studies (e.g. Doron et al, 2009), and the rationale for drawing on a 
community-based population in this current study; i.e. that obsessionality is experienced 
both in non-clinical and clinical populations and that an understanding of obsessions in 
non-clinical samples might further the understanding of clinical obsessions. However, 
although it is possible for findings from a non-clinical population to be extrapolated to a 
clinical population, such as to individuals with OCD where obsessionality is a key 
feature of the disorder, this is not automatic. For example, non-chnical samples might 
produce a restricted range on obsessional measures.
Phenomenology o f  OCD
OCD is a psychiatric diagnosis defined by the experience of obsessions that produce 
anxiety, and/or compulsive acts (compulsions) aimed at reducing anxiety (Stein & 
Fineberg, 2007) to a degree whereby these experiences cause the experiencer distress 
and can negatively affect the person’s ability to function in his or her daily life (Roth & 
Fonagy, 2005; Wells, 1997). Compulsions are repetitive, ritualistic, inflexible
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behaviours that can be covert (such as mental acts) or overt (such as repetitive handing 
washing) that the individual is compelled to carry out in response to their obsessional 
thoughts. The purpose of performing these compulsions is to experience temporary relief 
from the distress caused by the obsessive thoughts, which may include attempting to 
prevent a feared event from happening (Doron et al., 2009). However, 25% of people 
with OCD do not present with overt compulsive rituals, and may instead use covert 
compulsive rituals, such as counting or reciting ‘good’ thoughts to try and replace ‘bad’ 
ones (Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group [OCCWG], 2001). According 
to the Epidemiological Catchment Area survey, OCD is indicated has having a lifetime 
prevalence rate of 2.5% (Roth & Fonagy, 2005). Depression is commonly comorbid 
with OCD (Stein & Fineberg, 2007). Debates currently exist in the literature regarding 
the characterisation and classification of OCD as a single disorder.
As noted, classifications have been made on the basis of symptom content (e.g. 
‘checkers,’ ‘washers’) or more broadly (e.g. autogenous versus reactive obsessions). The 
diagnostic status of hoarding as separate disorder associated to, but distinct from, OCD 
has also been debated and it is possible that it will be categorised as a separate disorder 
in the new DSM. The multitude of various presentations of OCD has led to differing 
attempts to categorize what is nowadays considered to be a heterogeneous disorder.
Theories o f OCD
Both cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic theories consider that a conflicted sense 
of self (i.e. self-ambivalence regarding whether self is essentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’) is a 
key feature in OCD psychopathology (Kempke & Luyten, 2007). Rachman (1997, 1998) 
proposed that obsessions developed from individuals appraising repugnant thoughts and 
images as revealing their true personality (i.e. "dangerous, evil, unreliable, and 
potentially uncontrollable”', Bhar & Kyrios, 2006, p. 1846), which then leads to
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obsessive rumination. Individuals with OCD are considered to have an ambivalent sense 
of self, and have schemas that relate to perfectionism, control, overemphasis of thinking, 
and responsibility (Kempke & Luyten, 2007). Rachman (1997, 1998, 2002, 2004) 
developed different cognitive-behavioural models for different subtypes of OCD, using 
the idea of appraisal being the significant factor in the development and maintenance of 
this disorder. Psychodynamic theories have considered self-ambivalence in term of 
unconscious conflicts (e.g. between the id and superego, which is mediated by the ego; 
and between internalised ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects), and have argued that OCD occurs in 
individuals where the differing aspects of the self are not adequately integrated (Gomez, 
1997; McWilliams, 1994). The growing convergence between cognitive-behavioural and 
psychodynamic conceptualizations of the role of self-ambivalence may help to explain 
the formation and development of OCD symptomology and lead to more effective 
psychological treatments for people with this psychological disorder (ibid.). These 
theories will now be discussed.
Cognitive m odels o f  OCD
Cognitive theories of OCD (e.g. Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Clark & Purdon, 1993; 
Rachman, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2004) suggest that OCD symptoms arise from, and are 
maintained by, the misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses, and 
that this leads to these cognitive processes being experienced as highly significant and 
threatening. That is, it is not the occurrence of intrusions per se that is problematic, but 
that the way in which they are focussed upon once they occur.
Researchers have focused on differing conceptualizations of the role that appraisal 
might play in OCD symptomology, but have agreed that these misinterpretations occur 
from specific cognitions and dysfunctional beliefs, categorized within the following 
domains: (1) over-emphasizing the importance of thoughts, which refers to
Page 141 of 233
misinterpreting ordinary intrusive thoughts as showing the ‘true’ nature of the self rather 
than an ordinary insignificant experience; (2) an inflated sense of responsibility (related 
to harm to self/others), which refers to the belief that one holds a more powerful position 
concerning provoking or preventing oneself and/or other people experiencing negative 
outcomes; (3) intolerance of uncertainty, which refers to "beliefs about the necessity of 
being certain, about the capacity to cope with unpredictable change, and about 
adequate functioning in situations which are inherently ambiguous” (OCCWG, 1997, p. 
168); (4) thought-action fusion, which refers to a type of metacognitive beliefs (beliefs 
about having particular types of thoughts) that conflates thought with action; (5) 
overestimating the probability and severity of threat, which refers to perceiving the 
world as a more dangerous place than it is, and leads to a belief that constant vigilance is 
required to protect oneself and others from harm; and (6) perfectionism, which refers to 
a belief that it is possible to achieve perfection (i.e. having no faults) if one tries hard 
enough (OCCWG, 1997, 2001). Further, these appraisal processes are linked. For 
example, Rachman (1993) argued that elevated levels of responsibility develop from 
thought-action fusion beliefs. TAF beliefs have been divided into likelihood TAP beliefs 
(Rachman & Shafran, 1999), which focus on the belief that having specific intrusive 
thoughts increases the likelihood of them occurring; and morality TAF beliefs (ibid.), 
which focus on intrusive thoughts being thought of as morally equivalent to having put 
these thoughts into action and/or failing to do something that could prevent harm is as 
morally wrong as deliberately causing harm (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). However, often 
both these subtypes of thought-action beliefs are experienced related to a single intrusive 
thought. For example, the experiencer both believes that the thought may come true and 
that they would be morally responsible if this were to occur.
Salkovskis’s (1985, 1989) theory of OCD is presently the most comprehensive 
cognitive-behavioural theory of this disorder, and emphasises both how people with 
OCD tend to appraise their intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses as a sign that there
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are significant risks to self and others, and that they may be responsible for either the 
harm they fear has occurred or its prevention (Salkovskis & McGuire, 2003). This 
appraisal of their intrusive thoughts leads people with OCD to feel extreme discomfort 
and, in this theoretical model, is linked to their urge to engage in neutralizing behaviour 
(for example, compulsive washing or checking rituals) as a way of diminishing the 
experience of discomfort, which thus becomes a negative reinforcer of compulsive 
behaviour. This theory suggests that there are also other consequences of interpreting 
normal intrusive thoughts as a sign of responsibility, based on the idea that people with 
OCD try too hard to control their thoughts and actions. These include an increased 
attention to (and thus access to) their intrusive thoughts and the external triggers that 
lead to intrusive thoughts, as well as behaviours that attempt to reduce responsibility -  
neutralizing, reassurance-seeking, compulsions, avoidance, and thought-suppression. 
Rather than experiencing the normal extinction of anxiety, the result of engaging in 
these behaviours is counterproductive because these behaviours focus individuals’ 
attention on these distressing thoughts, thereby leading to them being experienced with 
increased frequency. Additionally, engaging in these behaviours prevents distressing 
intrusive thoughts from being tested, and the feared consequences of not engaging in 
these behaviours being discontinued (ibid).
Salkovskis’ model has been criticized for not focusing upon motivational factors, for not 
questioning why appraisals of intrusive thoughts are distressing or why there is an urge 
to engage in repetitive behaviour, and for focusing more upon cognitive factors to the 
detriment of considering emotional factors (Jakes, 1996; O’Kearney, 1998). However, 
Salkovskis has responded by reiterating how people with OCD are motivated by their 
need to attempt to diminish the experience of discomfort caused by their appraisal of 
their intrusive thoughts, and thus engage in neutralising and compulsive behaviour 
(Salkovskis & Freeston, 2001). Salkovskis et al. (1999) proposed that the origins of why 
some people may experience a distorted appraisal of intrusive thoughts that leads them
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to experience an inflated sense of responsibility may be related to them having 
experienced particular learning experiences. These include the pairing of an early 
developed sense of responsibility along with implicit and/ or explicit encouragement 
during the person’s formative years; having the experience of a thought and/or action 
that incorrectly is attributed to the occurrence of a negative event; an experience 
whereby an act of commission or omission leads to a negative event; being exposed to 
extreme and rigid codes of conduct and duty; or, not experiencing one’s own sensitivity 
to thoughts regarding responsibility being challenged by others (ibid.). Salkovskis et 
al.’s (1999) proposal that there are 5 primary pathways to the development of inflated 
responsibility was later given support by Coles and Schofield (2008) who were able to 
test this through developing the Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Beliefs Scale 
(PDRBS) which they correlated with other measures of OCD symptomology, parental 
styles, OCD-related beliefs, and levels of childhood responsibility (ibid). However, a 
critique of Cole and Schofield’s (2008) study is that because the data was derived from 
participants with OCD and hoarding behaviour, it is possible that the experience of 
living with these disorders may have distorted recall of early experiences. According to 
Abramowitz, Schwartz, and Moore (2003) experiences of blame and criticism, as well as 
situational/actual increases in responsibility, may interact with early experiences, thus 
predisposing individuals to appraise negatively their normal intrusive thoughts.
Psychodynamic theories o f  OCD
OCD as a concept existed in the psychoanalytic tradition and as such can be found in the 
early literature, where it is referred to as ‘obsessional neurosis’ (Freud, 1926). Freud 
initially speculated that this neurosis resulted from individuals experiencing something, 
primarily sexual, that was incompatible with his or her ideational lives. This caused such 
strong emotional distress, that thoughts related to this experience were supressed. Freud 
proposed that unconscious thoughts resurface into conscious awareness in the form of
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symptoms, and that supressed thoughts related to sexual acts that occurred as a child 
would return as obsessional thoughts (Freud, 1824, 1896). Freud also proposed that 
obsessive behaviours were not senseless, but instead had meaning which could be 
interpreted (Freud, 1907). However, Freud began to question his initial belief that people 
with obsessional neurosis had experienced sexual acts as children, and began to 
postulate that these experiences may have been fantasies rather than reality for most 
people. Freud’s focus on repressed sexuality lead him to suggest that children need to 
successfully negotiate psychosexual stages (oral, anal, and phallic), and that fixation at, 
or regression to, the anal stage results in the development of OCD symptomology in 
adults (Jakes, 1996). Freud associated the themes of toilet training with the conflictual 
themes of "aggression and submissiveness, cruelty and gentleness, dirtiness and 
cleanliness, order and disorder” (Fenichel, 1977, p.273, cited in Jakes, 1996) with those 
that are seen in OCD symptomology (Jakes, 1996). He argued that regression to this 
stage may occur as a result of an unresolved Oedipus conflict (ibid.), at a stage when 
issues of control, sexuality and aggression were being worked through in relation to the 
child’s primary caregivers.
However, other psychodynamic theorists have argued that OCD is not connected to 
psychosexual stages of development, and instead results from an individual’s incapacity 
to feel in control of life (e.g. Alder, 1964, cited in Jakes, 1996), and thus attempt to 
overly control aspects of themselves (Malan, 1979, cited in Jakes, 1996). More recent 
views of OCD have focused on Object Relations (e.g. Fairbaim, 1943, cited in Gomez, 
1997) and attachment theories (e.g. Bowlby, 1979). Object relations theorists moved 
away focusing on the idea that humans need to find ways of reducing tension caused by 
instinctual drives (pleasure-seeking) and instead proposed that people’s overriding need 
is for intimacy from other humans (object-seeking) (Gomez, 1997; Howard, 2006).
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Freud (1917), in his work on melancholia, refers to unconscious ambivalence towards 
objects, thus allowing them to be kept good. Klein (1946, cited in Gomez, 1997) also 
developed a theory of how, within the first few months of life, infants’ minds are 
dominated by the schizoid-position. This refers to the unconscious way they ‘split’ their 
objects into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ‘part-objects,’ as a way of attempting to both develop love 
and trust towards their primary caregivers whilst also managing their overwhelming 
feelings of hate towards them (borne out of feelings of persecution when their infantile 
needs are not met).
Drawing on both Freud’s and Klein’s work on ‘splitting,’ Fairbaim (1943) (who was a 
founder member of the Object Relations movement) developed the idea of ambivalence 
by postulating that infants internalize aspects of their primary caregivers that they find 
frightening and bad because they both need the objects and want to control them (so they 
are less threatening). By internalizing these objects the infant is "taking upon himself the 
burden o f badness which appears to reside in his objects’ (Fairbaim, 1943, p.65), 
thereby experiencing the self as bad as opposed to the caregiver. Fairbaim refers to this 
as ‘moral defence’ (1943, p.66) which the infant unconsciously chooses because 'it is 
better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than to live in a world ruled by the DeviV 
(Fairbaim, 1943, p.66); i.e. that it better to be bad but to live in a good, safe, secure, 
world, even if one is bad, than to escape being a sinner but live in a world that is ‘bad,’ 
unsafe and insecure wherein the destruction of the self is inevitable. Therefore, it is 
possible that Fairbaim’s (1943) theory helps to explain the observation that people with 
OCD adopt the most negative appraisal of themselves, a motivation that is contrary to 
research and theory that proposes that people are motivated to appraise information such 
that it maintains their positive self-image, such as recent research exploring the 
fundamental attribution error (Maruna & Mann, 2006) and the self-serving bias 
(Shepperd, Malone & Sweeny, 2008). Instead, it would appear that people with OCD 
have self-concepts (self-representations) that result in negative self-appraisals when
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experiencing unwanted intrusive thoughts (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). It might be 
speculated therefore that people with OCD feel safer and more secure when they 
appraise their intrusive thoughts as an indication that they are ‘bad’ rather than the world 
they occupy. This conceptualisation of OCD suggests that self-representations may be 
an important factor to be considered when considering obsessionality across both non- 
chnical and clinical populations.
Drawing on both cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic ways of conceptualising 
conflicting parts of the self (both conscious and unconscious), this paper now considers 
two conceptualisations of self-representation : self-ambivalence and self-discrepancy.
Self-ambivalence
Self-ambivalence refers to the distressing discomfort and uncertainty caused by holding 
conflicting self-representations/beliefs about the self; for example, that one is both 
worthy and unworthy, moral and immoral, loveable and unlovable (Kempke & Luyten, 
2007). In formulating their theory of the relevance of self-ambivalence to obsessional 
thinking, Guidano and Liotti (1983) drew on Bowlby’s (1970) attachment theory to help 
explain how opposing self-representations/beliefs about the self (self-ambivalence) may 
develop within an individual. Bowlby (1970) proposed that primary caregiver 
attachment relationships are internalized in infancy to create what he describes as 
‘internal working models’ of the self, others, and relationships. Accordingly, if infants 
experience their primary caregiver as responsive and supportive, then Bowlby’s (1970) 
attachment model suggests that this will enable them to develop an internalized self­
representation of being lovable, worthy, and competent. Similarly, if infants experience 
their primary caregiver as unresponsive and unsupportive then they will develop an 
internalized self-representation of being unlovable, unworthy, and incompetent.
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Guidano and Liotti (1983) proposed that if infants experience ambivalent attachments 
with their primary caregivers then they would develop an ambivalent self-representation. 
They proposed that ambivalent attachments could form either when infants experience 
their primary caregiver as oscillating between being responsive and supportive, and 
unresponsive and unsupportive/critical, or when infants experience one of their parents 
as responsive and supportive, and the other one as unresponsive and 
unsupportive/critical. Guidano and Liotti (1983) proposed that both of these experiences 
would lead to the development of internalized conflicting self-representations of being 
loveable, worthy, and competent and unlovable, unworthy, and incompetent.
In considering the relevance of self-ambivalence to obsessions, Guidano and Liotti 
(1983) argue that people with OCD are ambivalent about whether they are intrinsically 
moral, lovable, and worthy. Consequently, intrusive thoughts become more significant 
and distressing for individuals with OCD because they activate the negative aspect of 
conflicting beliefs about the self (e.g. T am immoral’), and are appraised as evidence of 
their ‘true’ revealed self. The more ego-dystonic the thoughts, the more these thoughts 
are experienced as a threat to the valued aspects of the self (i.e. moral, worthy, 
competent). Similarly to Rachman’s theory (1997,1998), Guidano and Liotti considered 
that compulsions could be viewed as attempts to recommit to moral and social ideals 
(Bhar & Kyrios, 2007) thus restoring the positive aspect of conflicting beliefs about the 
self (e.g. T am moral’) of the ambivalent self-concept, thereby resolving the 
ambivalence. Frost et al. (2007) propose that individuals with conflicting self­
representations (i.e. self-ambivalence) become preoccupied (i.e. obsessional) with 
seeking environmental evidence to validate each of their polarized views of self in an 
effort to seek certainty about their self.
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Drawing on Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) work, Bhar (Bhar, 2004; Bhar & Kyrios, 2000; 
Bhar and Kyrios, 2007) researched the associations between self-ambivalence and OCD, 
the results of which suggested that people with OCD are more self-ambivalent than 
healthy controls (Bhar and Kyrios, 2007). To conduct this research, Bhar and colleagues 
developed the Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007) which measures 
conflicting beliefs about morality, self-worth and social acceptance. Bhar and Kyrios 
(2007) found that self-ambivalence positively correlated with severity of OCD-related 
dysfunctional beliefs (i.e. responsibility, perfectionism, appraisal of thoughts as 
important) and symptoms. Additionally, participants with OCD scored significantly 
higher on the SAM compared to a non-clinical control group (the results remained 
significant after controlling for mood and self-esteem). Conversely, no significant 
difference was found between those individuals with OCD and those with general 
anxiety disorder (GAD), suggesting that self-ambivalence is a general feature of anxiety 
disorders rather than a distinct feature of OCD. However, a confounding methodological 
issue was that the participants in both the OCD and anxiety group had high levels of 
OCD dysfunctional beliefs, thus the study did not actually differentiate between these 
two clinical groups. George (2010) found that self-ambivalence (measured by the SAM) 
was significantly higher in an OCD group compared with both a mixed non-OCD group 
and a non-clinical group. This may be due to actively ensuring that only the OCD group, 
and not the anxiety group, contained participants who met the DSM-IV diagnostic 
criteria for OCD. This was achieved by a screening process that used the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV AXIS I Disorders - Clinical Version (SCID-CV, First et 
al, 1997). Following the idea that people with OCD are of a “tender conscience” 
(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980), Doron and Kyrios (2005) argue that although overall self­
ambivalence may not be a distinct factor of OCD to that of other anxiety disorders, it 
may contain specific domains that are more sensitive in OCD, such as the morality 
domain. This conceptualization led to further research that showed that people with 
OCD had sensitive domains within their self-conceptions (social acceptability,
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job/school competence, and morality) (Doron, Kyrios and Moulding, 2007; Doron, 
Moulding, Kyrios, and Nedeljkovic (2008), which in turn enabled for a broader 
conceptual understanding of OCD than had previously been achieved.
Bhar and Kyrios (2007) argue that self-ambivalence may be a meta-vulnerability for 
OCD that underpins the dysfunctional schemas identified by the Obsessive-Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (1997). For example, this could result in the following: a 
perfectionist schema that requires everything to be faultless otherwise it results in a 
negative appraisal of the self; an intolerance of uncertainty; wishing to control thoughts 
so as to reduce the activation of distressing negative beliefs; focusing on personal 
responsibility so as to ward thoughts that their ‘real’ self is irresponsible’; over­
emphasising the importance of thoughts compared to emotions, because thoughts are 
easier to control than emotions. Currently, little research has looked at the relationship 
between self-ambivalence and obsessionality and even less has looked at the differential 
relationships with obsessional subtypes. Given the earlier comments about the 
heterogeneity of obsessional content, theory could be advanced by looking at self­
ambivalence as a predictor of different subtypings.
Ascertaining the relationship betw een autogenous and reactive  
obsessions and self-am bivalence
Autogenous obsessions are predicted to be more ego-dystonic than reactive obsessions, 
and to have fewer identifiable triggers (Lee & Kwon, 2003). Moulding et al. (2007) 
have proposed, based on Lee and Kwon’s differentiation between autogenous and 
reactive obsessions presented above, that autogenous obsessions have a more negative 
impact on the person’s sense of self. Additionally, Purdon and Clark (1999) suggest that 
autogenous obsessions which are experienced as alien to the self (Purdon et ah, 2007) 
are likely to induce more doubt about a person’s sense of self than reactive obsessions.
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The researcher in the current study postulates that this may be because of the lack of 
perceived situational context (i.e. no trace of an external trigger that generates these 
intrusive thoughts) induces fear that these unwanted thoughts can only be attributed to 
personal traits, and thus are appraised as more significant than reactive obsessions. It is 
also possible that the significance given to these normal autogenous thoughts is further 
compounded in individuals with high levels of self-ambivalence. This is because the 
activity of attributing unwanted ego-dystonic normal intrusive thoughts to a personal 
trait, rather than understanding it as a response to a situational context, is likely to 
activate the negative aspects of self-ambivalence. This causes intrusive thoughts to be 
evaluated as a sign of the self being dangerous and immoral, thus evoking the fear that 
these unwanted ego-dystonic thoughts and impulses may be acted upon.
Consequently, the current study predicts that autogenous obsessions will be more highly 
related to self-ambivalence than reactive obsessions. In the only published study looking 
at the relation between autogenous and reactive obsessions and self-ambivalence. 
Moulding et al. (2007) found a higher correlation between autogenous obsessions and 
self-ambivalence (r = .30) than between reactive obsessions and self-ambivalence (r = 
.25) using a non-clinical sample, although the difference between the correlations is very 
small. Given that this is the only study, the first aim of the current study is to ascertain 
the relationship between autogenous and reactive obsessions and self-ambivalence using 
a sample of non-clinical participants.
Hypothesis
There will be a positive correlation between self-ambivalence and both autogenous and 
reactive obsession scores, but the effect size for the correlation between self­
ambivalence and autogenous obsessions will be greater.
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Self-discrepancy theory
The theories of self-ambivalence (e.g. Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; 
Frost et al. (2007) and self-discrepancy (e.g. Higgins, 1987; Carver et al., 1999; Ferrier 
& Brewin, 2005) are similar in that they both conceptualize individuals as having 
multiples selves. However, whilst self-ambivalence theory refers to conflict between 
differing self-representations (e.g. moral versus immoral), self-discrepancy theory is 
more explicit in describing this feature in terms of differing incongruent selves.
Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy theory offers a different approach to evaluating 
conflicting self-representations than self-ambivalence theory (i.e. that people have 
different self-state representations). These are the ‘actual self,’ being the representation 
of who they currently are; the ‘ideal self,’ being the representation of who they wish to 
be; and the ‘ought self,’ being the representation of who they ought to be. Higgins’s 
(1987) hypothesis that experiencing discrepancies between ‘actual’ and ‘ideal self 
would result in depressive type symptomology, whereas experiencing discrepancies 
between ‘actual’ and ‘ought self would result in anxiety-related symptomology, were 
later supported by empirical research (e.g. Higgins et al., 1986; Higgins, 1987; Higgins, 
1996). Additionally, other researchers (e.g. Oglivie, 1987; Carver et al., 1999) have 
proposed and studied the ‘feared self; that is the representation of who a person fears 
they might be or become. The feared self may be particularly pertinent to OCD given the 
threat content of obsessions. Drawing on Bachman’s (1997, 1998) theory, Ferrier and 
Brewin (2005) proposed that people with OCD have an uncertain sense of self which 
results in them attempting to protect others from their ‘feared self which they fear will 
otherwise cause people harm, thus proving that they are intrinsically dangerous and 
immoral. Also, based on Rachman’ theory that people with OCD are distressed by 
unwanted ego-dystonic intrusive thoughts because they believe that they reveal who they 
really are (i.e. dangerous, immoral and bad), Ferrier and Brewin (2005) hypothesized 
that a small discrepancy between ‘actual’ and ‘feared self may result in OCD
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symptomology. Ferrier and Brewin (2005) used the Selves Questionnaire (Carver et al., 
1999) to research this hypothesis. A smaller discrepancy between ‘actual self and 
‘feared self was found in the OCD sample compared to healthy controls, but no 
significant difference in discrepancy size was found between OCD and the non-OCD 
anxiety group. However, content analysis revealed that the ‘feared self in OCD was that 
of being dangerous (immoral, bad, or insane), whereas the ‘feared self within the non- 
OCD anxiety groups was related to that of being hopeless and fearful. The feared self of 
the healthy controls was characterised by a broad spectrum of negative traits (e.g. pride, 
selfishness). These findings seem to support Doron et al.’s (2005) findings that suggest 
that people with OCD have a sensitive morality domain.
More broadly, Rowa and colleagues (Rowa & Purdon, 2003; Rowa et al., 2005) 
researched obsessional content and distress levels and found that ego-dystonic thoughts 
(i.e. thoughts which contradict valued self-perceptions) were found to be more 
distressing than ego-syntonic thoughts (i.e. thoughts which match valued self­
perceptions) in people with OCD and non-clinical participants. Rowa and Purdon’s 
(2003) research into the role of ‘self as a vulnerability factor in OCD found that 
students who were allocated the task of reporting upsetting intrusive thoughts reported 
that these thoughts were more contradictory to their sense of self than students who were 
allocated the task of reporting their least upsetting intrusive thoughts. A replication of 
this study by Rowa, Summerfeldt and Antony (2005) using a clinical cohort gave similar 
results, indicating that ego-dystonic intrusive thoughts were rated by people with OCD 
as more meaningful and distressing than ego-syntonic thoughts (Rowa, Purdon, 
Summerfeldt, & Antony, 2005). These studies indicate that intrusive thoughts are 
appraised in terms of valence and significance based on self-representations (Doron et 
al, 2009).
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Self-discrepancy and autogenous and reactive obsessions
The Selves Questionnaire (Carver et al., 1999) allows empirical assessment of the 
discrepancy between actual self and ideal, ought, and feared self. In this way it becomes 
possible to employ another method to assess differing self-representations and how these 
might be related to autogenous and reactive obsessions. No current published studies 
exist that explore the associations between self-discrepancy and the autogenous/reactive 
subtyping. Such research might increase theoretical development and also indicate the 
relevance of looking at self-discrepancies in clinical samples of people with obsessions 
and compulsions. Therefore, the second aim of the current study is to look at the 
relationship between discrepancies in self-positions and autogenous and reactive 
obsessions.
Research Questions:
Is there a relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal and actual/feared self­
discrepancy and total obsession scores.
Is there a differential relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal and actual/feared 
self-discrepancy and autogenous versus reactive obsession scores?
Methodology
Design
This study employed a cross-sectional correlational design in a non-clinical sample. 
Participants completed all questionnaire-based measures in a survey at one time-point 
via a website on the internet (created using SSIWebV, Version 7.0.22., developed by
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Sawtooth Software). Therefore participants could access the online questionnaire from 
the setting of their choosing and were not geographically bound to the local area of the 
researcher.
Participants 
Sample size calculation
A priori power analysis was completed for both the hypothesis and exploratory research 
questions, with the aim being to estimate the size of the correlation coefficient (r). 
According to Cohen (1992), a large effect is r > 0.5 and small effect size is r = 0.1. The 
sample size affects the precision of the estimates of correlation coefficient. Stata 
(Statacorps, 2009) was used to estimate the width of 95% confidence intervals for 
different effect sizes. With a sample size of 150 participants the 95% confidence interval 
(95% Cl) would be of width 0.11 for a large effect and 0.10 for a small effect. With a 
smaller sample size of 100 the 95% Cl would increase to 0.20 for a large effect and 0.13 
for a small effect. For a sample size of 50 the 95% Cl would be 0.29 for a large effect 
and 0.19 for a small effect. A sample size of between 100 and 150 was therefore aimed 
for. A total of 506 participants began the survey, and out of these 374 participants 
provided useable data. Therefore, the intended sample size was surpassed.
Inclusion criteria
The sample criterion was any individual aged 18 or above. Regarding the rationale for 
using a non-clinical population, Doron et al. (2009) propose the following evidential 
support: first, that content of intrusive thoughts is similar, though less frequent in both 
clinical and nonclinical samples (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 
1984); second, that clinical and non-clinical populations reduce anxiety through using 
similar cognitive and behavioural strategies (Muris, Harald & Clavan, 1997). 
Additionally, there is a long tradition of utilising non-clinical samples to understand
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clinical OCD due to dominant cognitive-based theories conceptualising obsessions and 
compulsions as phenomena that are continuous in the general population.
Recruitment
The study was advertised on the following four websites:
1) The ‘Volunteer and Charity Work’ section (across UK geographical areas with a high 
population so as to reach as many potential participants as possible) on Gumtree 
(www. gumtree.com). which is a website specialising in online advertising.
2) The University of Hanover (http://psvch.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html),
3) Online psychological research UK (www.onlinepsvchreseaich.co.uk)
4) Social psychology network (www.socialpsvchology.org/expts.htm) .
All these sites hosted a one line advert (Appendix 1), within which a link to the study 
Information Webpage was embedded. The latter three websites have been specifically 
designed for researchers to advertise their studies online. Administrative staff and 
students within the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences (FAHS) at Surrey University 
were also invited to participate via an email in which they were sent a full-length advert 
(Appendix 2).
The full-length advert, the one line advert, and the Information Webpage (Appendix 3) 
offered a financial incentive for participants who completed the survey. The full-length 
advert and the Information Webpage explained that this offer could be taken up by the 
participant adding their email address to the Demographic Questionnaire (Appendix 4), 
on the understanding that it would be placed in a raffle, and would only be used, and the
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corresponding participant contacted, if it was one of the first four pulled out. First prize 
was £40, and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th prices were £30, £20, £10, respectively.
Sample characteristics
Due incomplete responses, there were 130 (25.69%) unusable surveys out of the 506 
who began the surveys. Therefore there were 376 useable surveys, of which there were 
85 (22.6%) males and 291 (77.4%) females. The age range of participant was between 
18 and 64, with mean average of 26.24 (standard deviation = 8.77). For males, the mean 
average was 26.60 (standard deviation = 9.27), and for females, the mean average was 
26.13 (standard deviation = 8.63). See table 1 for additional demographics.
Table 1. Summary of additional demographics
How became aware of study Participants (frequency and percentage)
Website advert 270(71.8%)
Word of mouth 106 (28.2%)
Highest educational qualification
No qualifications 6 (1.6%)
C.S.E/O’ levels 15 (4.0%)
AS levels/A levels 133 (35.4%)
Diplomas 27 (7.2%)
Degrees 110(29.3%)
Postgraduate diplomas/degrees 85 (22.6%)
Current employment status
Employed full-time 78 (20.7%)
Employed part-time 24 (6.4%)
Students 209 (55.6%)
Retired 1 (.3%)
Unemployed 52(13.8%)
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Other 12 (3.2%)
Current relationship status
Single 259 (68.9%)
Civil partnership/marriage 54 (14.4%)
Co-habiting 53 (14.1%)
Divorced/separated 9 (2.4%)
Widowed 1 (.3%)
Ethnic origin
White British 208 (55.3)
White Irish 7(1.9%)
Any of White Background 99 (26.3%)
White and Black Caribbean 2 (.5%)
White and Black African 4(1.1%)
White and Asian 4(1.1%)
Any of mixed background 4(1.1%)
Asian or Asian British Indian 13 (3.5%)
Asian or Asian British Pakistani 4(1.1%)
Asian or Asian British Bangladeshi 1 (.3%)
Any of Asian background 7 (1.9%)
Black or Black British Caribbean 3 (.8%)
Black of Black British African 5 (1.3%)
Chinese 5(1.3%)
Any of background 10 (2.7%)
Country from where internet-based 
questionnaire was accessed
UK 326 (86.7%)
Northern Ireland 3 (.8%)
Europe 14 (3.7 %)
U.S.A 29 (7.7 %)
Middle East 1 (.3%)
Western Asia 1 (.3%)
Africa 1 (.3 %)
Australia 1 (.3%)
Page 158 of 233
Demographic data
In terms of the implications for the external validity of study, it is important to observe 
that the participants were mainly female (77.4%), young (mean average age of 26.24), 
and from the UK. Although the literature does not predict a difference in the strength of 
associations between self-ambivalence, self-discrepancy, and autogenous and reactive 
obsessions, based on gender, age or ethnic origin, this may still be possible. Therefore, if 
this study was to be replicated, it might be useful to consider using a sampling procedure 
that ensures equanimity in terms of male and females participants, and that actively 
attempts to attract participants from across all ages. Difficulties that can occur when 
using self-reports across cultural groups are addressed in the section entitled, ‘using an 
online survey.’
M easures
Reactive and autogenous obsessions
The Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory, Part 1 (ROII; Purdon & Clark, 1993; Purdon 
& Clark, 1994) is a widely used measure of obsessions in clinical and non-clinical groups 
(Appendix 5). It comprises of a 52-item self-report questionnaire measuring the 
frequency of intrusive thoughts, images and impulses analogous to obsessions on a 7- 
point Likert scale (from T have never had this thought’ (0), to T have this thought 
frequently during the day’ (6)). Examples of items from this inventory include: T have 
had unacceptable intrusive thoughts that I left the heat, stove or lights on which may cause a 
fire,” “While driving I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of swerving into oncoming 
traffic.” The reliability and validity of this measure has been demonstrated within 
clinical and non-clinical populations, where it demonstrated high internal consistency, and 
high discriminant and concurrent validity with depression and anxiety (Clark & Purdon 
1993; Purdon & Clark, 1994). The researcher of current study was granted permission
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from the authors of the ROII to both use this measure online and for the instructions in 
this measure to be slightly modified so as to work in an online environment. Lee and 
Kwon (2003) carried out a factor analysis on the ROII (Part I), and from this derived that 
questions 1-21 and 25-44 relate to autogenous obsessions, and questions 22-24 and 45- 
52 relate to reactive obsessions. These findings have been replicated by Lee, Kwon and 
Telch (2005); Lee, Kim, Kwon and Telch (2005); Lee & Telch (2005); Lee, Zoung-Soul 
and Kwon (2005); and Moulding, Kyrios and Doron (2007). Therefore, each completed 
ROII provides both an autogenous obsession frequency score and reactive obsession 
frequency score. Given that autogenous obsession frequency scores are measured with 
41 items and reactive obsession frequency scores with 11 items, in the current study total 
and average scores were calculated to make the scales comparable.
Self-Ambivalence
The Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM; Bhar, 2004; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007) draws on 
Guidano and Liotti’s (1993) idea of conflicting beliefs about the self, and is a 21 item 
self-report questionnaire that measures conflicting beliefs about self-worth, morality, 
and social acceptance (Appendix 6). Respondents rate each item on a five-point Likert 
scale (‘Not at all’ 0, to ‘Agree Totally’ 4). The SAM consists of two subscales: self- 
worth ambivalence (SA) comprising 13 items, and moral ambivalence (MA) comprising 
6 items, with higher scores indicating increased self-ambivalence. Both subscales and 
the full scale (total ambivalence scored, calculated by summing the two subscales) 
demonstrated good internal reliability in clinical and non-clinical samples (Cronbach’s a 
ranging from .85 to .88), and acceptable test-retest reliability (r = .77, p = .000) (Bhar, 
2004; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). The SAM is readily available online.
Self-discrepancy
The Selves Questionnaire (Carver et al., 1999) is a self-report questionnaire based on 
Higgins’s (1985) self-discrepancy theory. Participants are given descriptions of self­
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concepts (‘ought self,’ ‘ideal self,’ ‘feared’ self) and are then asked to identify and list 
seven of their own traits for each of these self-concepts (see Appendix 7 for definitions 
of these self-concepts). Participants then rate the discrepancy on a 7-point scale between 
each of their listed traits and their perceived ‘actual self: the scale ranges from 1 (T am 
just like this trait’) to 7 (T am the opposite of this trait’), with higher scores indicating a 
greater discrepancy between the perceived actual self and the other self-position (i.e. 
ought, ideal, feared). These ratings are summed to produce total discrepancy scores for 
each pair. Regarding psychometric properties of the Selves Questionnaire, reliability 
data is not available for this questionnaire, but it does have good face validity (Ferrier & 
Brewin, 2005). Reliability data may not be available because the construct of self­
discrepancy is too fluid because it requires participants to operationalize their self traits 
in similar ways. However, this does not invalidate the questionnaire, because the 
questionnaire is measuring the discrepancies between differing self traits. The researcher 
of the current study was granted permission from the author of the Selves Questionnaire 
to both use this measure online and for the instructions in this measure to be slightly 
modified so as to work in an online environment.
Mood
The Depression, Anxiety and Stress scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is 
included in this study so that relationships between key variables can be assessed whilst 
controlling for dysphoria (Appendix 8). It is a widely used 42-item self-report 
questionnaire, based on a dimensional conceptualisation of psychological disorder. It 
comprises three self-report scales, measuring depression, anxiety, and stress. Each 
subscale consists of 14 items which participants score on a 3 point Likert scale (where 0 
= 'did not apply to me at all’, and 3 = 'applied to me much, or most o f the time’) to rate 
their experiences of depression, anxiety, and stress over the past week. The depression 
scales assesses inertia, anhedonia, lack of interest/involvement, hopelessness, 
devaluation of life, self-depreciation, and dysphoria. The Anxiety scale assesses
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situational anxiety, subjective experience of anxious affect, skeletal muscle effects, and 
autonomic arousal. The Stress scale assesses nervous arousal, difficulty relaxing, being 
irritable/over-reactive, upset/agitated, and impatient. The DASS demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency for each of the subscales (Depression = .96; Anxiety = .92; Stress = 
.95), and for the total scale (Cronbach a = .97) (Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007), and 
suitability for clinical and non-clinical sample populations (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1993, cited in Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Antony, Beling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998; Crawford & Henry, 2003). All three subscales demonstrate adequate discriminant 
and convergent validity. The DASS demonstrated construct validity through the 
capability of the Depression and Anxiety Scales to differentiate between depressed and 
anxious clinical groups (Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007). The DASS is readily 
available online.
Procedure
All measures described above were formatted into a single online survey. The first 
screen participants saw was the Information Webpage. Participants were then asked to 
read the Consent Webpage (Appendix 9) carefully and then click ‘yes’ if they wished to 
consent to participation in the study, and ‘no’ if they did not wish to consent. 
Participants then completed the Demographics Questionnaire (Appendix 4). In order to 
maintain anonymity, participants were not asked to give their name, but were asked to 
give their email address if they wished to be included in the raffle. Participants then 
completed the measures in the following sequence: SAM (Bhar, 2004; Bhar & Kyrios, 
2007), ROII (Part I) (Purdon & Clark, 1993; Purdon & Clark, 1994), DASS (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995), and then Selves Questionnaire (Carver et a l, 1999). At the end of the 
questionnaire stage, a Debriefing Webpage gave a fuller explanation of the purpose of 
the study, stated that this study was not designed to diagnose mental health conditions, 
and then recommended that participants see their GP/physician if they felt they need
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professional support. This screen directed participants to a list of organizations from 
which they could access support if they found any aspect of the questionnaire process 
distressing.
Once the recruitment phase has been completed, the numerical data was exported from 
the online data collection website into a SSPS datafile in order to analyse the data. 
During this process participants were automatically allocated a unique identification 
number. The email addresses entered into the demographic questionnaire from 
participants who requested to take part in the raffle were noted down and were put in a 
box. The emails were then deleted from the data file as they potentially identified 
participants’ data. The first four email addresses pulled out of the box were used to 
contact the corresponding participants to say they had won. These participants provided 
the researcher with further contact details in order to receive the aforementioned 
financial prizes. The researcher’s supervisor acted as a judicator throughout this 
process. Participants who ticked a box on the demographic questionnaire indicating that 
they would like to receive a summary of the study findings once they are available were 
sent a copy via email.
Ethical considerations
This study received a favourable ethical opinion from Surrey University’s Faculty of 
Arts and Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee (Appendix 10; Appendix 11).
An information sheet was the first webpage of the online questionnaire, and clearly 
briefed participants of the study’s purpose. It stated that all confidential material would 
be anonymised, and that participants did not have to include their email address in the
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demographic questionnaire unless they wished to be entered in to a raffle. The 
information webpage also stated that participants could withdraw from the study during 
survey completion. Consent was given by participants clicking on the ‘yes’ button on the 
website. At the end of the questionnaire there was a debrief webpage which explained 
the study in more detail. Although the study used a community-based sample and the 
measures have been used in previous studies, the researcher could not rule out that some 
participants might experience a degree of anxiety when completing some of the 
questionnaires. Therefore, the debriefing webpage also directed participants to a list of 
organizations from which they could access support if they found any aspect of the 
questionnaire process distressing. It also stated that this study was not designed to 
diagnose mental health conditions, and recommended that participants see their GP if 
they felt they needed professional support subsequent to taking part.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were performed using PASW (SPSS) version 18.0 for Microsoft 
Windows.
Data Screening
All data was screened for errors, outliers and missing values. Due to the large sample 
size, normality of distribution of each variable was explored by both using visual 
inspection of histograms and both the Shapiro-Wilk and one-sample Kolmogorov- 
Smimov tests. Due to some variables being positively skewed, log transformations were 
used to achieve normality of distribution for these variables.
Correlations
Zero-order Pearson’s correlations and partial correlations were used to explore 
relationships between the variables in order to address the primary research questions.
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Results
Data transform ations
Data screening confirmed that out 376 useable surveys, 310 participants completed the 
Selves Questionnaire. However, 56 of these respondents did not input all seven traits for 
each of the ought self, ideal self, and feared self sections of the questionnaire. Although 
respondents were asked to insert seven traits for each section, not all participants 
inserted the full 7 traits. Therefore, to standardise the scores an average discrepancy 
score was calculated by dividing the total discrepancy by the number of traits identified. 
Data screening confirmed that the Selves Questionnaire total average discrepancy and 
subscale average discrepancy (e.g. ought self, ideal self, feared self) scores were 
approximately normally distributed. The SAM total scores also approximate a normal 
distribution. However, data was positively skewed for the DASS total and subscale 
totals (depression, anxiety, stress), and the ROII total and subscale totals (e.g. 
autogenous obsessions and reactive obsessions). This was expected because the study 
used a nonclinical population. However, after a log transformation, further screening 
confirmed that these transformed variables were not significantly different from a 
normal distribution.
D escriptive sta tistics
Descriptive statistics, prior to log transformations, are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variables N Overall mean 
score (SD)
Item mean (SD)
Depression 354 11.14 (10.60) -
Anxiety 354 7.14(7.47) -
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Stress 354 13.49 (9.84) -
DASS Total 354 31.77 (25.62) -
SAM Total 397 33.06 (15.94) -
Autogenous obsessions 376 23.82 .58 (.59)
Reactive obsessions 376 10.12 .92 (.82)
ROII total 376 33.94 (29.73) -
Ought-actual self-discrepancy 309 22.11 3.38(1.13)
Actual-ideal self-discrepancy 309 23.07 3.55 (1.22)
Actual-feared self-discrepancy 309 30.62 4.74(1.30)
Total Discrepancies 310 75.55 3.88 (.70)
The overall mean scores for autogenous and reactive obsession in the current study are 
slightly higher than those from Lee and Telch’s (2005) sample of college students, 
(autogenous obsessions mean score = 21.47, SD = 20.81, and reactive obsessions mean 
score = 8.32, SD = 7.70). Even when acknowledging that comparisons are not exact, it 
suggests that the participants in the current study were more obsessional across both 
obsessional subtypes. Also, similarly to Lee and Telch’s (2005) results, in the current 
study there is a higher mean score for autogenous obsessions compared with reactive 
obsession. However, the reason for this is because Lee and Kwon’s (2003) analysis (and 
further replicative analyses) of the ROII found that 41 of the questions were related to 
autogenous obsessions whilst only 11 were related to reactive obsessions. However, 
when looking at the item means for the current study, it becomes clear that the reactive 
item mean is higher than the autogenous item mean, indicating that this type of 
obsessions were more common in the current sample.
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It is interesting to note that the mean score for stress was higher than both anxiety and 
depression, and that anxiety was rated as lowest out of the three dysphoria states. This 
may because non-chnical participant samples may be more used to experiencing stress 
rather than anxiety.
Regarding self-discrepancies, both the overall average mean and the item mean (taking 
account of the fact that not all participants completed 7 traits for each self­
representation) show that there is a greater discrepancy between actual and feared self 
than the other self-discrepancies. However, this needs to be understood within the 
context that larger discrepancies between actual and ought self, and also between actual 
and ideal self, have negative consequences, whilst the opposite is true for discrepancies 
between actual and feared self where smaller discrepancies would have negative 
consequences for the self.
Correlational analysis
In the analyses reported, sample sizes vary due to participants not completing all of the 
measures. In analyses involving self-discrepancy, average discrepancy scores are used.
Relationship between self-ambivalence and obsessive subtypes
Hypothesis: There will be a positive correlation between self-ambivalence and both
autogenous and reactive obsession scores, but the effect size for the correlation between 
self-ambivalence and autogenous obsessions will be greater.
Zero-order Pearson correlations indicated significant positive associations with medium 
effect sizes between self-ambivalence and both autogenous and reactive obsessions.
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However, contrary to the hypothesis, even though both effect sizes were within the 
medium range, there was a greater size5 for the correlation between self-ambivalence 
and reactive obsessions (r = .412, p  <.001, df = 374) compared with autogenous 
obsessions (r = .403, p < .001, df=  374). However, there were also significant positive 
associations with large effect sizes between self-ambivalence and the measure of 
dysphoria (DASS) (r = .650, p < .001, df=  352), between autogenous obsessions and 
dysphoria (r = .510, p < .001, df= 352), and between reactive obsessions and DASS (r = 
.521, p < .001, df -  352). Therefore, it was considered important to examine the 
relationship between self-ambivalence and autogenous and reactive obsessions after 
partialling out dysphoria.
Partial correlations between self-ambivalence and obsessions controlling for dysphoria 
yielded significant positive associations between self-ambivalence and both autogenous 
and reactive obsessions. However, the large effect sizes were reduced to small effect 
sizes. Similarly to the zero-order analysis, there was a correlation between self­
ambivalence and reactive obsession ipr6 = .113, p = .033, df = 351) than self­
ambivalence and autogenous obsessions (pr = .109, p = .041, df= 351).
Relationship between self-ambivalence and total obsessionality
Zero-order Pearson correlations indicated significant positive associations with medium
effect sizes between self-ambivalence and total obsessionality scores (ROII) (r = .475, p 
< .001, df=  374). However, there were also significant positive associations with large 
effect sizes between total obsessionality scores and dysphoria (r = .593, p < .001, df =
5 According to Cohen (1992), r=.10 (small effect size), the effect size accounts for 1% of the total 
variance; r=.30 (medium effect size), the effect size accounts for 9% of the total variance; and r=.50 (large 
effect size), the effect accounts for 25% of the variance.
6 The researcher has used the American Psychological Society’s symbol for partial correlation, pr, because 
the British Psychology Society does not have a symbol for this.
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352). Therefore, it was considered important to examine the relationship between self­
ambivalence and total obsessionality after partialling out dysphoria. After partialling out 
dysphoria, the large effect size was reduced to a small effect size but was still significant 
ipr = .147, p = .006, df= 351).
Relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal actual/feared, total discrepancy 
and total obsession scores
Exploratory question: Is there a relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal and 
actual/feared self-discrepancy and total obsession scores.
There was a significant positive association of a small effect size between actual/ought 
self-discrepancy and total obsession score (r = .282, p < .001, df=  307). There was a 
significant positive association of a small effect size between actual/ideal self­
discrepancy and total obsessions score (r = .175, p = .002, df -  307). There was a 
significant negative association of a small size between actual/feared self-discrepancy 
and total obsessions (r = -.186, p = .001, df=  307). There was a positive association of 
small effect size between total self-discrepancy score (average total of actual/ought, 
actual/ideal, and actual/feared self-discrepancy) and total obsession score (r = .132, p < 
.001, df= 308).
However, there were also significant positive associations with medium effect sizes 
between actual/ought self-discrepancy and dysphoria (r = .370, p < .001, df=  307), and 
actual/ideal discrepancy and dysphoria (r = .370, p < .001, df=  307). There was also a 
significant negative association with a medium effect size between actual feared 
discrepancy and dysphoria (r = -.355, p < .001, df=  307). Therefore, it was considered
Page 169 of 233
important to examine the relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal, actual feared 
self, and Selves total self-discrepancy and total obsession scores after controlling for 
dysphoria.
When controlling for dysphoria, the effect size for the positive association between 
actual/ought self-discrepancy and total obsession scores ipr = .084, p = .144, df=  306) 
reduced and was no longer significant. The effect size between actual/ideal self­
discrepancy and obsession total scores almost reduced to zero (pr = -.011,p = .850, df=
306) and was no longer significant. The same was true for the correlation between 
actual/feared self-discrepancy and total obsession scores (pr = .017, p =.770, df= 306).
Relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal, actual/feared, total self­
discrepancy and autogenous and reactive obsession scores
Exploratory question: Is there a relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal and 
actual/feared self-discrepancy and autogenous versus reactive obsession scores.
There were significant positive associations with a small effect size between 
actual/ought self-discrepancy and autogenous obsessions score (r = .268, p < .001, df =
307), between actual/ought self-discrepancy and reactive obsessions score (r = .205, p < 
.001, df=  307), between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and autogenous obsessions score 
(r =.168, p = .003, df = 307), and between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and reactive 
obsessions score (r =.175, p = .002, df = 307). There were significant negative 
associations with a small effect size between actual/feared self-discrepancy and 
autogenous obsessions score (r = -.155, p = .006, df=  307), and between actual/feared
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self-discrepancy and reactive obsessions score (r = -.140, p = .014, df = 307). There 
were significant positive associations with a small effect size between Selves total 
discrepancy and autogenous obsessions score (r =.143, p = .011, df= 308), and between 
total discrepancy and reactive obsessions score (r = .131, p  = .021, df=  308). As found 
previously, discrepancy scores were correlated with dysphoria so partial correlations 
were conducted.
When controlling for dysphoria, the positive associations were no longer significant and 
the effect size reduced between actual/ought self-discrepancy and autogenous obsessions 
score (pr = .099, p = .084, df= 306), between actual/ought self-discrepancy and reactive 
obsessions score ipr = .015, p = .795, df=  306), between actual/ideal self-discrepancy 
and autogenous obsessions score ipr = .013, p = .827, df = 306), and between 
actual/ideal self-discrepancy and reactive obsessions score ipr = .017, p = .761, df = 
306). There was no significant associations and a reduced effect size between 
actual/feared self-discrepancy and autogenous obsessions score (pr= .019, p = .733, df= 
306), and between actual/feared self-discrepancy and reactive obsessions score ipr = 
.044, p = .446, df = 306). The positive associations were no longer significant and the 
effect size reduced between Selves total discrepancy and autogenous obsessions score 
ipr =.064, p = .259, df = 307), and between Selves total discrepancy and reactive 
obsessions score ipr = .048, p = .401, df= 307).
Supplementary Analysis: the relationship between self-discrepancies and 
depression, anxiety, and stress
The current study’s previous finding that there was no relationship between self­
discrepancies and obsessionality once dysphoria had been partialled out suggested that 
dysphoria was an important factor in the relationship between these variables. This was 
not surprising as Higgins’ (1986) self-discrepancy theory proposed that there would be a
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strong association between actual/ought self-discrepancy and anxiety, and between 
actual/ideal self-discrepancy and depression. Supplementary analysis found the 
following results
There was a significant positive association with a medium effect size between 
actual/ought self-discrepancy and stress (r = .312, p < .001, df = 309), and between 
actual/ought self-discrepancy and depression (r = .369, p < .011, df=  309). There was a 
significant positive associations with a small effect size between actual/ought self­
discrepancy and anxiety (r = .249, p < .001, df=  309). There was a significant positive 
associations with small effect sizes between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and stress (r = 
.258, p < .001, df = 309), and between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and anxiety (r = 
.243, p < .001, df=  309). There was a significant positive association with a medium 
effect size between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and depression (r = .320, p < .001, df= 
309). There was significant negative associations with medium effect sizes between 
actual/feared self-discrepancies and stress (r = -.318, p < .001, df=  309), actual/feared 
self-discrepancies and anxiety (r = -.303, p < .001), and actual/feared self-discrepancy 
and depression (r = -.311, p < .001, df = 309). There was a significant negative 
association with a small effect size between total self-discrepancy and stress (r = -.136, p 
= .017, df= 310), a non-significant positive associations with a small effect size between 
total self-discrepancy and anxiety (r = .095, p = .095, df=  310), and significant positive 
association with a small effect size between total self-discrepancy and depression (r = 
.202, p < .001, df= 310).
Discussion
This study investigated the relationship between self-ambivalence, self-discrepancy and 
autogenous and reactive obsessions. It was hypothesised that there would be a positive 
correlation between self-ambivalence and both autogenous and reactive obsessions, but
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the effect size for the correlation between self-ambivalence and autogenous obsessions 
would be greater. Also, due to the lack of evidence base on self-discrepancy (which is 
similar to self-ambivalence in terms of them both measuring conflicting self­
representations), the study also addressed the following: is there a relationship between 
actual/ought, actual/ideal and actual/feared self-discrepancy and total obsessions scores; 
and is there a relationship between actual/ought, actual/ideal and actual/feared self­
discrepancy and autogenous /reactive obsessions scores?
The findings of the study were that (prior to partialling out dysphoria) there were 
significant positive associations between self-ambivalence and obsessionality, but that 
the difference in effect size for the correlation between self-ambivalence and both 
autogenous and reactive obsessions was very small. Once dysphoria was partialled out, 
the relationship between self-ambivalence and obsessionality still existed although the 
effect size was reduced, and there was no difference in the relationship between self­
ambivalence and autogenous, and self-ambivalence and reactive obsessions. These 
findings confirm the first part of the hypothesis; i.e. that there will be a positive 
correlation between self-ambivalence and both autogenous and reactive obsession 
scores. However, these findings disconfirm the second part of the hypothesis: i.e. that 
the effect size for the correlation between self-ambivalence and autogenous obsessions 
will be greater than between self-ambivalence and reactive obsessions.
Regarding the research questions, the study found that prior to partialling out dysphoria, 
there was a positive relationship between actual/ought self-discrepancy and 
obsessionality, and between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and obsessionality, and a 
negative relationship between actual/feared self-discrepancy and obsessionality. Also, 
prior to partialling out dysphoria, there was a larger effect size correlation between 
actual/ought and autogenous compared with reactive obsessions, a larger effect size
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between actual/ideal and reactive compared with autogenous obsessions, and non­
significant associations between actual/feared self-discrepancies and autogenous 
obsessions, and between actual/feared self-discrepancies and reactive obsessions. There 
was a slightly larger effect size for the correlation between total self-discrepancy scores 
and autogenous obsession compared with reactive obsessions. The largest effect sizes 
between self-discrepancy and obsessions was for actual/ought. However, once dysphoria 
had been partialled out, all of the relationships between self-discrepancies and 
obsessionality (and thus also both autogenous and reactive obsessions) reduced to almost 
zero. Limitations of the study, clinical implications, and future research 
recommendations can be found at the end of this discussion section, following a more 
detailed discussion of the findings.
The relationship betw een self-am bivalence and obsessionality
Prior to partialling out dysphoria, self-ambivalence was positively associated with 
obsessionality and these variables shared 22% of their variance. This finding seemed to 
give support to Bhar and Kyrios’ (2007) theory, given that it is based on clinical OCD, 
that the higher the obsessionality scores in a non-clinical sample, the greater the self­
ambivalence. This proposal was also given support by George’s (2010) findings that 
self-ambivalence was significantly higher in an OCD group compared with both a 
general anxiety group and a non-chnical group. Interestingly, although taking account 
that the current study’s design uses only one sample group from a non-clinical 
population and is therefore not directly comparable to George’s study, the zero-order 
correlations in the current study indicated that self-ambivalence was positively 
correlated with obsessionality. After dysphoria was partialled out self-ambivalence and 
obsessions shared only 2% of their variance.
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Therefore, the current study found a statistically significant relationship between self­
ambivalence and obsessionality once partialling out the effects of dysphoria. As such, 
there is a unique relationship, between self-ambivalence and obsessions, thereby 
suggesting that self-ambivalence may have some part to play in obsessionality. 
However, the relationship was weak and, given the correlational nature of the data, 
causality cannot be inferred. It may be that the experience of obsessions results in self­
ambivalence or vice versa. Therefore, although recognising that these results are based 
on a non-chnical sample, they do concur with Bhar and Kyrios (2007), who found that 
the relationship between self-ambivalence and obsessions was independent of self­
esteem, depression and anxiety. However, Bhar and Kyrios’s sample included people 
with OCD and other anxieties. Therefore the different results in terms of strength of the 
relationship between self-ambivalence and obsessionahty may be due to using a non- 
chnical sample in the current study.
Guidano and Liotti (1983) proposed, based on clinical cases, that individuals with OCD 
experience doubt related to whether they are intrinsically moral, lovable, and worthy, 
and see egodystonic intrusive thoughts as reveahng evidence that their true self is 
immoral, unlovable and unworthy. Therefore, all the findings from the current study 
seem to support this theory, even though they suggest that this relationship is weak, but 
it is still important to recognise that these findings cannot simply be extrapolated from a 
non-chnical sample to clinical population. However, the finding that there is only a weak 
relationship between self-ambivalence and obsessions raises the question of whether the 
SAM (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007) is adequate as an index of self-ambivalence; i.e. that the 
SAM is not a robust enough measure, or does not operationalize self-ambivalence 
sufficiently well. Alternatively, it may not focus enough on the domains of self­
ambivalence that are considered most sensitive to OCD according to Doron, Kyrios and 
Moulding (2007) and Doron, Moulding, Kyrios, and Nedeljkovic (2008), such as social
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acceptability, job/school competence, and morality. Although the SAM does have a 
morality subscale, it only has 6 items and may not measure moral self-ambivalence 
sufficiently.
Dysphoria was strongly correlated with both self-ambivalence and obsessions meaning 
that any assessment of the relationship between the two necessarily needed to be partial 
out the effect of dysphoria. This means that controlling for dysphoria gives a truer 
picture of the relationship between self-ambivalence and obsessionality in this non- 
clinical sample and, as such, there is little variance shared between these variables after 
controlling for dysphoria. Therefore, self-ambivalence does not explain much variance 
in obsessionality and instead the data reveals the nature of the relationship between self­
ambivalence, obsessions, and dysphoria. However, it is not surprising that self­
ambivalence would be associated with dysphoria, given Higgins’ (1987) assertion that 
contradictory self-states have consequences for positive mood has been supported in a 
number of studies (e.g. Strauman, 1989; Moretti & Higgins, 1990; Scott & O’Hara, 1993; 
Higgins, Shah & Friedman, 1997). Additionally, obsessionality is commonly comorbid 
with depression (Stein & Fineberg, 2007).
The relationship betw een self-am bivalence and autogenous 
obsessions and betw een self-am bivalence and reactive obsessions
The hypothesis that the correlation between self-ambivalence and autogenous obsessions 
would have a greater effect size than the correlation between self-ambivalence and 
reactive obsessions was not confirmed by the analysis. In fact, the shared variance was 
the same for both correlations at 16%. Therefore, there was no evidence of a difference 
between the strength of association been autogenous and reactive obsessions and self­
ambivalence. This replicates Moulding et al.’s (2007) findings to some extent, because
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even though they did observe a greater effect size between self-ambivalence and 
autogenous compared to reactive obsessions, the difference was very small at r =.30 
versus r =.25, respectively. The effect size for the two correlations differed by only .05 
and, as such, Moulding et al.’s (2007) study does not provide compelling evidence for a 
difference in the relationship. In the current study, after partialling out dysphoria, 
variance shared between self-ambivalence and reactive obsessions, and between self- 
ambivalence and autogenous obsessions reduced to 1%, thus discontinuing the 
hypothesis that there is more of an association between self-ambivalence and autogenous 
obsessions than between self-ambivalence and reactive obsessions. Therefore, to the 
extent that SAM is a measure of sense of self and it is only one way of conceptualising 
sense of self, the findings of the current study discontinu Moulding et al.’s (2007) 
hypothesis that autogenous obsessions have a more negative impact on the person’s 
sense of self, where sense of self is conceptualised within a self-ambivalence 
framework. Additionally, these findings fit with Frost et al.’s (2007) proposal that 
individuals with conflicting self-representations (e.g. that they are simultaneously moral 
and immoral) become preoccupied with seeking environmental evidence to establish the 
truth about themselves.
Dysphoria was strongly correlated with both autogenous and reactive obsessions, and 
with self-ambivalence, meaning that any assessment of the relationship between the two 
necessarily needed to be partial out of the effect of dysphoria. This replicates Moulding 
et al.’s (2007) finding that the relationship between and autogenous obsession and self­
ambivalence, and between reactive obsessions and self-ambivalence, reduces when 
controlling for mood. Therefore, self-ambivalence does not explain much variance in 
both autogenous and reactive obsessions independent of dysphoria. This is perhaps not 
surprising because distress is a core part of OCD (Roth & Fonagy, 2005; Well, 1997) 
and is commonly comorbid with depression (Stein & Fineberg, 2007).However, what
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the current analysis indicates is that, in a non-clinical sample, self-ambivalence is 
associated strongly with negative affect.
How robu st is the theoretical subtyping o f  obsessions into  
autogenous and reactive obsessions?
As noted, there was a strong association between dysphoria and obsessions. Further, it is 
also interesting to note that the differences in effect size between autogenous obsessions 
and dysphoria and between reactive obsessions and dysphoria is small. This suggests 
that the concept of subtyping obsessions in this way may not be valid or useful. Lee and 
Kwon’s (2003) assertion that one of the distinguishing characteristics between 
autogenous and reactive obsessions is that the former type are more ego-dystonic is not 
supported by the current analysis. This might be explained by considering Purdon et 
a/.’s (2007) argument that the same thought can both be syntonic and dystonie in 
relation to valued self-perceptions; that although a thought may contradict an 
individual’s valued self-perceptions, it can still be consistent with his or her preferences 
and past experiences, thus not making it an alien thought. Further, that dystonie thoughts 
can become increasingly experienced as syntonic the more an individual experiences 
them and shifts his or her self-perceptions accordingly. With this in mind, the researcher 
suggests that perhaps it is overly simplistic to consider that autogenous obsessions are 
more ego-dystonic than reactive obsessions. This is important as it would help to explain 
why there was not a larger effect size between self-ambivalence and autogenous 
obsessions than between self-ambivalence and reactive obsessions as was predicted by 
the hypothesis based on the theory that autogenous obsessions are more ego-dystonic. 
Therefore, if ego-dystonicity is not a clear distinguishing feature between the 
obsessional subtypes, then the subdivision itself starts to become questionable. 
Additionally, it might be the case that some contents are more ego-dystonic than others 
but that does not imply then that self-ambivalence should be differentially related.
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Perhaps what is needed is for research to establish the association between with self- 
ambivalence and ego-dystonicity regardless of thought type.
The relationship betw een self-discrepancies and obsessionality
Prior to partialling out dysphoria, actual/ought self-discrepancy was positively 
associated with obsessionality (these variables shared 7% of their variance), actual/ideal 
self-discrepancy was positively associated with obsessionality (these variables shared 
3% of their variance), total self-discrepancy was positively associated with 
obsessionality (these variables shared 1% of their variance), and actual/feared self­
discrepancy was negatively associated with total obsessionality (i.e. the higher the 
obsessionality the less actual/fear self-discrepancies) and these variables shared 3% of 
their variance. As such then, all of these associations had small effect sizes.
Although the current study sampled a non-clinical population, findings from the zero- 
order Pearson correlations seemed to have face validity because in a similar way to how 
intrusive thoughts are theorised to interact with self-ambivalence (Guidano and Liotti, 
1983), intrusive thoughts may activate/highlight the discrepancies between actual/ought 
self-discrepancies and/or actual/ideal self-discrepancies. Also, these finding appear to 
support Perrier and Brewin’s (2005) hypothesis that small discrepancies between actual 
and feared self would result in an increase in obsessionality because they would be 
appraised as evidence of a ‘true’ revealed self. However, the data is correlational and so 
it may be that the experience of obsessions creates discrepancies in self-perception 
equally as a discrepant self-image may motivate obsessions.
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After partialling out dysphoria, variance shared between all discrepancy variables and 
obsessionality reduced to zero. Therefore, the researcher argues that Frost et al.’s (2007) 
proposal that individuals with conflicting self-representations become preoccupied with 
seeking environmental evidence to establish the truth about themselves, also does not fit 
with findings from the current study regarding the relationship between all discrepancy 
variables and obsessionality, if it assumed that the conceptualisation of conflicting self­
representations is extended to include the existence of self-discrepancies. This is because 
in the current study self-discrepancies were not associated with increased obsessionality.
The relationship betw een self-discrepancies and autogenous 
obsessions, and betw een self-discrepancies and reactive obsessions
Prior to partialling out dysphoria, actual/ought discrepancy was positively associated 
with both autogenous (these variables shared 7% of their variance) and reactive 
obsessions (these variables shared 4% of their variance. Actual/ideal self-discrepancy 
was positively associated with both autogenous (these variables shared 2% of their 
variance) and reactive obsessions (these variables shared 3% of the their variance). Also, 
total selves discrepancy was positively associated with both autogenous (these variables 
shared 2% of their variance) and reactive obsessions (these variables shared 1% of their 
variance). These initial results were not surprising because self-discrepancies might be 
predicted to relate to obsessionality in a similar way to how self-ambivalence and 
obsessionality might be related.
Prior to partialling out dysphoria, actual/feared self-discrepancy was negatively 
associated with both autogenous (2% shared variance) and reactive obsessions (1% 
shared their variance). These findings were not surprising if it assumed that feared self 
traits are likely to be ego-dystonic, as are autogenous obsessions compared with reactive 
obsessions. A smaller discrepancy score means that individuals perceive their actual self
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is like their feared self. Theoretically, such a fear of being bad produces the occurrence 
of obsessions because the individual attends to negative intrusions more because these 
activate the possibility of being bad. But equally, it is possible that individuals who have 
lots of unpleasant obsessions are likely to come to feel that they are a bad person (i.e. 
that they are the person they fear). However, after partialling out dysphoria, variance 
shared between all discrepancy variables and both autogenous and reactive obsessions 
reduced to zero.
The relationship between self-discrepancies and depression, 
anxiety, and stress
A  supplementary analysis, suggested by the results above, was conducted to test 
Higgins’ (1985) self-discrepancy theory that there would be a strong relationship 
between actual/ought self-discrepancy and anxiety, and between actual/ideal self­
discrepancy and depression. The findings showed that there were significant positive 
associations with medium effect sizes between actual/ought self-discrepancy and stress 
and depression, and a significant positive association with a small effect size between 
actual/ought self-discrepancy and anxiety. There were significant positive associations 
with small effect sizes between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and both stress and anxiety, 
and positive association with a medium effect sizes between actual/ideal self­
discrepancy and depression. There were significant negative associations with medium 
effect sizes between actual/feared self-discrepancy and stress, anxiety, and depression. 
There was a significant negative association with a small effect size between total self­
discrepancy and stress, a non-significant positive association with a small size between 
total self-discrepancy and anxiety, and a significant positive association with a small 
effect size between self-discrepancy and depression. Therefore, these findings also 
confirm Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy theory that proposes that there would be a 
strong positive association between actual/ought self-discrepancy and anxiety. However,
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these findings indicate that the effect size between actual/ought self-discrepancy and 
stress is higher. This may because participants may be used to experiencing stress rather 
than anxiety in a non-clinical population. Additionally, what is interesting is that the 
effect size between actual/ought and depression is even larger, suggesting that Higgins’ 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory is not as predictive of what self-discrepancies have the 
strongest associations with depression, anxiety, and stress. The finding that there was as 
strong positive association between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and depression 
confirms Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory in terms of the relationship between 
these two variables. However, there were also strong positive associations with only 
slightly smaller effect sizes between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and anxiety, and 
between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and stress. Again, these findings confirm 
Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory, but additionally suggest that other types of 
dysphoria other than depression are almost equally as strongly associated with 
actual/ideal self-discrepancy.
The finding that actual/feared self-discrepancy is negatively associated with stress, 
anxiety, and depression is not surprising since the further away one perceives one’s 
actual self to be from one’s feared self, the lower the level of stress, anxiety, and 
depression. However, what is worthy of noting is that the differences between these 
effect sizes is very small, suggesting that actual/feared self-discrepancies have a similar 
strength of association with stress, anxiety, and depression.
M ethodological Lim itations
Using a non-clinical population
The main disadvantages of using a non-clinical population concerns the question of the 
extent to which findings in a non-clinical sample can be extrapolated to clinical
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populations. For example, Purdon and Clark (1994) suggest that some intrusive thoughts 
are more common within clinical populations and thus clinical populations would have 
scored higher on obsessionality (ROE). Thus, in terms of content differences, non- 
clinical samples may not endorse such a range of responses on obsessionality measures 
as clinical samples. Indeed, the item means for the autogenous and reactive subscales 
suggest infrequent occurrence of these experiences. This will have implications for the 
effects sizes achieved for correlations. Further, clinical samples may endorse extreme 
content more frequently which might call into question whether non-clinical samples 
allow a consideration of the full range of obsessionality. Additionally, the problem with 
the idea that constructs, such as self-ambivalence, obsessionality, and dysphoria are on a 
continuum between non-clinical and clinical populations (as suggested in cognitive- 
behavioural models), is that it does not address the possibility that although the surface 
manifestations of obsessionality appear similar, the underlying processes may be 
different.
However, there are mixed findings regarding the validity of analogue research. For 
example, although Coyne’s (1994) findings cast doubt on the validity of this type of 
research, and suggest that there are distinct differences between depression in non- 
clinical populations compared with clinical populations, these findings are in contrast to 
research by Cox et al. (1999) who found that the nature of depressive experience is 
similar in both analogue and clinically depressed samples in terms of the covariance 
matrices of depressive symptoms.
Recruitment strategy
A disadvantage of using a variety of recruitment pathways was that the researcher was 
unable to specify exactly how participants became aware about the survey (even though 
the demographic questionnaire asked for some information regarding this) and thus 
hypotheses about what drew participants to take part in the research (other than a
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potential financial incentive) and how this may have affected the results are not possible. 
However, a major advantage of using a variety of recruitment pathways was that the 
study was able to generate a large sample size that enabled the statistical analysis to find 
small effect sizes. This would have not been possible with a smaller sample.
Using an online survey
Although a possible disadvantage of using an online survey was an ethical concern that 
it might have been more difficult for participants to seek support than if they could speak 
to the researcher directly after completion of the survey, the researcher did supply 
several organisation’s contact details from where potentially distressed participants 
could seek support. An advantage of using an online survey was that the participants 
crossed demographic boundaries such as between students and nonstudents, and were 
not bound to a local region. However, it is possible that because the population sample 
in the study included participants from across different cultural groups, some of these 
groups may have interpreted some of the questions differently which were used to assess 
the constructs measured. However, even if some of the cultural groups did interpret 
some of the questions differently, the majority of the participants were from western 
cultures, thus limiting the effect of non-western perceptions of the constructs being 
studied. Using an online survey also meant that if participants wished, they could remain 
anonymous unless they wished to leave their email so as to take advantage of a potential 
financial incentive of taking part in a prize draw.
Demand characteristics, and other possible problems related to participants' 
responses
A weakness of self-report questionnaires is that they are subject to demand 
characteristics -  i.e. that participants wish to show their ‘better self rather than give an 
accurate reflection which they may perceive as less socially acceptable. Although this 
effect may be diminished for those participants that chose to remain anonymous, most
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participants chose to leave their email address so as to take part in the prize draw 
because of the financial incentive. However, the data suggests that participants were 
attempting to be truthful about themselves -  this is particularly apparent in the self­
discrepancy part of the questionnaire in which participants listed their actual, ought, 
ideal, and feared self. The demand characteristic effect may also have been reduced 
because the information sheet and questionnaire emphasise how normal it is to have 
intrusive thoughts.
Regarding reporting intrusive obsessions in the ROII, it is possible that non-clinical 
populations may feel more comfortable with thinking about intrusive thoughts than 
clinical populations because individuals with higher levels of self-ambivalence may be 
more worried about what others may think of them. However, this does not mean that 
non-clinical samples are not self-ambivalent, but instead that the experience of feeling 
comfortable with thinking about intrusive thoughts may be on a continuum related to 
level of self-ambivalence. Also, individuals with higher levels of obsessionality (i.e. 
moving towards the clinical end of the continuum) may have thought-action-fusion 
beliefs such as thinking that if they indicate what intrusive thoughts they have in the 
survey then these might come true. This belief would impede these individuals from 
wanting to indicate their level of experience of intrusive thoughts in the survey (i.e. they 
would indicate that they do not have intrusive thought which in fact worries them), 
thereby lowering their obsessionality score.
Order of measures within the survey
It is possible that by placing Carver et al.’s (1999) Selves questionnaire last in the 
survey, some participants may have been too tired to focus on the task which requires 
self-reflection. However, the reason for placing this questionnaire at the end of the 
survey was because it needed a lot of concentration and self-reflection, and therefore it 
was thought that some respondents may be less inclined to complete the survey if their
Page 185 of 233
first experience of the survey was to do to a particularly difficult and tiring task. 
However, the researcher noted that participants’ responses had face validity in that they 
fitted with the self-representations of actual, ought, ideal and feared self. Therefore, the 
order of the questionnaires within the survey did not seem to have an impact on the 
responses that participants gave.
Out of the 376 participants who provided useable data, 309 participants completed the 
part of the survey that included Carver et al.’s (1999) Selves’ Questionnaire. Out of this 
number, 254 participants completed 7 traits for each self-representation, but 55 gave less 
than 7 traits for at least one of the self-representations. This was accounted for by 
analysing the average score for each completed self-presentation. However, the fact that 
67 participants chose not to start the Selves Questionnaire and a further 55 were unable 
to manage to give seven traits for each section suggests that the task of being asked to 
complete seven traits for each self-representation was experienced as too arduous, which 
therefore has implications for the Selves Questionnaire measure if used again. As there 
is no particular reason why Carver et al.’s (1999) Selves Questionnaire needs to 
specifically ask for seven traits, future use of this questionnaire could be adapted to ask 
for fewer traits.
Alternative methods of data analysis
The current study used zero-order and partial correlation analysis to explore the strength 
of associations between the differing constructs being measured (i.e. self-ambivalence, 
self-discrepancy, and autogenous and reactive obsessions). Arguably these were the 
appropriate statistical tests for the research hypotheses and questions. However, there are 
potential advantages of using alternative methods of data analysis. For example, whilst 
correlation analysis gives the strength of relationships between two variables, but not the 
direction of causation, multiple regression analysis looks at which of a number of
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independent variables predict the dependent variable. Correlation analysis is limited to 
involving two variables at a time whereas multiple regression analysis can include all of 
the variables in a study (assuming the sample size is large enough). Therefore, had the 
study used multiple regression analysis, a model could have been generated that 
included self-ambivalence, self-discrepancy, and dysphoria as independent variables and 
obsessionality as a dependent variable. Running two multiple regression analysis on this 
model would have benefited the study because it would have shown which of these 
independent variables are the most important predictors of autogenous and reactive 
obsessions.
Is self-discrepancy a problematic construct to measure?
It is possible that self-discrepancy could be critiqued as a difficult construct to study 
because it is questionable how stable are self-representations/ self-positions (i.e. they 
may change over the life course, as and when people enter into relationships, 
marriage/civil partnerships, have children, et cetera). However, the important question 
that has been explored in this study is not how people define themselves, but the size of 
their self-discrepancies. So, whilst individuals’ self-perceptions may change over time, 
what it measured here is the discrepancy not the content, and so this study does not 
assume that self-characterisation does not change over time.
Sum m ary o f Theoretical Im plications
Within the literature there is a debate about whether OCD is a unitary or heterogeneous 
disorder. Theoretical contributions to understanding obsessions therefore can be made if 
specific factors are found to have a differential relationship with different obsessional 
subtypes. This study tested the prediction that self-ambivalence and self-discrepancy 
would be more strongly associated with autogenous than reactive obsessions, based on 
the convergence of both cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic theories regarding
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that self-concept is an important factor across both models in OCD (Kempke & Luyten, 
2007). The findings do not support this idea. Theoretically, the reason for this might be 
that sensitive domains of self-concept might predict frequency of particular types of 
obsessions. It is also possible that given self-ambivalence has been found across anxiety 
disorders and self-discrepancy relates to negative affect then this may be why we do not 
observe a differential relationship with obsession subtypes. Another reason for the 
current study’s finding is that the theoretical distinction between autogenous and 
reactive obsessions is weak. However, the current research findings have added to the 
psychological understanding of the strength of the relationship between conflicting self­
representations and dysphoria. The importance of this finding will be discussed further 
within clinical implications.
Clinical Im plications
The current study’s therapeutic focus on self-concept discrepancies is driven by the 
work of Guidano and Liotti (1983), and the convergence between cognitive-behavioural 
and psychodynamic models in relation to the importance of self-ambivalence in the 
development and maintenance of obsessions, as argued by Kempke and Luyten (2007). 
From a cognitive-behavioural perspective, if compulsions are a way to resolve 
ambivalence and compulsions maintain obsessions, then targeting the problem of 
ambivalence might ameliorate obsessions. From the psychodynamic perspective, the 
therapeutic relevance is that core intrapychic conflicts trigger sensitivity to obsessional 
thoughts. Hence, a therapeutic rationale in both models for dealing with core 
ambivalence is that it might help to reduce obsessions. The current study suggests a 
small role for self-ambivalence but this does not necessarily undermine therapeutic 
potential as it is based on new measures (SAM) or previously untested model (self­
discrepancy) and comes from a non-clinical sample that, generally, scored lower on 
obsessionality. Therefore, the findings of the current study suggest that clinical work 
with clients suffering from OCD and other psychopathologies that feature intrusive 
thoughts, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and/or negative moods (such as
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anxiety, depression, and stress), could benefit from including a focus on reducing self­
ambivalence. However, because the direction of the causation between these variables is 
unclear, it could also be the case that focusing on lowering negative mood could be used 
to reduce obsessionality in clinical disorders such as OCD. If this is the case, then 
focusing on psychological treatments that support clients lifting their mood (e.g. CBT) 
could also benefit them in terms of experiencing a reduction in obsessional thinking.
An interesting finding of the study is the strong relationships between self-ambivalence, 
self-discrepancy and dysphoria. The clinical implications of finding that there is strong 
relationship between self-discrepancies and dysphoria may be that mood disorders could 
be alleviated by work on clients’ self-discrepancies. This could take the form of 
developing acceptance of the discrepancies between actual and ought self, between 
actual and ideal self, and between actual and feared self. Therefore, it might be possible 
that both Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson, 
1999) and Compassion-Focused Therapy (CFT; Gilbert, 2010), which are third-wave 
CBT therapies, could be used to work with client’s acceptance of their self-discrepancies 
as way of working indirectly with reducing negative mood. Similarly, this therapeutic 
approach could be used to help decrease self-ambivalence, also with the aim of 
indirectly reducing negative mood.
Future Research
The findings of the current study need to be replicated in a clinical population, such as 
participants who meet the diagnostic criteria for OCD as well as other disorders that 
manifest intrusive cognitions (e.g. PTSD). This is because although the current study 
used research evidence that suggests that the constructs of self ambivalence, self­
discrepancy, obsessions, and dysphoria are dimensional, and thus can be researched on a 
non-clinical sample, there is still a debate regarding whether data from analogue samples
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can be extrapolated to clinical contexts. This is because non-clinical samples might 
produce a restricted range on obsessional measures. Therefore, replication of the current 
study would enable the hypotheses to be tested in clinical samples so as to see if 
conflicting self-representations has greater predictive power.
As aforementioned, contrary to the literature that suggests that useful distinctions can be 
made between autogenous and reactive obsessions, the current research suggest that this 
may not be useful concept as no significant differences were found between these two 
subtypes and their associations with both self-ambivalence and self-discrepancy. 
Building on these findings, it is important for future research to establish whether there 
is any association with self-ambivalence and ego-dystonicity regardless of thought type. 
To support this, more focus could be placed on developing differing ways of 
operationalizing self-concept discrepancies. Additionally, future research could also be 
extended to more conceptual work on different obsessional subtypes.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: One line advert
Opportunity to take part in internet-based questionnaire, with the chance of winning up 
to £40 (clicking on the link will take you to the information webpage of this study, but 
will not commit you to participating). [LINK]
Appendix 2: Full advert 
Research study exploring how the ways that we see ourselves may affect 
our experience of unpleasant or unwanted thoughts
I am conducting a study to explore how the ways that we see ourselves may affect our 
experience of unpleasant and unwanted thoughts. Participation involves completing an 
online survey and will take approximately 30 minutes.
Completion of the questionnaire entitles you to be entered into a prize draw if you so 
wish.
First prize is £40, second prize is £30, third prize is £20, and fourth prize is £10.
To find out more details about this study before choosing to particpate, please click on 
the following link. Clicking on the link will take you to the information webpage of this 
study, but will not commit you to participating. [LINK]
You can also find out further information by contacting the researcher (Jonathan 
Pointer) by email: i.pointer@surrev.ac.uk
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Appendix 3: P articipant Information W ebpage
' UNIVERSITY OF
Research study exploring how the ways that we see ourselves 
may affect our experience of unpleasant or unwanted 
thoughts
This study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Ethics Committee 
of the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at the University of Surrey -  ref 
number 601 -PS Y -11
You need to be aged 18 or above to participate in this 
study
Researcher: Jonathan Pointer, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of 
Surrey.
The nature of the study: The research study is part of the Clinical Psychology 
Doctorate at Surrey University.
Purpose of the research: Previous research has highlighted that it is usual for 
people to experience thoughts that are both unpleasant and unwanted. This study 
is looking to see if how we sees ourselves makes any difference to what type of 
unpleasant or unwanted thoughts we might have.
Setting: You will be invited to complete an internet-based survey in a setting of 
your choosing.
Procedure: If you decide to participate you will be asked to complete a internet- 
based survey that will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. For the study 
you will be asked a series of questions about a variety of topics, such as the types 
of unpleasant thoughts you may sometimes have, the sorts of personal qualities 
you think you have, and whether you sometimes feel low or anxious.
Risks of procedures: This study is aimed at the general public and does not 
involve anything that could cause sustained psychological or physical damage.
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However, in the unlikely event that you do experience emotional discomfort or 
distress from completing the questionnaire, a list of organization’s contact 
numbers will be provided for you at the end of the questionnaire (debriefing 
webpage) from which you can seek support.
Confidentiality and anonymity: All data received will be held and processed in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act, 1998, thus ensuring the protection of 
your identity from being revealed throughout the process of the study. Your 
results will remain anonymous. Any identifying material will be disguised or 
omitted from the final report.
Withdrawing from the study: There is no obligation to take part in this 
research. If you do start to complete the study, you can withdraw during study 
completion by closing your web browser.
Prize Draw: Completion of the questionnaire entitles you to be entered into a 
prize draw if you so wish. First prize is £40, second prize is £30, third prize is 
£20 , and fourth prize is £ 10.
Contact information: For further information on this study or to discuss the 
personal effect of having completed it, you are welcome to contact the lead 
researcher, Jonathan Pointer at i.pointer@surrev.ac.uk
Complaints: If you have any concerns or wish to make a complaint about any 
aspect of this study, please contact Dr Laura Simonds (Research Supervisor) by 
email: 1. simonds @ surrey, ac .uk
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Appendix 4: Dem ographic Questionnaire
1. How did you hear about this study? (Please respond by clicking
on one of the boxes)
Advert on website EH
Through word of mouth EH
2. From which country are you accessing this internet-based
questionnaire? (Please type your response in the box below).
3. What is your sex? (Please respond by clicking on one of the
boxes)
Male EH Female EH
4. What is your age? (Please type your response in the box below).
5. What is your highest educational qualification? (Please respond
by clicking on one of the boxes)
None Q  Diploma (HND, SRN, etc) EH
CSE/O-Level/GCSE Q  Degree (BSc, BA, etc) Q
AS-Level/A-Level EH Postgraduate diplom a/degree EH
6. What is your current employment status? (Please respond by
clicking on one of the boxes)
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Employed full-time
Employed part-time
□
□
Retired
Unemployed
□
□
Student 
7.
clicking on one of the boxes)
D  Other □
What is your current relationship status? (Please respond by
Single □
Civil Partnership/Married Q
Divorced/Separated
Widowed
□
□
Co-habiting □
How would you describe your ethnic origin? (Please respond by 
clicking on one of the boxes)
a) White
British
Irish
□
□
Any other White Background D
b) Mixed
White and Black Caribbean Q
White and Black African
White and Asian
□
□
Any other Mixed background □
c) Asian or Asian British d) Black or Black British
Indian □ Caribbean
Page 211 of 233 
□
Pakistani Q  African Q
Bangladeshi Q  Any other Black background □
Any other Asian background D
e) Chinese or Other ethnic group 
Chinese Q
Any other background □
NB: As referred to  on the consent webpage, please enter your email address in the box 
below ONLY if you wish to  be entered into the prize draw. Your email address will ONLY be 
used for the sole purpose of contacting you should you win a prize.
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Appendix 5: The Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory, P art 1 
(ROH; Purdon & Clark, 1993; Purdon & Clark, 1994)
INSTRUCTIONS
This questionnaire deals with a variety o f upsetting, unpleasant thoughts many people report 
having pop into their minds from time to time. Many o f these thoughts have an aggressive or 
sexual theme. They tend to intrude into our minds against our w ill and interrupt what we are 
doing or what we are already thinking about. These intrusive thoughts appear "out o f the blue" 
and are definitely uncharacteristic o f our usual habits and beliefs. Thus we experience them as 
being unacceptable. They occur in these three forms: images, like a picture in our heads, urges 
to do or say something, or just thoughts about something. W e are very interested in whether or 
not you have experienced intrusive thoughts.
Listed below are thoughts, most o f which were reported by a group o f undergraduate students in 
a previous study. Beside each item is a scale which ranges between 'O' (never) and '6' (always). 
Rate how often you have each o f the thoughts listed (regardless o f whether it occurs as an image, 
urge or thought) by circling the number on the scale that best represents its frequency. When 
you have finished, continue on to Part 2 o f the ROH, which will ask you some questions about 
your most upsetting intrusive thought.
0 = NEVER (I have never had this thought)
1 = RARELY (I have had this thought only once or tw ice ever)
2 = OCCASIONALLY (I have this thought a few  tim es a year)
3 = SOMETIMES (I have this thought once or twice a m onth)
4 = OFTEN (I have this thought once or twice a week)
5 = VERY OFTEN (I have this thought daily)
6 = ALW AYS (I have this thought frequently during the day)
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0 'NEVER' 1 'RARELY' 2 'OCCASIONALLY' 3 'SOMETIMES' 4 'OFTEN' 5 VERY
OFTEN' 6 ALWAYS'
While driving, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
1. Driving into a storefront window 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Running the car off the road 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Hitting pedestrians or animals 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Swerving into oncoming traffic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Purposefully smashing into poles or trees 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I see or use a sharp object (knife, razor, scissors, etc.), I have had unacceptable intrusive 
thoughts of:
6. Slitting my wrist or throat 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. Cutting off my finger, toe or hand 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I am in a high place (like a cliff, bridge, window, high building, etc.), I have had unacceptable 
intrusive thoughts of:
8. Jumping off of a high place 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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OFTEN' 6 ALWAYS'
9. Pushing a stranger off of a high place 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. Pushing a close friend or family member off of a high place 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I am near traffic or railway/subway tracks, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
11. Jumping in front of a train, subway, or car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
12. Pushing a stranger in front of a train subway or car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
13. Pushing a close friend or family member in front of a train, subway or car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I am around others and I am not provoked, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
14. Kicking, pushing or otherwise hurting complete strangers 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
15. Saying something rude to, or insulting a stranger 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. Bumping into people in the hallway or tripping them on the stairs 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
17. Insulting someone in authority, such as a police officer,minister or priest 0 1 2 3 4 5
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0 'NEVER* 1 'RARELY' 2 'OCCASIONALLY' 3 'SOMETIMES' 4 OFTEN' 5 VERY
OFTEN' 6 ALWAYS'
Even though I am not angry at close friends or family members, and am otherwise unprovoked by 
them, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
18. Saying something rude or insulting to one of them 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
19. Hitting or punching one of them 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
20. Choking one of them 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
21. Stabbing one of them with a knife or other sharp object 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Even though I know it's probably not true, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts that:
22. I left the heat, stove or lights on in the house/apartment which may cause a fire 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
23. I left the door of the house apartment unlocked and there is an intruder inside 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
24. I left the water taps running in the house/apartment which may cause a flood 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I am in a public gathering (class, meeting, church) and am not provoked, I have had 
unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
25. Blurting out obscenities at the person talking 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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26. Accidently belching or "breaking wind" loudly 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
27. Throwing something at the speaker 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
28. Suddenly walking out of the meeting thereby causing a scene 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Even though I am not angry or otherwise provoked, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
29. Scratching the paint of cars I pass with my keys or another sharp object 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
30. Picking something up and throwing it through a window 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
31. Deliberately breaking or wrecking something (dishes, ornaments, pool table that belongs to me,
my friends or my family 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
32. Shoplifting or stealing something even though I don't really want it 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
33. Grabbing the money out of a cashier's till when purchasing an item 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
34. Holding up the bank teller while doing routine banking 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Out of the blue and for no particular reason, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
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35. Having sex with a person who I would never want to have sex with 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
36. Having sex with a person who has authority over me (minister, boss) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
37. That the fly of my pants is unzipped or that my blouse is unbuttoned 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
38. Throwing my arms around and kissing an authority figure 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
39. Lifting my skirt or dropping my pants, thereby indecently exposing myself 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
40. Engaging in sexual activity that goes against my sexual preference (e.g., homosexual, heterosexual)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Suddenly and for no particular reason I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
41. Authority figures (minister, boss) being naked 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
42. People I come in contact with being naked 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
43. Having sex in a public place 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
44. Engaging in a sexual act that I would find completely disgusting 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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When I am in a public place, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts that:
45. I am going to catch a sexually transmitted disease (STD) from touching
a toilet seat or tap 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
46. I will become dirty, or contaminated, by touching public door-knobs 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
47. I will become dirty, or contaminated, by putting a public telephone to my ear 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
48. I will contract a fatal disease from touching things strangers have touched 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
49. I will transmit a fatal disease by using public facilities 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Even though the house/apartment already looks tidy, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts 
that:
50. I must check to ensure that absolutely everything is put away 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
51. I must check to ensure that all specks of dust have been picked up off of the floor 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
52. I must check to see if there is dirt in unseen places 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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A ppendix 6: Self-Am bivalence M easure (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007 )
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. Indicate 
your answer by circling the appropriate number on the scale beside each 
statement.
Not at all Agree a little Agree moderately 
0 1 2
Agree a lot 
3
Agree totally 
4
Not at 
all
Agree a 
little
Agree
Modérât
ely
Agree a 
lot
Agree
totally
1 .1 feel tom between different parts of my 
personality
0 1 2 3 4
2 .1 tend to move from one extreme to the other 
in how I think about myself
3 .1 question the extent to which others want to 
be close to me
0 1 2 3 4
4. I have mixed feelings about my self-worth
5 .1 feel that I am full of contradictions 0 1 2 3 4
6. I think about my worth as a person g g
7 .1 am constantly aware of how others perceive 
me
0 1 2 3 4
8 .1 doubt whether others really like me ######
9 .1 fear I am capable of doing something 
terrible
0 1 2 3 4
10.1 constantly worry about whether I will 
make anything of my life
il . Î am secure in my sense of self-worth 
(reversed)
0 i 2 3 4
12. I think about how I can improve myself I N I #
13. When I am with others, I think about 
whether I look my best
0 i 2 3 4
14.1 am mindful about how I come across to 0 4
15.1 am constantly worried about whether I am 
a good or bad person
0 i 2 3 4
16. I question whether 1 am a moral person 2 4
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17.1 tend to think of myself in terms of 0 1
categories such as “good” or “bad”
18. 1 question whether 1 am morally a good or 0 1
19.1 am constantly concerned about whether I 0 Î
am a “decent” human being
20. If I inadvertently allow harm to come to 0 1
others, this proves 1 am untrustworthy
21. Essentially people like you or they don’t; 0 1
there is no middle ground
2 3 4
2 3 4
 2 3 4
Revised 2007. SA = 1-12,14; MA = 15-20.
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Appendix 7: Selves Questionnaire (Carver et al., 1999)
In this study you are going to be asked to give information about several aspects 
of your SELF. You are going to be asked to think about some fairly subtle issues 
and to make some difficult distinctions. It is important that you take your time, 
reflect on yourself, and answer the questions carefully, honestly and as accurately 
as possible.
Please take your time. Thinking about yourself and making these distinctions can 
be a tiring process. We know that this is going to wear you out a little. If you 
start to get 'burned out,' or begin to lose your concentration, take a little break 
from it to relax. Return to the questionnaire when you've regained your ability 
to focus.
Work your way through the booklet, completing the pages in order. If you find 
that the same traits come to your mind as you work on different pages, that is 
OK. The traits you list can be the same from one page to another, or they can 
differ. Whatever is correct for you is what you should write down.
Please read all the instructions you are given very carefully.
Please note:
A trait can be understood as a psychological or behavioural aspects of a 
person.
Eg. Imaginative, cautious, immoral, extroverted.
Turn now to the next page, read the instructions printed at the top of it, and 
provide the information requested. ACTUAL SELF
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ACTUAL SELF
Below, please list some traits which make up your 'Actual Self Your Actual 
Self is the kind of person you think are right now. It’s defined by the personality 
traits you think you actually do have as part of your self.
Make sure these are traits you believe YOU actually have, not what others think 
of you.
Please list seven traits that describe your Actual Self. Print these qualities, one 
per line, on the seven lines below.
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
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OUGHT SELF
Below, please list some traits which make up your 'Ought Self Your Ought Self 
is the kind of person you believe you have the duty or obligation to be. It’s 
defined by the personality traits you think you ought to possess, or feel obliged 
to possess. It’s not necessary that you actually have these traits now, only that 
you believe you ought to have them.
Make sure these are YOUR ought self traits, not traits that other people think 
you ought.
Please list seven traits that describe your own Ought Self. Print these qualities, one 
per line, on the seven lines below.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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IDEAL SELF
Below, please list some traits which make up your 'Ideal Self. Your Ideal Self is 
the kind of person you'd really like to be. It’s defined by the personality traits 
you ideally would like to have. It’s not necessary that you actually have these 
traits now, only that you want to have them.
Make sure these are YOUR ideal self traits, not what other people would like 
you to be.
Please list seven traits that describe your Ideal Self. Print these qualities, one per 
line, on the seven lines below.
1
2
3
4
5
6................................................................
/
7
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FEARED SELF
Below, please list some traits which make up your ‘Feared Self.’ Your Feared Self is 
the kind of person you fear being. It’s defined by the personality traits you might 
become in the future, but that you’d rather NOT become. It’s not necessary that you 
have these traits, only that you want to avoid having them.
Make sure these are YOUR feared self traits, not what others fear for you.
Please list seven traits that describe your Feared Self. Print these qualities, one per 
line, on the seven lines below.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Now go back and locate page 3, the page headed OUGHT SELF. Copy the traits
you wrote down on page 3 into the seven spaces below.
After writing all seven of your Ought Self traits into the spaces below, rate how 
similar you are NOW To each trait, according to a scale that ranges from 'I am 
just like this trait' (1) to I am the opposite of this trait' (7) . CIRCLE the 
number on the scale to the right of each space below that best describes where 
you think you are regarding the trait you wrote in that space.
I am 
just like 
this trait
I am
opposite of 
this trait
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Now go back and locate page 4, the page headed IDEAL SELF. Copy the traits
you wrote down on page 4 into the seven spaces below.
After writing all seven of your Ideal Self traits into the spaces below, rate how 
similar you are NOW to each trait, according to a scale that ranges from 'I am 
just like this trait' ( l ) t o ' I  am the opposite of this trait’ (7). CIRCLE the number 
on the scale to the right of each space that best describes where you think you 
are regarding the trait you wrote in that space.
I am I am
just like opposite o f
this trait this trait
 1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 2  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 3  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 4  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 5  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 6  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Now go back and locate page 5, the page headed FEARED SELF. Copy the traits
you wrote down on page 5 into the seven spaces below.
After writing all seven of your Feared Self traits into the spaces below, rate how 
similar you are NOW to each trait, according to a scale that ranges from ‘I am 
just like this trait (1) to ‘I am the opposite of this trait’ (7). CIRCLE the number 
on the scale to the right of each space that best describes where you think you are 
regarding the trait you wrote in that space.
I am I am
just like opposite o f
this trait this trait
 1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 2________________________________  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 3________________________________  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 4________________________________  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 5________________________________  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 6________________________________  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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A ppendix 8:Depression, A nxiety and  S tress scale (DASS; Lovibond  
& Lovibond, 1995)
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how 
much the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1 I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0 1 2 3
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0 1 2 3
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 0 1 2 3
5 I just couldn't seem to get going 0 1 2 3
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3
7 I had a feeling of shakiness (e.g., legs going to give way) 0 1 2 3
8 I found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3
9 I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most 
relieved when they ended 0 1 2 3
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3
11 I found myself getting upset rather easily 0 1 2 3
12 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3
13 I felt sad and depressed 0 1 2 3
14 I found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way 
(e.g., lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting) 0 1 2 3
15 I had a feeling of faintness 0 1 2 3
16 I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 0 1 2 3
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0 1 2 3
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0 1 2 3
19 I perspired noticeably (eg, hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion 0 1 2 3
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3
21 I felt that life wasn't worthwhile 0 1 2 3
22 I found it hard to wind down 0 1 2 3
23 I had difficulty in swallowing 0 1 2 3
24 I couldn’t seem to get any enjoyment out of things I did 0 1 2 3
25 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (e.g. sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 0 1 2 3
26 I felt down-hearted and blue 0 1 2 3
27 I found that I was very irritable 0 1 2 3
28 I felt I was close to panic 0 1 2 3
29 I found it hard to calm down after something upset me 0 1 2 3
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30 I feared that I would be “thrown” by some trivial
but unfamiliar task 0 1 2
31 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0 1 2
32 I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing 0 1 2
33 I was in a state of nervous tension 0 1 2
34 I felt I was pretty worthless 0 1 2
35 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with
what I was doing 0 1 2
36 I was terrified 0 1 2
37 I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 0 1 2
38 I felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2
39 I found myself getting agitated 0 1 2
40 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make
a fool of myself 0 1 2
41 I experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands) 0 1 2
42 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0 1 2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
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A ppendix 9: Consent W ebpage  
Consent
• I have read and understood the information webpage for this internet-
based survey, and therefore know o f the nature and purpose o f this 
study, and what my involvement in it will be. I also understand that 
although it is unlikely that I w ill have a sustained experience o f  
emotional distress from participating in this study, there is a list of 
organisations that will be listed in the debriefing webpage o f this 
survey from which I can access support.
• I understand that my responses w ill remain anonymous and any
identifying material w ill not be included in the final report or any 
publication arising from this study.
• I understand that there is no obligation to take part in this study. If I do
start to complete the study, I can withdraw during study completion 
by closing my web browser.
• I understand that I will be entered into a prize draw if  I wish by
entering my email address on the background information webpage o f  
the questionnaire. I understand that first prize is £40, second prize is 
£30, third prize is £20, and fourth prize is £10.
• I confirm that I have read and understood the above and that by
clicking ‘Y es’ I am freely consenting to participate in this study.
• I understand by clicking ‘N o’ I am declining to participate in this study.
Do you agree to go on?
E Yes
C  No
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A ppendix 10: Evidence o f  favou rab le  eth ical opinion
fro m  th e  U niversity  o f  Surrey's Faculty o f  A r ts  an d  Human  
Sciences (FAHS) E thics C om m ittee
U N IV E R S IT Y  O F; S SURREY
Chair: Faculty o f Arts an d  Hum an S c ien c es  E thics Art$ arKl Muman Stiences
C om m ittee racuity ottice
University o f S urrey  a d  Building
Guildford. Surrey GU2 7XH UK
Jonathan Pointer 
PsychD Clinical Trainee 
Department o f  Psychology 
University o f  Surrey
19* April 2011 
D ear Jonathan
R eference: 601-P S Y -ll (w ith condition)
T itle  o f  P ro jec t: An investigation o f  the re la tionship  betw een self-am bivalence and  
autogenous/reactive obsessions
Thank you for your submission o f  the above proposal.
I  am pleased to advise that this proposal has received a favourable ethical opinion from the facu lty  o f  
A rts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee provided that the following condition is adhered to:
♦ Ydii seek to  recruit s ta ff and students from the Faculty o f  Arts and Human Sciences only. (If  
you wish to  recruit from other Faculties, you will need to  seek ethical review ifom the 
University Ethics Committee).
It has also been suggested that the language used on the information sheet may render the research ‘o f  
disproportionate interest to people who suffer bouts o f  depression or who have depressive tendencies' 
and less accessible than the language used in the debriefing shee t W e would therefore invite you to  
consider w hether the language used in the information sheet needs to  be adjusted to  take account o f 
these points. However this is offered as an invitation, rather than as a  condition o f  our favourable 
ethical opinion.
I f  there are any significant changes to your proposal w hich require further scrutiny, please contact the 
Faculty Ethics Committee before proceeding with your Project.
Yours sincerely
D r Adrian Coyle 
Chair
120
YEARS A  history of shaping the future since 1891
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Appendix 11: Further evidence o f  favou rab le  eth ical opinion from  
the FAHS 
(Copy of email from FAHS Faculty Amin)
RE: Favourable ethical opinion for your proposal 601-PSY-l 1 (with condition) 
EARL J E Mrs (FAHS Facility Amin)
Sent: 20 April 2011 10:13
To: Pointer ID Mr (PG/R - Psychology)
Ce: Simonds LM Dr (Psychology)
Dear Jonathan
Many thanks for your letter confirming adherence to the condition under which your proposal 
received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee, as stipulated in the letter from Dr Adrian Coyle dated the 19th April 2011 which 
will be the evidence required for your file as requested. If there are any other significant 
changes to your study please inform the Ethics Committee.
You will now be able to proceed with your project and I wish you every success with your 
research.
Many thanks
Kind regards
Julie Earl
Secretary and Administrator FAHS Ethics Committee
Administrative Assistant
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences
University of Surrey
Tel: 01483 689175
Room 36 AD 04
M ondays,Tuesdays, Thursdays & Fridays
